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Abstract
Today's Internet interdomain routing protocol, the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP), is increasingly complicated and fragile due to policy
misconfigurations by individual autonomous systems (ASes). To create
provably correct networks, the past twenty years have witnessed, among
many other efforts, advances in formal network modeling, system
verification and testing, and point solutions for network management
by formal reasoning. On the conceptual side, the formal models
usually abstract away low-level details, specifying what are the
correct functionalities but not how to achieve them. On the practical
side, system verification of existing networked systems is generally
hard, and system testing or simulation provide limited formal
guarantees. This is known as a long standing challenge in network
practice --- formal reasoning is decoupled from actual implementation.
This thesis seeks to bridge formal reasoning and actual network
implementation in the setting of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), by
developing the Formally Verifiable Routing (FVR) toolkit that
combines formal methods and programming language techniques. Starting
from the formal model, FVR automates verification of routing
models and the synthesis of faithful implementations that
carries the correctness property. Conversely, starting from large
real-world BGP systems with arbitrary policy configurations,
automates the analysis of Internet routing configurations,
and also includes a novel network reduction technique that
scales up existing techniques for automated analysis. By
developing the above formal theories and tools, this thesis aims to
help network operators to create and manage BGP systems with
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correctness guarantee.
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ABSTRACT
AUTOMATED FORMAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNET ROUTING
CONFIGURATIONS
Anduo Wang
Boon Thau Loo
Andre Scedrov
Today’s Internet interdomain routing protocol, the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP), is increasingly complicated and fragile due to policy misconfigurations by
individual autonomous systems (ASes). To create provably correct networks, the
past twenty years have witnessed, among many other efforts, advances in formal
network modeling, system verification and testing, and point solutions for net-
work management by formal reasoning. On the conceptual side, the formal mod-
els usually abstract away low-level details, specifying what are the correct func-
tionalities but not how to achieve them. On the practical side, system verification
of existing networked systems is generally hard, and system testing or simulation
provide limited formal guarantees. This is known as a long standing challenge in
network practice — formal reasoning is decoupled from actual implementation.
This thesis seeks to bridge formal reasoning and actual network implemen-
tation in the setting of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), by developing the
Formally Verifiable Routing (FVR) toolkit that combines formal methods and pro-
gramming language techniques. Starting from the formal model, FVR automates
verification of routing models and the synthesis of faithful implementations that
carries the correctness property. Conversely, starting from large real-world BGP
systems with arbitrary policy configurations, FVR automates the analysis of In-
ternet routing configurations, and also includes a novel network reduction tech-
nique that scales up existing techniques for automated analysis. By developing
the above formal theories and tools, this thesis aims to help network operators to
create and manage BGP systems with correctness guarantee.
viii
Contents
Contents x
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Research Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Background: BGP Anomalies and Formal Models 8
2.1 Background on BGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 BGP Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Stable Path Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.2 Routing Algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Taxonomy of BGP Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.1 eBGP Anomaly: Policy Conflicts Across ASes . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.2 iBGP Anomaly: Inconsistent Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.3 IGP-iBGP Anomaly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Overview 26
4 Verifying Formal Models 29
4.1 Unified Policy Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.1 Extending Routing Algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
ix
4.1.2 Converting Policy Guidelines to Algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1.3 Converting SPP Instances to Algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 Automated Safety Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.2.1 Strict Monotonicity Implies Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.2.2 Converting Policies to Yices Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2.3 Yices Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.1 Pinpoint iBGP Configuration Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.2 eBGP Gadget Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5 Synthesizing Faithful Implementations 46
5.1 Background: Declarative Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.2 Generating Faithful NDlog Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.3 Correctness of NDlog implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.4.1 Convergence Time vs. Network Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4.2 Pinpoint iBGP Configuration Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.4.3 eBGP Gadget Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.4.4 Alternative Routing Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6 Verifying Actual Routing Systems 66
6.1 Detect Anomalies in Policy Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.1.1 A Maude Library for BGP Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.1.2 Specifying BGP Instance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.1.3 Detecting Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6.2 Verifying Declarative Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.2.1 Path-vector Protocol in Declarative Network . . . . . . . . . . 92
x
6.2.2 Verifying Path-Vector Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2.3 Soft-state, Events and Network Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.2.4 Alternative Routing Mechanisms: Distance-Vector . . . . . . . 100
6.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7 Scalability Techniques for Analysis 108
7.1 Network Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.1.1 Formal Model for Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.1.2 Network Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.2 Properties of Network Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.2.1 Duality: Relating Duplicate and Complementary Reduction . 119
7.2.2 Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.2.3 Local Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.2.4 Confluence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.3.1 Network Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.3.2 Reduction Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.3.3 Observations and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
8 Conclusion 136
8.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8.2 Future Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8.2.1 Software-Defined Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8.2.2 Formal Synthesis for Software-Defined Networks . . . . . . . 138
A Appendix 141
A.1 Inconsistent Policy Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
xi
A.2 Properties of Network Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A.2.1 Duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A.2.2 Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Bibliography 147
xii
List of Tables
2.1 Key attributes in BGP route selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Operations on Path Attribute in BGP Route Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Operations on Path Attribute When sender originates route . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1 Spectrum of policy configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.1 Algebra and NDlog Mapping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.1 Overview and Interpretation of Maude Library . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.2 Summary of BGP analysis in Maude. In the first row, each entry shows the simulation
time in milliseconds. In the second row, for each entry, the first value denotes exhaus-
tive search time in milliseconds, the second denotes number of states explored, and the
third on whether our tool determines the instances to be safe (“Yes”) or unsafe (“No”). 106
7.1 Summary of results across various input topologies. Averages across multiple
runs are presented. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
xiii
List of Figures
2.1 Overview of BGP system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Policy-based routing process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 The path digraph for Disagree has a cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Export policy for Gao-Rexford guideline. The bold line indicates a route to des-
tination d, with an associated route signature. Each unidirectional link between
nodes u and v has a link label. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Disagree Gadget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 Cyclic Route Preference Causes Oscillation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 IGP-BGP Inconsistency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 Policy-based routing process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1 FVR Architecture: static analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2 iBGP configuration instance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.1 FVR Architecture: Implementation-based Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2 Convergence time (seconds) for BGP against longest customer-provider chain. 58
5.3 Average per-node bandwidth utilization (MBps) for iBGP with gadget. . . . . 58
5.4 Average per-node bandwidth utilization (MBps) for HLP. . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.1 FVR Architecture: Dynamic Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.2 Network Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.1 FVR Architecture: Network Reduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
xiv
7.2 The network configuration of Disagee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.3 The path digraph for Disagee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.4 The EPD notation for the Disagree configuration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.5 Nodes u, v are merged by duplicate reduction if they agree on how to route to
destination d through their neighbors x, y, . . . , z: For any path pi, qj , u, v agree
on their preference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.6 Nodes u, v are merged by complementary reduction if their neighbors x, y, . . . , z
agree on how to route to destination d through them: After merging, the route
preference for any path pi, qj are set according to the consensus among x, y, . . . , z.116
7.7 Application of complementary and duplicate reduction to border and internal
routers, respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.8 One-step reduction of complementary nodes 3, 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.9 Two-steps reduction: when internal nodes have consensus on how to rank
paths from border gateway nodes, all the border gateway nodes can be reduced
into one. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.10 If u and v are neither duplicate nor complementary, merging them can create a
cycle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.11 The EPD in (a) either rewrites to (b) or (c) depending on the order of two com-
plementary reductions (u, v or v, w) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.12 Duplicate/complementary reductions do not commute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.13 Route reflector example: clients are border routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.14 Route reflector with POP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
7.15 EPD Generation time as number of nodes increases for the Cisco-Synthetic
topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.16 Reduction time as number of nodes increases for the Cisco-Synthetic topologies 131
7.17 Reduction rate as number of nodes increases for the Cisco-Synthetic topologies. 132
xv
7.18 In a Cisco-Synthetic network, duplicate reduction (left) merges core (triangles),
internal routers (ovals) and retains the border gateway nodes (highlighted squares)
post-reduction; Complementary reduction (right) merges core, border gateway
routers and retains internal nodes (highlighted ovals). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
A.1 A policy configuration, known to suffer oscillation due to inconsistent config-
uration (cyclic preference arcs) within a single node. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.2 Relate duplicate and complementary reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A.3 Lemma 2: Case (a.2) and (b) None of Nfrom are on a cycle; Case (c.1) Some of
Nfrom and u, v are in the cycle, and at least one of those in Nfrom is in Γ−(u) and
Γ−(v); Case(c.2) Same as (c.1) except that no nodes in Nfrom are both in Γ−(u)
and Γ−(v). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
A.4 Proof sketch of Lemma 3: Case 1 (left) and Case 2.1 (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.5 Proof sketch of Lemma 3: Case 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.6 Proof sketch of Lemma 4, Case 1 (left), and Case 2 (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Today’s Internet is a network of networks, the constituting networks under a single
administrative domain are called domains. To exchange reachability information
across and within the domains, the Internet runs a single inter-domain routing
protocol, called the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP allows each domain to
independently configure its BGP policy to influence routing for economical rea-
sons. As a result, the system-wide behavior of the Internet is determined by the
implementation of the BGP protocol, as well as how each network domain con-
figures its BGP routing policies. Given a BGP network (or BGP system), we refer
to its network topology, routing mechanisms (e.g. how the BGP nodes exchange
reachability information), and BGP routing policies as configurations (we use BGP
configurations, policy configurations, Internet routing configurations interchange-
ably); and broadly refer to any of the non-converging BGP behaviors as routing
anomalies (or BGP anomalies, anomalies).
Several studies such as [36, 42, 44] have shown that BGP mis-configurations
result in routing anomalies including route oscillation, delayed convergence, or in
severe cases, prolonged periods of network disruptions. These routing anomalies
incur serious performance disruptions and router overhead. In response, the net-
1
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working community has proposed several BGP extensions [59, 72, 74], alternative
Internet architectures [69], and policy configuration guidelines (or “safety guide-
lines”) that help the network operator to achieve global convergence if universally
adopted [18, 19]. Despite all these efforts, BGP policy-based routing configurations
have become a main source for routing anomalies ranging from the frquent route
oscillation to the less common but more sever Internet outage. Indeed BGP config-
urations has been recognized Internet’s most complicated and fragile components,
and are the focus of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
To build a more reliable, predictable, and secure network, the last twenty years
have witnessed great efforts in modeling, static reasoning and dynamic anomaly
detection for BGP configurations. These efforts include formal network modeling,
system verification and testing, and point solutions through formal reasoning.
On the conceptual side, abstract formal models of BGP allow researchers to
explore how local policies affect BGP stability [25, 66, 30, 67, 70, 16, 28, 33, 21,
20, 17, 73]. Algebraic models such as routing algebra are used to formalize rout-
ing protocols with convergence guarantees. Combinatorial models such as stable
path problem enable researchers to study the dynamic behavior of BGP and identify
policy guidelines that, if universally adopted by ISPs, could ensure global conver-
gence [19, 18, 23, 14, 22, 64, 13, 63]. However, these formal models usually abstract
away low-level details, specifying only some correct functionalities but not how to
achieve them. The correct-by-construction approach of routing algebra also leaves
out useful semantics, which cannot be expressed algebraically.
Concurrently, on the practical side, several diagnosis tools for anomalies are
developed, ranging from static configuration checker and model checking tools, to
runtime debugging tools of deployed systems. Static checking tools include rcc [50],
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which statically checks “potential” configurations for possible faults. Model check-
ing tools use a collection of algorithmic techniques for checking temporal proper-
ties of system instances based on exhaustive state space exploration. Recent ad-
vances in model checking detect anomalies in network protocol systems by im-
posing constraints on network implementations. Other model-checking tools for
BGP anomalies include [34, 11, 56]. In addition, several practical software tools
and testing platforms have been proposed to facilitate the verification of existing
networked systems, such as runtime verification platform [15, 32] Pip [61]), which
provides mechanisms for checking at runtime that a system does not violate ex-
pected properties. However, system verification of existing networked systems is
generally hard, and system testing or simulation provide limited formal guaran-
tees.
There are also hybrid approaches — point solutions such as BGP configuration
guidelines [18, 19], extensions [59, 72, 74], alternative Internet architectures [69].
However, the development of such guidelines and architectures requires deep un-
derstanding and insights, relying on the reasoning process that is often manual,
tedious, and error prone. Worse, once developed, to make the approach effective,
universal deployment is also required, incurring additional overhead.
This is known as a long standing challenge in network practice — the formal
reasoning process is decoupled from the actual implementation.
1.2 Research Challenges
This thesis aims to address the long standing challenge — the decoupling of formal
reasoning and actual implementation. To achieve this in the setting of BGP routing
configuration, we must address the following challenges.
• Automation. Abstract BGP models enable researchers to explore how local
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policies affect BGP stability [25, 66, 30, 67, 70, 16, 28, 33, 21, 20, 17, 73]. How-
ever the reasoning process is a tedious and manual one, based on large num-
ber of low-level variables. To lower the bar of adoption of these model-based
reasoning tools, and to free network operators to better focus on high-level
network-wide properties, we need tool support that automates the reasoning
process.
• Generating property-preserving implementation. The formal models usu-
ally abstract away low-level details, specifying what are the correct function-
alities but not how to achieve them. To enforce the formal reasoning result
on actual implementation, a solution is to compile a verified formal model
into executable implementation.
• Applicability. Existing correct-by-construction formal models allow us to
verify formal models and generate correctness-preserving implementations.
However, these models do not capture all “well-behaved” policy configura-
tions since they rely on sufficient correctness conditions that rule out some
“correct” yet semantically useful policy configurations. The static verifica-
tion output is also restrictive. To better address actual policy configurations,
we need more general formal models and analysis techniques that provide
more informative analysis output.
• Scalability. Finally, due to the size of the Internet, and the NP-hard nature
of the global convergence property — the general problem of analyzing BGP
systems are hard. State-based analysis (e.g. model checking) will likely suf-
fer an exponential blow-up as network size increases. Therefore, we need
networking-theory that exploits the redundancy in policy configuration to
scale up existing analysis.
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1.3 Contributions
In bridging formal reasoning and the actual implementation for BGP systems, in
this thesis I designed and implemented Formally Verifiable Routing (FVR) toolkit.
Its methods and tools can be broadly classified into two categories.
First, to verify formal models and synthesize faithful implementations, FVR
frees network operators from manual analysis and lower the bar of applying for-
mal tools, and enforces the formal reasoning result in the actual distributed routing-
protocol implementation. Thus FVR addresses the research challenges automation
and generating implementation, and the specific contributions are:
C1. Verifying a routing policy using a SMT solver [80, 81]. I map various pol-
icy configuration models into logical constraints; and formulated verification
of routing convergence property as a constraint solving problem solvable
in existing SMT-solvers — the policy configurations constraints are checked
against convergence conditions drawn from previous work [67].
C2. Verifying a routing policy with a theorem prover [82, 79]. In addition to SMT
solving, I formalize in theorem prover the algebraic routing policy model that
allows construction of compound policy configurations from atomic ones. By
using the theorem prover’s (e.g. PVS) abstract data-types, I develop a suite of
verified atomic component algebras, based on which network operators can
compose compound policy configurations with correctness guarantees.
C3. Convert formal policy model into NDlog programs [81, 80]. NDlog is a dat-
alog like language for specifying declarative networking. I develop logical
formulations for both policy models (routing algebra and SPP formalism)
and NDlog programs, based on which the formal model is mapped into a
logically equivalent NDlog program. I also prove the translation is sound
and implemented it for the BGP protocol.
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Second, FVR automates formal analysis of actual Internet routing systems, in-
cluding the policy configurations and the routing mechanisms. FVR also mitigates
the inherent state explosion problem in exhaustive search based formal analysis
by including a network reduction technique that scales up analysis. Central to net-
work reduction is a rewriting calculus that reduces input network size prior to
analysis. Thus FVR addresses the research challenges of Applicability and Scala-
bility, and the specific contributions are:
C4. Extract the formal model [85]. I design a formal model in Maude that cap-
tures a BGP system’s dynamic behavior given its topology and policy con-
figurations. The dynamic representation is essentially a transition system of
concurrently updating network objects — the routers and routing messages. I
also implement a Maude library that automatically extracts the formal model
for a BGP system.
C5. Dynamic analysis on formal model [85, 84]. I develop a Maude library that
automatically catches conflicting policy configurations in the formal model.
This is achieved by detecting route oscillations in the dynamic routing system
updates by utilizing Maude’s high-performance exhaustive search capability.
C6. Verifying routing protocols in NDlog programs [76, 83]. The core of reason-
ing about NDlog program is to encode the semantics of NDlog— a variant of
datalog — in logical statements recognizable in PVS. To achieve this, I de-
velop a mapping that compiles NDlog program into logically equivalent PVS
recursive definitions, hence lowering the barrier to using theorem provers for
verifying NDlog routing protocols.
C7. Network Reduction [84, 77]. I develop two reduction rules that transform
policy configurations by only requiring neighboring routing information. The
transformation proceeds by repeatedly merging network node pairs and the
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relevant portion of configurations in the rest of the network. I prove that the
rewriting rules are sound with regarding to the network property being ana-
lyzed. I also prove that they are symmetric to each other, and study how the
order of node merging affects the reduction result.
C8. Case studies and evaluation [84, 78]. I develop a prototype of network re-
duction in Maude, evaluated it on a variety of network configurations (e.g.
full mesh, route reflectors, confederations) on network topologies ranging
from the AS-level CAIDA to router-level Rocketfuel dataset [68, 4]. The ex-
periments show that network reduction enables us to analyze networks up
to 500 nodes that are otherwise not tractable, while incurring only a small
overhead.
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Chapter 2
Background: BGP Anomalies and
Formal Models
This chapter, we provide brief background information on today’s Internet and the
BGP routing protocol. We review two formal BGP models that our analysis adopts.
We also present a taxonomy of BGP anomalies, including safety, the standard prop-
erty for BGP convergence across ASes; acyclic preference, the property for ensuring
a consistent configuration within an AS; and IGP-iBGP consistency, the property for
avoiding intra-AS oscillation. This taxonomy of anomalies form the problem space
our methods and tools aim to address.
2.1 Background on BGP
Today’s Internet has grown from a collection of loosely cooperated networks, called
the Autonomous Systems (AS) (or domains), each of which is typically owned and
administered by an independent entity such as an Internet Server Provider (ISP).
To exchange inter-Autonomous System (or inter-domain) network reachability in-
formation, a single routing protocol called the Border Gateway Protocol or BGP [6,
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60, 5, 71] is used. As shown in Figure 2.1, BGP exchanges the routing informa-
tion across ASes using external BGP (eBGP), while distributes those external ones
within each AS using internal BGP (iBGP).
Figure 2.1: Overview of BGP system
Note that unlike the intra-domain routing protocols used solely within an AS,
BGP adds routing policy policy, which is used by AS administrator to overwrite
the shortest-path behavior. While this policy expressiveness contributes to BGP’s
popularity since it enables the ASes to express their own economic purposes, it also
introduces routing anomalies ranging from route oscillations, slow convergence, to
routing inconsistency [24, 26].
Since the internal routers do not communicate directly with routers outside
their own AS, but through the border gateway routers, to maintain a consistent
routing view within an AS, the original BGP protocol requires each AS to form a
full-mesh BGP sessions among border gateway routers and internal routers. This
full-mesh requirement does not scale up well. As an alternative to full-mesh, route
reflectors are proposed. Route reflectors [5] are routers that serve a special role,
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Figure 2.2: Policy-based routing process
they collate and distribute route advertisements on behalf of other internal routers
called their clients.
In both eBGP and iBGP sessions, an individual BGP speaker (i.e. a network
node that supports BGP protocol) exchanges route information (i.e. routing adver-
tisements) with its neighbor using a path-vector protocol. Every BGP route is en-
dowed with attributes that describe it. From the point of view of each BGP speaker,
the policy-based BGP routing process, shown in Figure 2.2, in the following three
steps: (1) Upon receiving a route advertisement, a BGP speaker may choose to
accept or ignore the advertisement based on its import policy. Import policy in-
cludes filters which are used to deny certain routes. If the route is accepted, the
BGP speaker may also tweak the path attributes associated with the route, and
the stores it as a possible routing candidate in its routing table; (2) For each desti-
nation, the BGP speaker selects among all candidate routes one single best route
based on their attribute values according to its local routing policy; (3) After the
route selection process, if a new best route is selected, it may be re-advertised to
the BGP speaker’s neighbors according to its export policy. An example export pol-
icy is a filter which forbids re-advertisement of routes to certain neighbors if the
BGP speaker is unwilling to carry traffic.
The determination of all the three kinds of policies is up to the network oper-
ator: BGP allows considerable flexibility. Conflicting policies, within or between
10
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Stage BGP route selection step
eBGP
1. Highest LOC PREF
2. Lowest AS path length
3. Lowest origin type
iBGP
4. Lowest MED (with same NEXT-HOP AS)
5. Closest exit point (lowest IGP cost)
6. Lowest router ID (break tie)
Table 2.1: Key attributes in BGP route selection
ASes, are the cause of protocol oscillation, as the protocol struggles and fails to
satisfy all policies at once.
In general, administrators implement the policies by configuring the path at-
tributes associated with each route. These path attributes are summarized in Ta-
ble 2.1. We also characterize these by whether they are primarily associated with
eBGP- or iBGP-level routing decisions. In the second step of BGP policy-based
routing, i.e., route selection step, the BGP speaker selects the single best route by
comparing the attributes of its current available routes (for a given destination)
with the new route, and then decides whether the new route is selected and pro-
moted to be the best route. The attributes are listed in the order in which they
are compared during route selection: if the routes are tied at any stage, then BGP
proceeds to consider the next attribute on the list.
The most important attribute in eBGP route selection is local preference (LOC PREF).
This is a value set by each router on routes it receives, according to (arbitrary)
rules established by the network operator. If two routes have the same local pref-
erence, then the next tiebreaking attribute is the AS path length—the number of
ASes through which this route passes—followed by the ‘origin’ code. The next
step is to use the multi-exit discriminator (MED) attribute, the most important at-
tribute in iBGP route selection, which says which individual link is preferred, out
of the many links between this AS and a given neighbor. If that was not enough to
determine a single best route, BGP breaks ties by examining the shortest-path dis-
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Table 2.2: Operations on Path Attribute in BGP Route Selection
Path attribute Receive from (before selection) Send to (after selection)
1 LOCAL PREF
External (NA): Set by local policy External: NA
Internal (LOCAL PREF) : Unchanged Internal: Unchanged
2 AS PATH
External (P): Unchanged External: Append local AS
to P
Internal (P): Unchanged Internal: Unchanged
4 MED
External (MED/NA): Unchanged External: MED (local-set)
/NA
Internal (NA): Unchanged Internal : NA
5 NEXT HOP
External (NEXT HOP): Unchanged External: Set self
Internal (NEXT HOP): Unchanged Internal: Unchanged
tance to the relevant border router. Finally, if all else fails, it uses the value of each
router’s unique identifier. This final step is meant to ensure that all possible routes
can be placed in a total order, with no two routes being equivalent in preference.
Finally, we summarize the operations on path attributes in Table 2.2 and Table
2.3. For example, for attribute LOCAL PREF, import policy is specified in the first
row of Table 2.2 and 2.3. If a router receives a new path from external nodes, then
set LOCAL PREF according to its local policy, otherwise unchanged; When a router
advertises a new path to a neighbor, if it is sent to an external node, then removes
LOCAL PREF and sets its value to NA (because normally, AS would not like to expose
their local policy to neighbor ASes), otherwise unchanged. Finally, when a router
receives a path originated from an internal neighbor or advertises a path that it
originates, always leaves LOCAL PREF unspecified, i.e. sets its value to NA.
2.2 BGP Models
Routing anomalies are caused by routing misconfigurations. To represent the rout-
ing configurations for diagnosis, this thesis utilizes two formal models: stable path
12
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Table 2.3: Operations on Path Attribute When sender originates route
Path attribute Before Send to
1 LOCAL PREF External: NAInternal: NA
2 AS PATH External: Set local ASInternal: Empty path
4 MED External: MED (local-set)Internal : NA
5 NEXT HOP External: Set selfInternal: Set self
problem (SPP) and routing algebra. For each model, we present a sufficient correct-
ness condition that ensures protocol convergence (devoid of anomaly).
2.2.1 Stable Path Problem
Stable Paths Problem (SPP) [24] is a well-known formalism for BGP policy configu-
ration, where the entire configuration instance is modeled in terms of the router-
level topology and each router’s policy-induced route preferences. SPP is a well-
established combinatorial model of BGP configurations that captures the outcomes
of routing policy—which paths are preferred over which other paths, at each router—
while avoiding the need for detailed modeling of the BGP decision process in all
its complexity.
Specifically, SPP models routing policy as an combinatorial structure: an in-
stance of the SPP G is a tuple (V,E, d, P,Λ), where V and E are network nodes
and arcs respectively, d is the specific destination node 1, P is the set of permitted
(usable) paths available for each node to reach d, and Λ is the ranking functions for
each node. For each node v, λv is its ranking function, mapping its routes to nat-
ural numbers (ranks), and P v are its permitted paths, the set of available paths to
reach o. A path assignment is a function pi that maps each network node v ∈ V to a
1Assuming the Internet is symmetric, we can study its routing behavior by studying routing to
a single destination.
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path pi(v) ∈ P v. A path assignment is stable if each node u selects a path pi(u) which
is (1) the highest ranked path among its permitted paths, and (2) is consistent with
the path chosen by the next-hop node. Consistency requires if pi(u) = (uv)P then
for the next-hop node v, we must have pi(v) = P . A solution to the SPP is a stable
path assignment.
For a given SPP instance G as above, and a node i in V , write P i for the subset
of P consisting of paths from i to d. In this thesis, we will use the symbol ‘◦’ for
concatenation of arcs and paths. If (i, j) is an arc in E, and p is a path from j to d,
then their concatenation (i, j) ◦ p is a path from i to d. Similarly, if p is a path from
i to j, and q is a path from k to l, and (j, k) is an arc in E, then the concatenation is
p ◦ (j, k) ◦ q or just p ◦ q.
One major benefit of SPP formalism is that researchers have identified and
proved various sufficient conditions for BGP convergence [67, 24]. In this the-
sis, we adopt the sufficient safety condition based on a structure called the path
digraph [67] . For a SPP instance (V,E, d, P,Λ), its path digraph is defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 1. Let G = (V,E, d, P,Λ) be an SPP instance. The path digraph is a graph
whose nodes are the elements of P , and where there is an arc (p, q) from p to q if either of
these two cases holds:
• If q = r ◦ p for some path r, there is a ‘transmission arc’.
• If p and q are two paths in P i and λ(p) is smaller than λ(q) (i.e. p ranks higher and
is more preferred), there is a ‘preference arc’.
If the digraph is acyclic then the SPP is safe, that is, the SPP instance has a
unique stable solution, which can be found by iteration from any starting state. We
will call an SPP instance cyclic (or acyclic) if its path digraph is cyclic (or acyclic).
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For example, disagree gadget which exhibits divergence behavior, has a cyclic path
digraph, as shown in Figure 2.3
Figure 2.3: The path digraph for Disagree has a cycle
Route preference and Route selection In addition to the above ranking function
Λ, we review two useful alternative notions: route preference relation ≺ and route
selection function σ. Consider two paths p and q.
Conveniently, use p ≺ q to denote that p is preferred over q, i.e. if λ(p) ranks
higher λ(q). Similarly, use σ({p, q}) = p to denote that among two routes {p, q}, p is
the best and selected. Note that, among the three notions, route selection function
σ is most general: it applies to a set of paths; besides, it does not imposes a total
ordering (ranking) among a router’s permitted paths.
2.2.2 Routing Algebra
Routing algebra[67] is an abstract structure that describes how BGP speakers cal-
culate route preferences. An abstract routing algebra is a tuple 〈Σ,,L,⊕,O〉.
• Path signatures Σ: It contains signatures for paths, which describe relevant
attributes of the paths so that routes can be ranked. In particular, there is a
special element φ in Σ, representing the signature for prohibited paths.
• Path preference relation : It is a total order relation over the elements of
Σ and is used by the routing protocol algorithm to select the most desirable
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path. To capture the property that prohibited paths are never selected, for
any signature α that is not φ, α ≺ φ.
• Link attributes L: It is a set of labels describing attributes of links between
immediate neighbors.
• Path concatenation ⊕: It is the concatenation function that takes a label and
a signature and returns a signature. The purpose of ⊕ is for ASes to calculate
the attributes of a new route received from its neighbor based on the link it
comes from and the attributes of the received route.
• Initial path signatures O: It is a subset of Σ called origination that represents
signatures associated with initial routes, which are the paths containing only
one node.
An important properties of a routing algebra is monotonicity, which ensures that
as a path grows longer, it does not become more preferred. Formally:
Monotonicity: ∀l ∈ L,∀s ∈ Σ, s  l ⊕ s
Monotonicity ensures that a path uv ◦ Pv, where uv is a link from u to v, and
Pv is a route from v to the destination, should be less preferred than the path Pv.
In the definitions above, s represents the signature of Pv and l is the label for uv.
Notice that uv◦Pv and Pv are actually routes for different source nodes u and v. In a
real protocol implementation, each AS only has a local view of its routing policies;
which means that neither u nor v need to compare the preference between these
two routes. However, convergence is a global property concerning routing policies
at all nodes; and therefore, the route preference relation  is a total function for all
routes in the entire system. The monotonicity property on the global routing policy
will impact the convergence of the system as a whole.
Complex policies can be represented as compositions of simpler policies [25].
For example, ASes often rank routes based on multiple attributes (e.g., the next-
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hop AS, the path length, and so on) in a series of “tie-breaking” steps. This is
naturally captured by the lexical product operator, where A⊗ B denotes the lexical
product of algebras A = 〈ΣA,A,LA,⊕A〉 and B = 〈ΣB,B,LB,⊕B〉. Each link
label in the resulting algebra is a pair, consisting of the labels for uv in A and B.
Similarly, each signature for a path P is a pair composed of signatures from A and
B. The concatenation function is the pairwise concatenation of the labels and sig-
natures. The preference relation is also pairwise in lexical order: the first compo-
nents are compared using A, if equal then the second components are compared
using B. For instance, the widest shortest hop-count policy is the lexical product
of a policy that prefers higher bandwidths with a policy that prefers shorter paths.
Example: Shortest Hop Count As a first example to show the mappings between
the abstract algebra and a concrete policy, we consider shortest hop count policy.
In this policy, routes with fewer hop counts are preferred.
• Link labels and path signatures. Since each node’s immediate neighbor is
one hop away, each link’s attribute is set to 1: L = {1}, whereas Σ is the
set of natural numbers, which describes the hop count of a path. ∞ is the
signature for prohibited path, i.e. all paths with cost ∞ are excluded from
consideration.
• Preference relations. To select paths of fewest hop count, the less than equal
(≤) relation on natural numbers is used as .
• Concatenation. To compute the hop counts of paths, ⊕ is the plus (+) func-
tion on natural numbers for summing up the cost of a link and an existing
path.
• Initial path signatures The hop count of a path containing one node is 0.
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Example: Gao-Rexford Guideline As a second example, we illustrate the use of
algebra to specify policy guideline. We consider the well-known Gao-Rexford pol-
icy guideline. Gao-Rexford guideline is based on the three types of business rela-
tionships between neighboring ASes: peers, customers, and providers. The policy
guideline captures the constraint that an AS prefers routes through its customers
over routes through peers or providers (called “guideline A” in [19]).2
Links and paths are distinguished based on their attributes, mapping naturally
to label set L, and signature set Σ, respectively. Consequently, the representation
of the policy guideline in algebra is straightforward:
• Link labels and path signatures. Routes are classified based on the business
relationship between neighboring ASes. Routes received from a customer,
provider, or peer are classified with path signatures C, P, and R, respectively.
In addition, the signature φ explicitly denotes all prohibited routes. There-
fore, Σ = {C,P,R, φ}. Likewise, labels c/p/r denote three classes of links to
customers, providers, and peers, and L = {c, p, r}.
• Preference relations. Each AS prefers routes via customers over those via
providers or peers, which is straightforwardly encoded as C ≺ P and C ≺
R. To have a total ordering on the signatures, we must define a preference
relation between provider (P ) and peer (R) routes. Using P = R implies
that an AS can decide which routes are preferred based on other tie-breaking
methods. So, our encoding uses the following three constraints: C ≺ P ,
C ≺ R, and P = R.
• Concatenation. The signature of a new route depends only on the node’s
relationship with its neighbor, as captured by the link label; for example p ⊕
C = P , p ⊕ R = P , and p ⊕ P = P . However, an AS does not export routes
2A router is motivated to obey this guideline because it got paid by the customers.
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learned from one peer or provider to other peers and providers, as illustrated
in Figure 2.4. The figure shows a node u deciding whether to export (to its
neighbor v) a route to destination d. Figure 2.4(a) shows that u is a provider
of v, making uv a provider link and vu a customer link. Node u can export
customer routes (C) to v, but any peer (R) and provider (P ) routes are filtered.
• Initial path signatures The initial signature of a route is determined by the
business relationship between the two end routers: it is set to c/p/r if the
route is from a customer, peer, or provider.
v u
p
c
d
C
Allowed paths
v u
r
r
d
C
v u
c
p
d
C/P/R
(a) exports only customer routes to provider
(b) exports only customer routes to peer
(c) exports all routes to customer
v u
p
c
d
P/R
Prohibited paths
v u
r
r
d
P/R
Figure 2.4: Export policy for Gao-Rexford guideline. The bold line indicates a
route to destination d, with an associated route signature. Each unidirectional link
between nodes u and v has a link label.
Note that in algebra, route filtering is expressed by generating a prohibited path
(φ). For import policies, if v decides not to import a path of signature s from u, we
can encode this import policy as l ⊕ s = φ where l is the label for link vu. Our
example policy involves export filtering. An export filter at node u can be modeled
as an import filter at the receiving node v. The export filters in Figure 2.4(a) can
be represented by c ⊕ P = φ and c ⊕ R = φ, where the customer v filters any
routes that u learned from its own peers or providers. The complete definition of
the concatenation operator is:
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⊕ C R P
c C φ φ
r R φ φ
p P P P
Similar algebraic encodings have been presented in prior work [66], but our
illustration here serves to highlight a shortcoming of existing algebraic represen-
tations. To address this limitation, we propose extension to the original algebraic,
and we will revisit this example in Chapter 4.1.2.
Finally, the lexical product [25] can then be used to compose multiple policies,
for instance, combining the Gao-Rexford guideline with a policy that excludes par-
ticular paths by AS.
2.3 Taxonomy of BGP Anomalies
In this thesis, we identify three families of routing oscillation anomalies and the
routing attributes involved in oscillation.
• In eBGP anomalies, routing policy conflicts occur at an inter-AS level. The
typical causing attribute is LOC PREF, because it is set arbitrarily at each AS,
independently of any other.
• iBGP anomalies are limited to a single AS, and associated with MED. Due to
a quirk in the decision procedure, it is possible for there to be three routes
p, q, and r such that p is preferred to q, q to r, and r to p. The router will be
unable to settle on a single choice, if there is feedback where its actions cause
the visibility of those three routes to change.
• iBGP-IGP anomalies result from inconsistency between the semantics of
route reflectors, and particular IGP distance values.
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2.3.1 eBGP Anomaly: Policy Conflicts Across ASes
Policy conflicts across ASes are caused by the tension between (1) autonomy re-
quirement that each router sets its policy independent of its neighbor; (2) the rout-
ing tree that the BGP system converges to, imposes dependency between the rout-
ing choice (policy) of neighboring routers. Given a group of connected ASes and
the corresponding routing policies, for destination d, a routing tree is a spanning
tree rooted at d such that each router’s selected route is given by the path from the
root to the router node.
When the routers are from different ASes, their routing policies can be set in
an arbitrary way such that no unique policy compliant routing tree can be formed.
We call this scenario policy conflicts across ASes.
n0
n1 n2 [n2 n1 n0]
[n2 n0]
[n1 n2 n0]
[n1 n0]
Figure 2.5: Disagree Gadget
For example, consider an eBGP system called the Disagree “gadget”, whose
network topology is shown in Figure 2.5. The available routes for each node are
listed besides the corresponding node. The order in which the paths are listed il-
lustrates each node’s routing policy: Nodes prefer higher ranked routes, e.g. node
n1 prefers route [n1 n2 n0] over [n1 n0]. Disagree has two stable path assign-
ment solutions: ([n1 n2 n0], [n2 n0]) and ([n2 n1 n0], [n1 n0]). How-
ever, Disagree is not guaranteed to converge because there exists an execution trace
where route assignments keep oscillating. Consider the execution where node n1
and n2 update and exchange routing messages in a synchronized manner, and
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their network states oscillate between two unstable path assignments ([n1 n0])
([n2 n0]) and ([n1 n2 n0] [n2 n1 n0]) forever.
The related eBGP correctness property we consider is safety [67, 26]. The progress
of the BGP algorithm towards a solution depends on the timing of messages and
other non-deterministic factors: we want to ensure that every execution schedule
will result in a routing solution being found, regardless of the asynchronous nature
of the protocol. The final state is characterized by stability, meaning that no future
messages will affect which best paths are selected by each router.
Definition: A BGP instance is safe, if under all possible executions, it converges
to a stable state, where the best routes selected by all the routers form a policy-
compliant routing tree.
2.3.2 iBGP Anomaly: Inconsistent Policies
An unfortunate outcome of the BGP decision procedure is a corner case with the
‘MED’ attribute, where not all route preferences can be modeled by a total binary
relation. This is because, with MED, one can have three routes p, q and r where p
is preferred over q, q over r, and r over p, all at the same router: the preferences
are cyclic. This phenomenon is associated with a specific family of protocol oscil-
lations.
Consider the scenario in Figure 2.6: The routing policies of the instance are set
by the following route selection functions:
σiBGP ({AB,AC}) = σigp({AB,AC}) = AC (2.1)
σiBGP ({AB,ADE}) = σigp({AB,ADE}) = AB (2.2)
σiBGP ({AC,ADE}) = σmed({AC,ADE}) = ADE (2.3)
σiBGP ({AB, AC,ADE}) = σigp({AB, σigp({AC,ADE})}) (2.4)
= σigp({AB,ADE}) = AB (2.5)
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Figure 2.6: Cyclic Route Preference Causes Oscillation
Here the function σiBGP is inconsistent in lines (1) and (5). It prefersAC when given
both AB and AC, but if it learns about ADE as well, its best route switches to AB,
rather than sticking with AC or adopting the new ADE.
The cyclic nature of the preferences in this example is revealed from the first
three lines: (1) says AC is better than AB, (2) says AB is better than ADE, but (3)
says ADE is better than AC. The inconsistency arises from the fact that different
attributes are being used to establish the preferences: MED in (3) overrides IGP
distance.
We will now formalize this idea by showing that an inconsistent σiBGP function
always leads to such a ‘cycle’. Conversely, if σiBGP is consistent then its preferences
can be implemented by a ≺ relation.
Given a selection function σ, derive a binary relation ≺ by p ≺ q if and only
if p = σ({p, q}) 6= q. This relation is called cyclic if there are paths p1 through pn
where
p1 ≺ p2 ≺ p3 ≺ · · · ≺ pn ≺ p1.
Otherwise, it is acyclic.
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2.3.3 IGP-iBGP Anomaly
While BGP can choose the correct egress point in an AS, for each destination, estab-
lishment of the intra-AS path to that border router is the responsibility of another
protocol (an interior gateway protocol or IGP). Problems can occur if the iBGP
configuration does not match the distance values used in the IGP [73, 17].
Consider the scenario in Figure 2.7. The iBGP instance consists of four nodes:
the dashed lines denote the BGP links, the solid lines the IGP links, and the num-
bers along the IGP links denote the link costs. The IGP links carry traffic, whereas
the iBGP links exist in order to propagate routing information, so that the IGP can
select the correct border router as the egress point for each packet.
The nodes RR1 and RR2 are ‘route reflectors’, and the nodes C1 and C2 are
clients of RR1 and RR2 respectively. This means that they will always choose a
route through their local reflector, if possible. However, IGP route decisions are
based on minimizing the sum of link weights: so for C1 to reach RR1, the actual
path taken will be C1C2RR1 with a total cost of 2. Similarly, C2 will try to reach
RR2 by using the path C2C1RR2.
The interaction between the IGP forwarding and the BGP routing policy results
in a forwarding loop. Packets fromC1 to an external destination will be routed first
to C2, on the assumption that this is the best way to reach RR1. But C2 is trying to
reach RR2 instead, and so it forwards the data to C1. The end result is that the data
never gets to either reflector, and does not reach its destination.
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Figure 2.7: IGP-BGP Inconsistency.
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Overview
We have reviewed the algebraic and combinatorial models for BGP systems, and
located three sources of anomalies (Chapter 2.3). This chapter presents the overview
of Formally Verifiable Routing (FVR) — the toolkit and its underlying theories that
address these anomalies with these models.
Figure 3.1: Policy-based routing process
As shown in Figure 3.1, the overall goal is to bridge formal reasoning (left)
and the actual implementations (right) in the setting of BGP systems. The formal
reasoning can be carried out in either an inductive theorem prover, a fully auto-
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matic SMT solver, or the Maude analyzer that combines both; The actual systems
consist of the implementation of the protocol and the policy configurations. What
bridges them are the middle boxes: In the center, the formal model box consisting of
routing algebra and combinatorial model of SPP, plays a central role. The top mid-
dle declarative network specification box is the key programming language technique
that enables program synthesis and actual system verification. Finally, the bottom
network reduction box is the scalability technique.
More specifically, starting from the formal model, we designed and imple-
mented Formally safe routing (FSR) toolkit [80] that automates verification of
routing models (arc 4, Chapter 5) and synthesizes faithful implementations (arc
5) that carry the correctness property [1, 80, 81, 82]. Reversely, starting from the
large real-world BGP systems with arbitrary policy configurations, we designed
and implemented the two component tool-kits [84, 78, 77] for detecting anomalies
in larger BGP systems: the reasoning engine that automates the analysis of Inter-
net routing configurations (arc 6), and the scalability component that implements
a novel scalability technique for analysis (arc 7).
The rest of the thesis will describe in details the four key enabling techniques
outlined as follows.
• Verifying formal network models. (arc 4) Chapter 4 shows the automatic
verification of BGP policies that are expressible in the routing algebra model.
The verification is achieved by constraint solving using Yices SMT-solver.
• Generating faithful implementations from verified models. (arc 5) Chap-
ter 5 shows, given a verified routing algebra model, how to convert it into a
network datalog (NDlog) program, which can be further compiled into actual
distributed implementation with the existing declarative networking engine.
Correctness proof of the generated NDlog programs are checked through in-
ductive reasoning using the PVS theorem prover.
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• Verifying actual routing systems. (arc 6) Chapter 6 presents the verifica-
tion of actual network systems beyond those expressible in routing algebra
models. We develop a more general BGP model in the formal tool Maude
with exhaustive-search based analysis functions. This Maude extension al-
lows us to analyze BGP systems with arbitrary policies that are not captured
for correctness-by-construction models. The dynamic analysis functions also
provide more informative analysis output in the form of a trace that demon-
strates routing anomalies.
• Scalability techniques for analysis. (arc 7) Chapter 7 presents a configuration
rewriting calculus that transforms network configurations while preserving
routing properties. We proved the correctness properties and demonstrate its
effectiveness by evaluation on real-world networks. Our evaluation results
show that reduction effectively scales up analysis by incurring low overhead.
Reduction also uncovers redundancy in network configurations.
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Verifying Formal Models
This chapter presents FVR’s ability to verify routing configurations that can be
expressed in the routing algebra model. These include general policy guidelines
and concrete BGP instances. Hence FVR’s automatic analysis serves two impor-
tant communities: For researchers, FVR automates important parts of the design
process and provides a common framework for describing, evaluating, and com-
paring new safety guidelines. For network operators, FVR automates the static
analysis of internal router (iBGP) and border gateway (eBGP) configurations for
detecting safety violations.
Figure 4.1: FVR Architecture: static analysis.
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As shown in Figure 4.1, given a policy configurations, FVR uses routing alge-
bra model as the representation for analysis, and automates the analysis through
constraint solving in SMT solver. These two main enabling technologies are as
follows.
• Policy configuration as algebra: We first extend routing algebra [25, 66], en-
abling researchers and network operators to express policy configurations in
the abstract algebraic form. These configurations can be anything from high-
level policy guidelines (e.g., proposed constraints that a researcher wants to
study) or a completely specified policy instance (e.g., an iBGP configuration
or a multi-AS network that an operator wants to analyze). Router configu-
ration files can be automatically translated into the algebraic representation,
easing the adoption of FVR.
• Safety analysis: We then automate the reasoning process of routing algebra
by formulate the safety analysis as a constraint satisfaction problem, solvable
with existing SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) solver [86]. Specifically,
we use Yices solver to determine whether it is possible to jointly satisfy the
policy configuration and the safety requirement of strict monotonicity (the left-
most top input in Figure 4.1, drawn from previous work [66]). If all con-
straints can be satisfied, the routing system is provably safe; otherwise, the
solver outputs the smallest subset of the constraints that are not satisfiable to
aid in identifying the problem and fine-tuning the configuration.
4.1 Unified Policy Specification
FVR statically checks policy configurations for routing anomalies, and support a
wide range of policy configurations inputs: ranging from high-level guidelines to
specific instances, as summarized in Table 4.1. For example, the shortest hop-count
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Policy Topology Preferences Filters
Hop-count General Specific None
Gao-Rexford General Constrained Constrained
IGP-cost Specific Specific Constrained
SPP instance Specific Specific Specific
Table 4.1: Spectrum of policy configurations
routing policy does not specify the network topology but completely specifies the
path preferences; in contrast, the Gao-Rexford guideline merely constrains the pref-
erences and filters based on business relationships. In other settings, a researcher
may analyze specific BGP “gadgets” that violate a proposed safety guideline; sim-
ilarly, network operators may verify the safety of their network configuration.
In these settings, the topology, preferences, and permitted paths are much more
concrete, and can be expressed naturally as instances of the Stable Paths Problem
(SPP) [24].
While the existing algebra describe routing policies in terms of the network
arcs, described in Chapter 2.2.2, it is not sufficient for specifying policies in terms
of the distributed policies on network nodes. For example, the concatenation op-
erator ⊕ that expresses the combined results of route filtering at adjacent network
nodes, does not indicate which node performs which route filtering—the import-
ing node, the exporting node, or a combination of the two. Such distinction is also
crucial in distributed implementation which is also node-based (Chapter 5). To
bridge this gap, in this section, we extend the original routing algebra by splitting
the original concatenation operator ⊕ into three operators: separate operators for
import filtering ⊕I , export filtering ⊕E , and the basic concatenation ⊕P .
Using the extended routing algebra, we first show how to specify typical pol-
icy guidelines. In the second half of this section, we propose an automatic way to
specify policy configuration instances, given its SPP representation: we describe
how to translate SPP instances to an algebraic representation. Together, these ex-
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tensions enable FVR to automatically analyze safety for a wide range of policy
configurations.
4.1.1 Extending Routing Algebra
The routing algebra in Chapter 2.2.2 does not distinguish whether routes are fil-
tered during export or import—an important distinction when generating dis-
tributed protocol implementations. To specify the two filters separately, we replace
the original ⊕ operator with three concatenation functions for export (⊕E) and im-
port (⊕I) filtering, and a simple concatenation function for route generation ⊕P . The
result of l ⊕E s is either E (export), or F (filtered). For example, if node u does
not export routes with signature s to node v, we can encode the export filter as
l ⊕E s = F , where the label of link uv is l; otherwise l ⊕E s = E. The result of
l ⊕I s is either I (import) or F (filtered). For example, if u does not import a path
with signature s from w, we can encode this import filter as l ⊕I s = F where l is
the label for link wu; otherwise l⊕I s = I . Whenever an incoming route advertise-
ment is received, the import filter (⊕I) is first applied. If accepted, a new route is
generated (⊕P ), and exported after filtering (⊕E). 1
In general, for safety analysis, we need to combine the import and export filters
into a single concatenation operator (⊕). At a high level, this is as simple as assign-
ing the signature φ (for prohibited paths) to any path filtered by either the import
or the export policy. However, for a path vu ◦ Pud, the import filter at v depends
on the label l of the link vu, but the export filter at u depends on the label l¯ of the
reverse link uv. We can generate ⊕ as follow: for each label l and signature s, if
l¯ ⊕E s = F or l ⊕I s = F , then l ⊕ s = φ; otherwise l ⊕ s = l ⊕P s.
1A similar extension that distinguishes between import and export labels was proposed in [70].
Their approach is equivalent to ours, for the purpose of safety analysis. We chose ours because it
provides a straightforward translation to declarative networking implementations.
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4.1.2 Converting Policy Guidelines to Algebra
In the Gao-Rexford guideline example, neighboring ASes have a bilateral business
relationship, leading to link labels of p¯ = c, c¯ = p, and r¯ = r and the combined ⊕
table shown earlier in Chapter 2.2.2.
Revisiting the Gao-Rexford example from Chapter 2.2.2, the three concatena-
tion operators ⊕I , ⊕P , and ⊕E are defined as follows:
⊕I C P R ⊕P C P R ⊕E C P R
c I I I c C C C c E F F
r I I I r R R R r E F F
p I I I p P P P p E E E
Each row of the leftmost (rightmost) table corresponds to one import (export)
policy in Figure 2.4, from top to bottom; for example, in the rightmost table, the
first row exports only customers routes to a provider. Since there are no import
restrictions, the leftmost table has I for all its entries. The center table shows the
⊕P operator, where new routes have their signatures (C, R, and P ) set according
to the labels (c, r, and p) respectively.
In addition to the above guideline example, our algebra extensions can be used
to specify a variety of import and export filter guideline. For example, if the sig-
nature includes the entire AS path, we can easily specify an import (export) policy
that disallows routes that traverse a particular AS, by expressing⊕E (⊕I) to output
F values whenever a route passes through a particular AS.
4.1.3 Converting SPP Instances to Algebra
Researchers and network operators often want to analyze concrete policy config-
urations to explore small “gadgets” that violate a policy guideline or verify a real
network configuration is safe. And we use such “gadgets” as example configura-
tions to show how to represent policy instances in algebra.
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Figure 4.2: iBGP configuration instance
We assumed that each “gadgets” is given in terms of its SPP representation. A
SPP instance consists of a topology, where each node has a ranked list of “permit-
ted paths” that it could learn from its neighbors, as described in Chapter 2.2.1. We
propose a general process to convert an arbitrary SPP instance into algebra form.
As an illustrative example, Figure 4.2 as presented in [16], shows an gadgets
that captures the internal BGP (iBGP) configuration, where the squares (a, b, and
c) are route reflectors and the circles (d, e, and f) are egress nodes that each have an
externally-learned route (r1, r2, and r3) to the destination. The solid lines denote
iBGP sessions (labeled with its IGP cost) and dotted lines denote additional (IGP)
links. Each node has an ordered list of permitted paths, ranked from most to least
preferred; for instance, node a prefers the route aber2 over adr1.
To convert an SPP instance to an algebraic representation, we need an auto-
matic way to construct the equivalent link labels, path signatures, preference rela-
tions, and concatenation operator. [33] has shown a formal translation of SPP to
routing algebra . While the goal of our translation is the same as theirs, the algebra
we use is of a slightly different form. At a high level, we assign a unique label to
each link, and a unique signature to each path. Then, we convert the ranking of
permitted paths into a series of preference relations, and define the concatenation
function to connect the permitted paths and exclude any filtered routes.
Using the SPP instance in Figure 4.2 as an example:
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Labels and signatures. Since a concrete configuration does not have any meaningful
classification of links and routes, we assign each link uv a unique label constant luv,
and each permitted path p = un · · ·u0 a unique signature rp. In our iBGP example,
the label set L is {lab, lac, lad, lba, lbc, lbe, lca, lcb, lcf , lda, leb, lfc}, and the signature set Σ
is {r1, r2, r3, raber2, radr1, rbcfr3, rber2, rcadr1, rcfr3, rdaber2, rdacfr3, rebadr1, rebcfr3, rfcber2,
rfcadr1}.
Preference relations. Each node has a ranked list of permitted paths, of the form
r1, r2, ...rn. We translate this list into the equivalent pairwise preferences: r1 ≺
r2, r2 ≺ r3, ...rn−1 ≺ rn. For instance, at node a, raber2 ≺ radr1. The preference
relation is defined as the collection of preference relations at each node.
Concatenation. The⊕ operator constrains the relationship between label and signa-
ture constants. In particular, for any permitted path ruvp at node u, ruvp = luv ⊕ rvp;
for instance, raber2 = lab⊕rber2. Any other paths are disallowed by assigning the sig-
nature φ; for instance, lcb ⊕ rber2 = φ because path cber2 is not listed as a permitted
path.
Using the above process, we have also encoded various eBGP gadgets [24] in
algebra as SPP instances.
4.2 Automated Safety Analysis
Given any algebra, FVR fully automates the process of safety analysis, relieving
users from the manual and error-prone process of proving safety for each new al-
gebra. The key insight is that the safety analysis can be translated automatically
into integer constraints checkable by a standard SMT solver. Applying our tech-
nique of encoding SPP instances using algebra (Section 4.1.3), FVR can check safety
for both high-level policy guidelines and concrete configurations. After a brief re-
view of safety analysis based on routing algebra, we explain how to generate the
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integer constraints and present three examples that illustrate the conversion pro-
cess and resulting safety analysis.
4.2.1 Strict Monotonicity Implies Safety
FVR uses the safety requirement of strict monotonicity, in order to automatically
check that a given policy configuration converges. This is an important property
of a routing algebra, which ensures that a path does not become more preferred as
it grows longer. Formally:
Monotonicity: s  l ⊕ s, ∀l ∈ L,∀s ∈ Σ
Monotonicity ensures that a path Pv from v to the destination is not less preferred
than a longer path uv ◦ Pv, where uv is a link from u to v. In the definitions above,
s represents the signature of Pv and l is the label for uv.
FVR uses the stricter form of monotonicity, where l and l⊕ s cannot be equally
preferred, defined as follows:
Strict Monotonicity: s ≺ l ⊕ s, ∀l ∈ L,∀s ∈ Σ
Sobrinho has proved the following theorem [66].
Theorem 2. If the routing algebra is strictly monotonic, then the path-vector protocol
converges.
Theorem 2 reduces the convergence analysis of protocols to modeling the rout-
ing policies in a routing algebra, and proving that the algebra is strictly monotonic.
Note that strict monotonicity is a sufficient, not necessary condition. Hence, there
are safe systems that cannot be specified as a strictly monotonic algebra. Conse-
quently, FVR will report these systems as unsafe (i.e. false positives). However,
this sufficient condition is still very useful in practice to analyze the safety of BGP
systems.
Note that the strict monotonicity is actually the most general condition known
that guarantees safety regardless of the network topology. This enables researchers
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and network operators using FVR to benefit from this theoretical result by provid-
ing automated tool support.
4.2.2 Converting Policies to Yices Constraints
Policy configurations expressed in routing algebra have a natural representation
as integer constraints. Path signatures can be mapped to integers, and path pref-
erences can be expressed as comparisons (≤) between these integers. By defini-
tion [66], the preference relation  needs to be a total relations, and ≤ is indeed a
total order. This mapping is also complete because we can always map the signa-
tures onto the integer domain, when the  is a total order. Strict monotonicity im-
poses additional constraints on the preference relation, also naturally captured by
comparing integers. This observation allows FVR to leverage SMT solvers, which
determine whether a set of constraints (i.e., first-order logic formulas) are satisfi-
able based on a set of theories (e.g., integer theory). Translating from algebraic
input to SMT constraints is straightforward, making this approach preferable to
other alternatives (e.g., SAT solvers) that would require greater effort to generate
encoding.
In addition, an SMT solver produces valuable output, beyond the basic “yes/no”
answer. If the constraints can be satisfied, the solver returns a concrete instance
(example) that satisfies all of the constraints. For instance, we consider the simple
constraint x < 2 when x is an integer. An SMT solver can prove that there exists a
value instantiating x that makes x < 2 true, and returns x = 1 as an example. If the
constraints cannot be satisfied, the solver returns the smallest subset of constraints
that are not satisfiable—an invaluable aid in identifying the problematic parts of
the policy configuration. In our FVR implementation, we utilize the Yices [86] SMT
solver, although the technique we present here can be applied to SMT solvers in
general. Our technique generalizes to other SMT solvers well because our encod-
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ing only requires the basic integer theory which is readily included in most SMT
solvers.
Input to SMT solver: Given a policy configuration written in routing algebra, FVR
generates integer constraints for safety analysis recognizable by the solver. FVR
generates two kinds of constraints based on the sufficient conditions required for
safety in Section 4.2.1: (1) route preference constraints based on  relation (2)
strictly monotonic constraints based on ⊕ function. FVR automatically generates
these integer comparison constraints, allowing us to leverage Yices built-in inte-
ger support for enforcing total ordering. More concretely, we generate constraints
from the algebraic specification via the following three steps:
• Step 1: For each signature, we define a variable of the type positive integer.
• Step 2: For each s1  s2 in the specification, we generate a constraint s1 ≤ s2.
Since signatures are integers, the ≤ relation imposes a total ordering.
• Step 3: For any signature s and s′, and label l, for each definition of s′ = l⊕ s
in the specification, a constraint s < s′ is generated. This constraint enforces
strict monotonicity. To check for (non-strict) monotonicity, we could generate
s ≤ s′ instead.
SMT solver output: The conjunctions of all constraints are checked by Yices for
satisfiability. If Yices returns sat, an assignment of integers to variables (signa-
tures) exists that satisfies all of the constraints. This means that the algebra is
strictly monotonic, and by Theorem 2, any path-vector protocol that implements
the policy configurations converges.
On the other hand, if Yices returns unsat, specific input constraints that form
an unsatisfiable core are provided. Unsatisfiable core (or unsat core) is a minimal set
of inputs constraints that cannot be conjunctively satisfied. It is often significantly
smaller than the set of input constraints.
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Given the natural mapping of the original input specifications in algebra and
Yices constraints, one can easily identify the preference relation for each violating
constraint. The user can use these violating preferences as hints to identify (and
fix) specific problematic parts of the policy configuration. Note that, there can
be multiple unsatisfiable cores (i.e. many configuration conflicts), and Yices only
outputs one of them at each invocation. To fix all the configuration problems, the
user can attempt removing all unsatisfiable cores one by one in an iterative fashion.
Policy compositions: The lexical product (Chapter 2.2.2) of a monotonic algebra
and a strict monotonic algebra is strictly monotonic [25]. For policy configurations
in the form of a lexical product over algebras, safety analysis can be performed
by analyzing each algebra separately. Consider the lexical product A ⊗ B of two
algebras A, B. Analysis starts from algebra A, and if it is strictly monotonic, the
composed policy is safe. If A is monotonic, then B is checked. If B is strictly
monotonic, then the composed algebra is safe, otherwise it is deemed unsafe. If A
is not even monotonic, then the composed policy is deemed unsafe.
4.2.3 Yices Examples
We present several examples to demonstrate the three-step process of generating
Yices constraints from algebraic input and the analysis process.
Shortest Hop-Count: We start with the simplest example using shortest hop-
count. The algebraic specification of this policy is presented in Chapter 2.2.2. We
show the Yices encoding of the constraints below:
(define-type Sig (subtype (n::nat) (> n 0)))
(assert (forall (s::Sig) (< s s+1)))
39
Chapter 4. Verifying Formal Models
The first line declares a type (Sig) for signatures, which is the subset of positive
integers. Yices provides the built-in type nat for integers. Yices uses prefix syntax,
so n > 0 is encoded as (> n 0). Step 1 and 2 are omitted since the signatures are
already integers, and the preference relation  is already specified using ≤.
The second line corresponds to step 3, and encodes the strict monotone con-
straint. assert is the keyword to tell Yices to insert this constraint into the logical
context to be checked for satisfiability. Since the domain of the signatures is infi-
nite, we cannot enumerate all strict-monotonicity constraints; instead, we univer-
sally quantify using forall over all signatures.
As expected, Yices returns sat for this policy.
Gao-Rexford Guideline A: Our second example analyzes the safety of Gao-Rexford
guideline A, with the routing algebra presented earlier in Section 2.2.2. The con-
straints are expressed in Yices as:
(define-type Sig (subtype (n::nat) (> n 0)))
(define C::Sig) (define P::Sig) (define R::Sig)
;; preference relations
(assert (< C R)) (assert (< C P)) (assert (= R P))
;; strict monotonicity
(assert (< C C)) (assert (< C R)) (assert (< C P))
(assert (< R P)) (assert (< P P))
The first four statements define the three classes of signatures—customer (C),
provider (P), and peer (R)—as positive integers (step 1). The next three constraints
correspond to step 2, encoding the route preference constraints of C < R, C <
P and R = P . The next five constraints correspond to entries in the combined
concatenation operator in Section 2.2.2 after omitting constraints in the form S < φ,
which are already ensured to be true because any signature is strictly preferred
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over the signature for prohibited path φ by definition. This corresponds to step 3,
which encodes strict monotonicity of the algebra.
Interestingly, Yices returns unsat for the above input, indicating that the al-
gebra is not strictly monotonic. One of the violating constraints is resulted from
c ⊕ C = C, which states that a customer route that is sent from a customer link
is still a customer route. This is a known property of the Gao-Rexford guideline,
which requires an additional constraint on acyclicity in the customer-provider re-
lationship for safety.
Another approach to guaranteeing safety in
Gao-Rexford is to use another algebra that is strictly monotonic as the tie breaker,
in the event of a tie between two equally preferred route classes (e.g., provider and
peer, or routes from same classes). As an example of policy composition, we first
use Yices to prove that the algebra encoding guideline A is monotonic (s  l ⊕ s
∀l ∈ L,∀s ∈ Σ), and then compose guideline A with a strictly monotonic algebra
such as shortest hop-count; the resulting protocol converges.
To perform the above analysis, we modify the strict monotonicity constraints
in the above Yices encoding to check for monotonicity constraints. This requires
changing each < to ≤, e.g. (assert (<= C C)), etc. When we check the con-
straints, Yices returns sat, and provides a possible instantiation C=1, P=2, R=2.
In addition to guideline A, we have applied FVR to analyze a number of guide-
lines including Gao-Rexford guideline B [19] and also guidelines that ensure safe
backup routing [18].
Internal BGP Configuration Instance: As our final example, we use FVR to ana-
lyze the six-node iBGP configuration in Figure 4.2, using our technique for encod-
ing SPP instances in algebra (Section 4.1.3). In Section 7.3, we present our expe-
riences analyzing a larger network based on the Rocketfuel [68] dataset, and also
the analysis of well-known eBGP gadgets.
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We use the same three-step process to generate solver constraints. First, each
permitted path in the SPP instance is mapped to an integer variable. Second, a
constraint is generated for each route preference, derived from the per-node rank-
ings in SPP. Finally, for each entry of the concatenation function, we generate a
strict monotonic constraint as described in step 3. All in all, eighteen constraints
are generated.
The number of constraints depends on the number of permitted paths which,
in turn, depends on the network topology. In contrast, the previous two examples
are independent of the network topology. These differences reflect the broad ap-
plicability of FVR, in analyzing policy configurations that range from partially to
fully specified (see Table 4.1).
For these input constraints, Yices returns unsat, meaning that the algebra vio-
lates strict monotonicity. In fact, this iBGP system is known to be unsafe [16].
However, given eighteen constraints, pinpointing the problem manually is quite
difficult. For larger networks with even more constraints, manual analysis be-
comes even harder. Fortunately, Yices can generate the minimal set of constraints
(unsat core) that cannot be satisfied. More details on pinpointing configuration
problems with unsat core are in Section 5.4.2.
Here, the unsat core includes the rankings of nodes a, b and c’s and strict mono-
tonicity constraints involving available routes of those nodes, but does not include
constraints for the route preferences of node d, e, and f. This leads to the conclusion
that there are potential problems with the configurations of the route reflectors a,
b, and c. In fact, each reflector prefers other reflector’s client over its own, which
causes an oscillation [16].
Once the problem is identified, the network operator can change the network
settings such as topology, so that the route preferences of nodes a, b, and c are
changed, and use FVR to analyze the safety of the new configuration. As vali-
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dation, we rerun Yices with a modified configuration that does not include the
preference cycle among the reflector nodes, and the solver returns sat.
Soundness of SPP Safety Analysis For an SPP instance, each AS only knows
the preference relation among the routes that are in its own routing table, and the
policy configurations do not enforce any order among routes that originate from
different nodes. However, the safety analysis of the routing algebra requires a
total ordering of all routes. The output of sat means that there exists one strictly
monotonic algebra that extends the route preference relation specified in policy
configurations to be a total order. Applying Theorem 2 directly, we know that a
protocol that implements this extended algebra is safe. We argue that a protocol
that implements the extended algebra has exactly the same behavior as a protocol
that implements the original policy configurations where the preference relation
is only a partial order. The reason is that additional preferences in the extended
relation describes preferences between routes that have different sources, which
are not relevant to the route selection process in practice anyway; and therefore
will not affect the protocol behavior.
4.3 Evaluation
We present several case studies of using FVR to automatically generate a proof of
safety or pinpointing configuration problems of both policy guidelines and specific
instances.
4.3.1 Pinpoint iBGP Configuration Errors
We emulate a scenario where a network operator uses our FVR toolkit to study the
safety properties of an existing iBGP network configuration. As the input topol-
ogy, we utilize the intra domain topology (with inferred link weights) of AS 1755
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from the Rocketfuel [68] dataset, which contains 87 routers and 322 links. Pairwise
IGP costs are computed a priori based on the shortest paths. The iBGP reflector-
client topology is synthetically configured as a 6-level hierarchy with 53 reflectors.
Given the above input topology, on all 87 routers, and have each router within
the AS compute the best route to a remote destination outside the AS, under the
condition that several egress routers are aware of external routes to this particular
destination. At each router, the route preference is based on the IGP cost from the
router to the egress routers, i.e., the route with the lowest IGP cost is selected. This
policy is similarly configured using routing algebra. The algebraic representation
of the SPP instance of the network is extracted and analyzed for safety.
In the absence of real router configurations, we extract the per-node rankings
from NDlog implementation runs as follows. We execute the GPV protocol in ND-
log on all 87 routers, and populate the permitted paths of each router based on its
incoming route advertisements. These permitted paths are then sorted based on
IGP costs described above, to generate per-node rankings. FVR directly translates
these per-node rankings expressed in algebra into constraints used by our SMT
solver to perform safety analysis.
In total, the extracted SPP instance contains 259 constraints generated for strict
monotonicity, and 292 constraints for per-node rankings. On a quad-core machine
in our testbed, the SMT solver returns unsat within 100 ms, and reports a minimal
unsatisfiable core consisting of six constraints. Interestingly, these six constraints
not only form a dispute wheel, but are also directly attributed to the routers in the
embedded gadget that we deliberately introduced earlier. This provides a “hint”
for network operators to fix the configuration error starting from the errant con-
straints.
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4.3.2 eBGP Gadget Analysis
FVR’s applicability extends beyond high-level guidelines and iBGP configurations.
We briefly summarize our experiences of using FVR to analyze well-known eBGP
gadgets: GOODGADGET, BADGADGET and DISAGREE [24]. These experiments
highlight the use of NDlog implementations generated from NDlog implementa-
tions of SPP instances.
The input algebra for these three gadgets are SPP instances described in Sec-
tion 4.1.3, where the algebra is used to encode per-node permitted paths and rank-
ings. Our analysis results are as expected: GOODGADGET is safe, while BADGAD-
GET and DISAGREE are unsafe. These results match the manual proofs in prior
work [24], but are obtained automatically by our solver.
4.4 Summary
This chapter present FVR’s ability to automate the verification of a wide range of
routing configurations that can be expressed in routing algebra model. These in-
clude high-level guidelines to specific router configurations. We show that routing
algebra has a natural translation to both integer constraints (to perform safety anal-
ysis with SMT solvers). We also preformed extensive experiments with realistic
topologies and policies, showing that by SMT solving, FVR can detect problems in
an AS’s iBGP configuration, prove sufficient conditions for BGP safety.
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Implementations
Once the routing algebra is verified (Chapter 4), FVR compiles it into a provably-
correct emulated implementation, as shown in Figure 5.1. The resulting imple-
mentation can be used for further empirical study prior to actual deployment. We
also prove that the generated implementation is faithful to the algebra.
Figure 5.1: FVR Architecture: Implementation-based Analysis.
The basic idea is to synthesize a provably-correct implementations of safe in-
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ter domain routing by unifying research in routing algebras [25, 66] with recent
advances in declarative networking [39, 38, 41, 40, 53, 48] . Specifically, given the
verified configuration’s algebra form and a formal description of the path-vector
mechanism, FVR maps it to a Network Datalog (NDlog) specification, which is then
executed using the RapidNet declarative networking engine [2, 49], thus FVR au-
tomatically generate a distributed routing-protocol implementation that matches
the policy configuration—avoiding the time-consuming and error-prone task of
manually creating an implementation.
5.1 Background: Declarative Networking
FVR uses a declarative networking language called Network Datalog (NDlog) as
an intermediary language to bridge the gap between the abstract routing algebra
and efficient distributed implementations. Our choice of NDlog is motivated by
the following. First, the declarative features of NDlog allows for straightforward
translation from the algebra to NDlog programs. Second, NDlog enables a variety
of routing protocols and overlay networks to be specified in a natural and concise
manner. In fact, NDlog specifications are orders of magnitude less code than imper-
ative implementations. For example, traditional routing protocols such as the path
vector and distance-vector protocols can be expressed in a few lines of code [41],
and a more complex protocol such as the Chord distributed hash table can be ex-
pressed in 47 lines. This makes possible a clean and concise proof (via logical
inductions) of the correctness of the generated NDlog programs with regard to the
algebra. The compact specifications also makes it easy to incorporate alternative
routing mechanisms to the basic path-vector protocol, as we will later demonstrate
in our evaluation section. Finally, when compiled and executed, these declarative
protocols perform efficiently relative to imperative implementations [39].
In FVR prototype, we use the open-source RapidNet [2] declarative network-
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ing engine as a basis for executing NDlog programs. NDlog programs are compiled
by RapidNet into distributed execution plans that are based on the Click [35] exe-
cution model. Our generated NDlog implementation is composed of two compo-
nents: one implements the routing mechanisms, the other implements the routing
policies. FVR provides a built-in module implementing the path-vector mecha-
nism, which we discuss in detail in Section 5.1. The component implementing
policies is directly translated from the algebra. In Section 5.2, we show how FVR
translates the algebra into NDlog programs.
Generalized Path Vector Mechanism FVR takes as input, a generalized path-vector
protocol, as its default routing mechanism. The NDlog implementation is shown
below, and for the rest of this thesis we refer to it as the GPV program. GPV im-
plements a path-vector protocol that computes the most preferred path based on a
routing algebra.
NDlog is a distributed variant of Datalog. An NDlog program is composed
of several rules. Each rule has the form p :- q1, q2, ..., qn., which can be
read informally as “q1 and q2 and ... and qn implies p”. Here, p is the head
of the rule, and q1, q2,...,qn is a list of predicates that constitutes the body of the
rule. A rule is triggered (evaluated) once all the body predicate values (tuples) are
generated. Once triggered, the head tuple is generated. Rule execution is done
in a continuous, long-running fashion using a distributed query processor, where
rule head tuples are continuously updated (inserted or deleted) in an incremental
fashion [45] as the body tuples are updated.
//GPV program
gpvRecv sig(@U,SNew,PNew) :- msg(@U,V,D,S,P),
PNew=f_concatPath(U,P), V=f_head(P),
SNew=f_concatSig(L,S), label(@U,V,L),
f_import(L,S)=true.
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gpvStore route(@U,D,S,P) :- sig(@U,S,P), D=f_last(P).
gpvSelect localOpt(@U,D,a_pref<S>,P) :- route(@U,D,S,P).
gpvSend msg(@N,U,D,S,P) :- localOpt(@U,D,S,P),
label(@U,N,L), f_export(L,S)=true.
In NDlog, the names of predicates, function symbols, and constants begin with
a lower-case letter, while variable names begin with an upper-case letter. Similar
to most implementations of Datalog, NDlog includes a limited set of function calls
beginning with “f ”, and user-defined arithmetic functions beginning with “a ”.
These functions include boolean predicates, arithmetic computations, and simple
list operations.
The above program manipulates the following tuples. label(@U,V,L)1 tuples,
where each tuple represents an edge from the node itself (U) to one of its neigh-
bors (V) of attribute L. A set of computed routes, stored as sig(@U,S,P) tuples at
each source node U, where S and P are the signature and path of the route respec-
tively. Route advertisement messages exchanged among nodes are represented by
msg(@U,V,D,S,P) tuples. Each tuple denotes a message that is sent by node V to
U, and the advertised route is for destination D with path P and signature S. We
provide a high-level description of the above program, broken down by rules:
• Receiving routes. Rule gpvRecv is triggered upon receiving a route adver-
tisement (msg tuple) from a neighboring node. Based on the route advertise-
ment, the rule generates a new route with a new path PNew and a new signa-
ture SNew. The f concatSig implements the simple concatenation function
⊕P , while the function f import(L,S), implements the import filter ⊕I in
algebra. It evaluates to true if and only if L⊕IS= I .
1NDlog supports a location specifier, expressed with “@” symbol followed by an attribute. This
attribute is used to denote the source location of the corresponding tuple. For example, label
tuples are stored based on the value of the U attribute.
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• Storing routes. Rule gpvStore builds a route table at each node, which
stores all the candidate routes to the destination, by using the information in
its locally maintained sig table.
• Selecting routes. Rule gpvSelect computes the optimal route (represented
as localOpt tuples) based on the route table. The user-defined aggregate
function a pref computes the optimal route by using the route preference
function f pref (as its comparison function), which implements the  rela-
tion in algebra.
• Sending routes. Rule gpvSend propagates new routes to neighbors. When-
ever a node’s local optimal routes localOpt(@U,D,S,P) to destination D is
updated, the updated route is re-advertised to all neighbors N. Similar to im-
port policies, we use the f export function to filter out routes: rule gpvSend
only generates a message if the route is not filtered by the export policy.
f export(L,S) implements ⊕E , and it returns true if and only if L⊕ES= E.
GPV provides a template for users to plug in customize policy configurations.
One of the advantages of using NDlog is its ease of incorporating routing poli-
cies in algebraic form with routing mechanisms (e.g. GPV). Signature generation
is achieved by performing a predicate unification of labels and signatures recur-
sively in NDlog rules, and applying the appropriate function (f concatSig) for
generating new signatures. The recursive signature generation (from other signa-
tures) is encoded in only 4 rules in NDlog. Import and export filters are simply
boolean functions (f export, f import) in rule bodies which are triggered when
true. While it is certainly possible to use an imperative language instead, NDlog
provides the right balance of features in terms of compact specifications, ease of
proofs and translation from algebra.
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Algebra NDlog Predicates / functions
 f pref
⊕P f concatSig
⊕I f import
⊕E f export
Table 5.1: Algebra and NDlog Mapping.
5.2 Generating Faithful NDlog Implementation
Table 5.1 summaries the correspondence between definitions in algebra, and the
function names in the generated NDlog programs. We use the extended algebra in-
troduced in Section 4.1.1, which distinguishes between simple concatenation func-
tion ⊕P , import filter ⊕I , and export filter ⊕E . Functions f pref, f concatSig,
f import, and f export are directly generated from input routing algebra as fol-
lows:
• Step 1. For each s1  s2 in the specification, add a statement to f pref(S1,S2)
that returns true if S1= s1 and S2= s2.
• Step 2. For any signature s and s′, and label l, for each definition of s′ = l⊕P s
in the specification, generate a statement in f concatSig(L,S) that returns
s′ if L= l and S= s.
• Step 3. For any signature s and label l, if l ⊕E s = F , generate a statement
in f export(L,S) that returns false if L= l and S= s. Similarly define
f import(L,S) for import filter ⊕I .
To deploy the NDlog implementation on a concrete topology, each router takes
additional configuration information automatically generated from the topology:
• Step 4. For each link in the input topology, generate a corresponding label
tuple (assigned a value from the set L). A sig tuple is also generated for
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each one-hop path to the destination. Signatures associated with these one-
hop paths are typically known as the origination set [25], a subset of Σ defined
as part of the input algebra.
Note that the above steps can be generated on a per-node basis, based on each
node’s input algebra. If the algebra directly uses functions and relations that ND-
log has built-in support (e.g. integer arithmetic), then steps 1 to 3 can simply use
NDlog’s built-in functions.
Policy Composition: If the network designers choose to use the compositional fea-
ture of the routing algebra, the compositional operators can be straightforwardly
mapped to NDlog templates as well. In particular, the lexical product of two pol-
icy algebras can also be concisely represented in NDlog by encoding the labels and
signatures as a pair, and customizing the f pref comparator function to check the
first attribute, and then the second attribute in the case of a tie-breaker.
NDlog Examples We present examples to demonstrate the process of generating
NDlog programs from input algebra.
Shortest Hop-Count: For shortest hop-count, the label for each link is 1, so for a
node u, for each of u’s neighbor v, FVR generates a tuple label(@u,v,1). If u has
a direct link to the destination d, then a tuple sig(@u,1,[ud]) is defined. This
completes Step 4.
Next the concatenation and preference function are generated (Step 1 and 2).
The concatenation function is defined as integer addition, and the preference rela-
tion is integer ≤ relation.
#def_func f_concatSig(L,S) { return L+S }
#def_func f_pref(S1,S2) { return S1 <= S2 }
Finally, the shortest hop-count policy does not have any import or export filter-
ing, so they are the constant true function (Step 3).
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#def_func f_export(L,S) { return true }
#def_func f_import(L,S) { return true }
Gao-Rexford Guideline A:
Based on the network topology, for a node u, FVR generates a label(@u,v,ch)
tuple for each of its neighbor v, and ch is ‘c’ if v is u’s customer; ‘p’, if v is u’s
provider; and ‘r’, if v is u’s peer. Similarly, for each initial route of length 1,
sig(@u,ch,[ud]) is defined and ch is ‘C’ if the link ud is a customer link; ‘P ’,
if ud is a provider link; and ‘R’, if ud is a peer link. This corresponds to Step 4.
Next, in Step 1 and 2, definitions for functions implementing ⊕P and  are
generated as follows.
#def_func f_concatSig(L,S) {
if (L==’c’) && (S==’C’) return ’C’
if (L==’c’) && (S==’P’) return ’C’
if (L==’c’) && (S==’R’) return ’C’
if (L==’p’) && (S==’C’) return ’P’
.... }
#def_func f_pref(S1,S2) {
return (S1==’C’ && S2==’R’) || // C < R
(S1==’C’ && S2==’P’) // C < P }
f concatSig returns the signature S based on the link L, as defined by the ear-
lier input algebra c ⊕P ∗ = C, p ⊕P ∗ = P , r ⊕P ∗ = R, where ∗ stands in for
any signature C, P , or R. For each entry in ⊕P , FVR generates an if clause, and
we omit the rest of the definitions. f pref returns true if S1 is a customer route
(C). This forces a customer route to be preferred over a peer/provider routes (R
and P respectively). This is a direct translation from the earlier input algebra for
Gao-Rexford, namely C ≺ P and C ≺ R.
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Finally, import and export functions are generated based on the filters ⊕I and
⊕E . Since guideline A does not specify import filters, f import is the constant
function that always returns true. The export function returns true if the route is
not filtered (l ⊕E s = E); false if the route is filtered (l ⊕E s = F ).
#def_func f_import(L,S) { return true }
#def_func f_export(L,S) {
if (L==’c’ && S==’P’) return false
if (L==’c’ && S==’R’) return false
if (L==’r’ && S==’P’) return false
if (L==’r’ && S==’R’) return false
return true }
SPP Instances: Since SPP imposes explicit rankings, the f pref function would
compare signatures for a given source/destination pair. Based on per-node rank-
ings of paths, f pref(S1,S2) will return true if S1 is preferred over S2, and false
otherwise. To speed up the comparison process, one possible optimization (en-
hancement to step 2) is to store the per-node rankings in an ordered table for fast
retrieval. Similarly, for export filters, one can maintain a table of permitted paths
to be exported, and the f export simply checks that a particular path is in the
permitted export list, before it is exported. Import filters can be implemented sim-
ilarly.
5.3 Correctness of NDlog implementation
In order to apply Theorem 2 and show that the NDlog implementation of a strictly
monotonic algebra converges, we need to show the correctness of the NDlog im-
plementation. The correctness depends on two conditions: first, the NDlog pro-
gram correctly implements the path-vector protocol, and second, the NDlog pro-
gram correctly implements the input algebra. Prior work has experimentally val-
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idated [39] and formally proved [76] the correctness of an NDlog implementation
of the path-vector protocol. We will revisit the verification of declarative network
in Section 6.2. In addition, [52] has formally proved correct NDlog’s operational
semantics. We hence focus on the second condition.
We introduce several notations to set up our proofs. We define ι to be a function
that maps the set of links in the network topology to the set of labels in L. Given a
concrete network topology, ι is the correct assignment of labels to links, i.e. ι(uv) =
l if the label of link uv is l. The function σ0 maps initial routes (route of length 1)
to their signatures. σ0 is the correct signature assignments to initial routes. Given
a destination d, σ0([ud]) = s if the signature of route [ud] is s.
Given ι, σ0 and an algebra A, function σι,σ0,A maps each route to its signature.
When it is clear from the context, we omit the subscripts, and write σ.
σ(p) =
σ0(p) p = [ud]ι(uv)⊕ σ(p′) p = uv ◦ p′
Finally we define a function nd(t) that returns the NDlog term that represents
t. A key aspect is to prove that NDlog computes the signatures for routes correctly,
formally:
Theorem 3 (Correctness of NDlog translation). Given any path p, if
sig(nd(u),nd(s),nd(p)) is generated by prog, and s 6= φ, then s = σ(p).
Proof of correctness To prove Theorem 3, we make a few assumptions. First, ι
and the complement of the label operation l¯ has the property that the label assigned
to a link vu is the complement of the link assigned to uv.
(Property A): ι(uv) = ι(vu).
For example, in the Gao-Rexford guideline, the reverse direction of a customer link
is a provider link.
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We also assume that generated functions and predicates faithfully implement
the algebraic specifications, which are formally stated below.
(Property B):
• f export(nd(l),nd(s)) = true iff l ⊕E s = E.
• f import(nd(l),nd(s)) = true iff l ⊕I s = I .
• f concatSig(nd(l),nd(s)) = nd(s′) iff l ⊕P s = s′.
• f pref(nd(s1),nd(s2)) = true iff s1  s2.
• label(@nd(u),nd(v),nd(l)) :- . is in prog iff ι(uv) = l. sig(@nd(u),nd(s),nd(p))
:- . is in prog iff σ0(p) = s.
Given an algebra A, and a network topology represented by ι and σ0, let prog
be the NDlog program that is translated from A, and ι and σ0.
We first prove the following lemma (containing two parts i and ii), which state
that the generated signature tuples are correct; and that if a route update message
is generated, then the route’s signature is correctly computed, and the export poli-
cies have been applied:
Lemma 4.
(i) Given any path p, if sig(nd(u),nd(s),nd(p)) is generated by prog, and s 6= φ, then
s = σ(p).
(ii) Given any path p, if msg(nd(u),nd(v),nd(d),nd(s), nd(p)) is generated by prog, and
s 6= φ, then s = σ(p), and ι(vu)⊕E s = E.
Proof (sketch): By induction of the length of p.
We abbreviate nd(t) to t when it is clear from the context that NDlog represen-
tation of t is required.
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In the base case, the length of p is 1. We know that σ(p) = σ0(p) and by our
assumptions (Property B), we know that if sig(u,s,p) is generated by prog, then
s = σ0(p). So part (i) holds.
By examining the GPV program, msg(n,u,d,s,p) tuple is only generated when
gpvExport is applied. So we know that s = σ(p) (s and p comes from the sig tu-
ple), and that f export(l,s) = true and label(u,n,l) is true. Use Property B
again, we know that l ⊕E s = E, and ι(un) = l, so part (ii) holds.
In the inductive case, to prove part (i), we examine the gpvSig rule. The
new path and signature is generated from the tuple msg(u,v,d,s,p). Using in-
duction hypotheses, we know that s = σ(p), and ι(vu) ⊕E s = E. If a new
sig(u,snew,pnew) is generated, then it must be the case that f import(l,s) =
I where l = ι(uv). Using property A, we know that ι(uv) = ι(vu). By examining
the way we generate ⊕ from ⊕p, ⊕E and ⊕I , we know that snew = ι(uv) ⊕ σ(p),
which is equal to σ(pnew) (Property B). We can prove part (ii) in similar ways as
we prove part (i) in the base case.
Lemma 4 implies Theorem 3.
5.4 Evaluation
We present several case studies of using FVR: (1) empirically evaluating protocol
dynamics and temporal properties that cannot be easily checked in formal analysis,
and (2) deploying and evaluating alternative routing mechanisms.
In all cases, the inputs required to our tool for analysis and experimentation
are the routing mechanism, input policies (specified in the form of algebra), and a
network topology (synthetically generated or obtained from either CAIDA [9] or
Rocketfuel [68]).
Evaluation environment. FVR provides an interface for users to specify policy con-
figurations using algebraic specifications, which are compiled into NDlog programs.
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Figure 5.2: Convergence time (seconds) for BGP against longest customer-provider
chain.
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FVR uses the RapidNet [2, 49] declarative networking engine to compile the ND-
log programs into applications (with an execution model similar to Click [35]) ex-
ecutable in ns-3 [51], an emerging discrete event-driven simulator similar to the
popular ns-2. Like its predecessor, ns-3 emulates all layers of the network stack,
supporting configurable loss, packet queuing, and network topology models. It
also allows for a simulation mode, enabling a comprehensive examination under
various network topologies and conditions, as well as an deployment mode where
different hosts in a testbed environment execute the deployed system over a real
network. The ability to run the same application in these two modes enables us
to execute each NDlog program at scale in simulation and in an actual implemen-
tation running on a testbed, providing two avenues for augmenting the formal
analysis.
5.4.1 Convergence Time vs. Network Size
Our first case study presents a scenario where a researcher empirically evaluates
policy guidelines using the distributed NDlog implementation automatically gen-
erated from the algebraic specifications. To ensure strict monotonicity, we com-
pose the basic Gao-Rexford guideline A policy with the shortest hop-count as the
tie-breaker (using algebra’s composition operator). The researcher has already an-
alyzed the composed policy for its safety properties using Yices, but would like
to measure the convergence time with respect to the depth of the AS hierarchy. A
prior study [63] proved that, the worst case upper-bound of the convergence time
for Gao-Rexford guideline is 2 × (d + 1) phases (rounds of route advertisements),
where d is the length of the longest customer-provider chain. The researcher can
use the implementation that FVR generates from GPV (Section 5.1), and policy con-
figurations. We present our results using RapidNet’s simulation and deployment
modes.
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Simulation Mode Our first experiment is carried out in RapidNet’s simulation
mode. As our input topologies, we utilize the AS-level network graph (with an-
notated customer-provider relationships) provided in the CAIDA dataset [9]. The
simulation is performed in a quad-core machine with Intel Xeon 2.33GHz CPUs
and 4GB memory running Linux 2.6. In the simulation setup, all links have 100
Mbps in bandwidth and 10 ms latency.
To fit the simulation into memory and use a similar network size for our sub-
sequent testbed evaluation, we extract sub-graphs from CAIDA’s global network
topology as follows: we remove all stub ASes2, randomly select an AS R as the root,
and then extract the AS hierarchy (transitively) provided by the AS. We choose 14
such sub-graphs with the length of the longest customer-provider chains ranging
from 3-16. For each sub-graph, we executed the GPV protocol with guideline A,
and measured the convergence time (from start of protocol until all nodes have
computed routes to all destinations).
Figure 5.2 (CAIDA-Sim) shows the protocol convergence time as the length of
the longest provider-customer chain increases. As a basis of comparison, we plot
the theoretical worst-case convergence time [63]. Our protocol mechanism is con-
figured to batch and propagate routes every second, a feature easily achieved us-
ing NDlog’s time-based predicates [40]. For instance, given the longest customer-
provider chain of 10, the execution should converge within at most 2 × (10 + 1)
phases, namely 22 seconds. We make the following two observations from our
simulation results. First, the convergence time increases linearly with the length of
the longest customer-provider chain, validating the trend shown in the prior the-
oretical results. Second, we observe that, in practice, the protocol converges faster
than the theoretical worst case. Upon further investigation based on execution
logs, we realize the faster convergence is because customers at the “leaves” of the
customer-provider tree typically have multiple paths to the root providers and can
2The pruned topology contains 5220 ASes and 23101 links.
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leverage peer-to-peer links, and hence rarely require the full depth to propagate
routes.
Deployment mode Our second experiment validates our simulation results us-
ing RapidNet’s deployment mode. Here, we utilize 32 quad-core machines with a
similar hardware/software configuration as our simulation experiment. The ma-
chines are connected using high-speed Gigabit Ethernet. We run up to 5 Rapid-
Net instances per machine, and configure the neighbor links among RapidNet in-
stances to be consistent with the earlier CAIDA setup in simulation. As before, we
set the propagation period to 1 second.
Figure 5.2 (CAIDA-Testbed) shows that the convergence time obtained in the
testbed closely mirrors that of our earlier simulation results. Our tool can switch
between simulation and deployment based evaluation easily. Simulation and de-
ployment modes of RapidNet uses the same compiled code base, with a config-
uration flag indicating running the network stack in simulation or using actual
sockets. In the rest of this section, we primarily present results obtained in the
simulation mode.
All in all, our first set of experiments based on the Gao-Rexford guideline is en-
couraging. Not only are we able to use Yices to check the guideline for safety, we
are able to (with minimal effort) generate distributed implementations that pro-
vide additional performance insights using actual Internet topologies.
5.4.2 Pinpoint iBGP Configuration Errors
We emulate a scenario where a network operator uses our FVR toolkit to study the
safety properties of an existing iBGP network configuration. As the input topology,
we utilize the intra-domain topology (with inferred link weights) of AS 1755 from
the Rocketfuel [68] dataset, which contains 87 routers and 322 links. Pairwise IGP
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costs are computed a priori based on the shortest paths. The iBGP reflector-client
topology is synthetically configured as a 6-level hierarchy with 53 reflectors.
Given the above input topology, we execute a GPV protocol on all 87 routers,
and have each router within the AS compute the best route to a remote destina-
tion outside the AS, under the condition that several egress routers are aware of
external routes to this particular destination. At each router, the route preference
is based on the IGP cost from the router to the egress routers, i.e., the route with
the lowest IGP cost is selected. This policy is similarly configured using routing
algebra, and compiled into NDlog implementations.
To experiment with FVR’s ability to detect configuration errors, we embed a
gadget similar to Figure 4.2 into the iBGP topology. This embedding is achieved
by selecting three neighboring routers from the graph and setting their IGP cost to
the egress routers the same as those in Figure 4.2. One goal of our experiment is to
see whether our tool can detect this unsafe gadget embedded in a larger network
instance.
Experimentation: Upon fixing the configuration errors, we experimentally evalu-
ated both iBGP configurations implemented using NDlog. Similar to the earlier
CAIDA experiments, all the links are set to 100 Mbps bandwidth, 10 ms latency,
and up to 3ms jitter. Figure 5.3 shows our comparison of average per-node band-
width utilization over time for the iBGP protocol with and without the embedded
gadget (shown as Gadget and NoGadget after the fix). Compared with Gadget, we
observe a 91% decrease in communication overhead, and 82% decrease in conver-
gence time in NoGadget.
5.4.3 eBGP Gadget Analysis
FVR’s applicability extends beyond high-level guidelines and iBGP configurations.
We briefly summarize our experiences of using FVR to analyze well-known eBGP
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gadgets: GOODGADGET, BADGADGET and DISAGREE [24]. These experiments
highlight the use of NDlog implementations generated from NDlog implementa-
tions of SPP instances.
Experimentation We further experimentally evaluate the gadgets using the au-
tomatically generated NDlog implementation. In all cases, we provide an input
topology, which contains one or more gadgets on a subset of the nodes. For GOODGAD-
GET, as the number of gadgets increases, both the convergence time and commu-
nication cost increase. The increase is due to route re-computation, which occurs
when a previously computed best path is overwritten by a longer path with a
higher local preference. Nevertheless, all GOODGADGET scenarios converge as
expected. On the other hand, the BADGADGET execution never converges—the
protocol continued to transmit a high rate of update messages indefinitely. For
DISAGREE, a gadget that can temporarily oscillate between two stable states be-
fore eventually converging, the protocols takes a longer time to converge as the
percentage of conflicting links increases3.
5.4.4 Alternative Routing Mechanism
While we have adopted GPV as the default mechanism, given that FVR is an exten-
sible framework, other routing mechanisms can also be used, as long as they are
implemented in NDlog. In our final case study, we demonstrate how researchers
can supply FVR with a different routing mechanisms to study their impact on con-
vergence behavior. We consider the Hybrid Link-State and Path-Vector (HLP) [69]
protocol that has been proposed as an enhancement to the path-vector protocol.
HLP capitalizes on the assumption that the ASes running BGP can be partitioned
into domains that form a customer-provider hierarchy. HLP uses the regular link-
3A conflicting link is a link where the two adjacent nodes always prefer to route through each
other.
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state protocol within each customer-provider hierarchy, and a path-vector protocol
(called Fragment Path-Vector, where paths that are internal to the hierarchy are hid-
den) across different hierarchies. We implement HLP in NDlog by using just 10
rules (11 rules if we also specify that internal paths are hidden).
We configure the network topology as a 10-domain network. Each domain is
a 20-node acyclic hierarchical structure rooted by a top provider, where each node
(with the exception of the top provider) has 1 or 2 providers. We configure the
topology and policies within a domain based on the Gao-Rexford guideline A.
Link latencies within one domain are set to 10 ms. In addition, there are a total of
p84 cross-domain links throughout the network; these links are configured to have
50 ms latency. In all cases, links are set to have a bandwidth of 100 Mbps. For cost
hiding, we set 5 as the threshold.
Figure 5.4 shows the bandwidth utilization of HLP over time, with and without
cost hiding (shown as HLP-CH and HLP, respectively). As a basis of comparison,
we execute the path-vector protocol (shown as PV). We note that as expected, HLP
converges faster than PV, requiring 0.35 seconds compared to 0.4 seconds for PV.
Moreover, the per-node communication cost for HLP and PV is 1.09 MB and 1.75
MB, respectively. HLP-CH further reduces the communication cost to 0.59 MB per
node.
Beside HLP, other possibilities include multi-path routing protocols, and neighbor-
specific BGP mechanisms, which typically require further customization to user-
defined functions, for instance, propagating the top-k paths instead of the current
best. Such comparisons are tremendously useful for researchers to study the full
design space in both policies and mechanisms.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter presents FVR’s ability to generate provably-correct implementation
from the verified algebraic representation of routing policy. We show that routing
algebra has a very natural translation to declarative networking programs. By gen-
erating the actual distributed implementation, FVR has combined safety analysis
and experiments with the protocol implementations to pinpoint configuration er-
rors and gain insights into the performance of the generated implementation. This
allows research on inter-domain routing to leverage mature technologies, such as
SMT solvers and RapidNet, to automate complex and error-prone tasks for re-
searchers and practitioners alike.
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Verifying Actual Routing Systems
The routing algebra we verified enable us to synthesize provably-correct routing
configurations, as shown in the previous chapter. However, the model, due to its
correctness-by-construction nature is too restricted and does not capture all correct
and useful configurations in real world. For example, routing algebra assumes
total ordering of all available routes in the BGP network system, which may not be
available in a actual configuration (shown in Figure 2.6). Moreover, when dealing
with iBGP-eBGP interaction, routing algebra can only specify the BGP networks
where all the component iBGPs are configured in the same way, due to the inherent
limitation in the semantics of lexical product [25]. On the other hand, the dynamic
behavior of the BGP system also depends on the underlying routing mechanism —
path vector protocol. Thus, to reason about an actual routing system, it is necessary
to be able to verify arbitrary routing configuration and the path vector routing
protocol.
This chapter presents BGPVerif ’s ability to detect routing anomalies in actual
configurations, and verify routing mechanism. As shown in Figure 6.1, based on
the combinatorial SPP model, FVR includes Maude library [7, 43] that automati-
cally detects routing anomalies in policy configurations; Simultaneously, FVR uti-
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Figure 6.1: FVR Architecture: Dynamic Analysis.
lizes theorem prover to verify the routing mechanism implemented in declarative
networks.
6.1 Detect Anomalies in Policy Configurations
Background: Rewriting Logic and Maude Rewriting logic [46] is a logical for-
malism that is based on two simple ideas: states of a system can be represented
as elements of an algebraic data type, and the behavior of a system can be given
by transitions between states described by rewrite rules. By algebraic data type, we
mean a set whose elements are constructed from atomic elements by application
of constructors. Functions on data types are defined by equations that allow one to
compute the result of applying the function. A rewrite rule has the form t⇒ t′ if c
where t and t′ are patterns (terms possibly containing variables) and c is a condi-
tion (a boolean term). Such a rule applies to a system state s if t can be matched
to a part of s by supplying the right values for the variables, and if the condition
c holds when supplied with those values. In this case the rule can be applied by
replacing the part of s matching t by t′ using the matching values for variables in
t′.
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Maude [7] is a language and tool based on rewriting logic. Maude provides a
high performance rewriting engine featuring matching modulo associativity, com-
mutativity, and identity axioms; and search and model-checking capabilities. Given
a specification S of a concurrent system, Maude can execute this specification and
allows one to observe possible behaviors of the system. One can also use the search
functionality of Maude to check if a state meeting a given condition can be reached
during the system’s execution. Furthermore, one can model-check S to check if a
temporal property is satisfied, and if not, Maude will produce a counter exam-
ple. Maude also supports object-oriented specifications that enable the modeling
of distributed systems as a multiset of objects that are loosely coupled by message
passing. As a result, Maude is particularly amenable to the specification and anal-
ysis of network routing protocols. We choose Maude because: (1) It comes with
a full-fledged automated tool support for analyzing distributed system [8, 54, 12].
Based on Maude’s object-oriented specification language and underlying rewrit-
ing logic, we encode in Maude the BGP protocol as a transition system driven by
rewriting rules. Consequently, we can use the high-performance rewriting engine
provided by Maude to analyze BGP instances automatically.
6.1.1 A Maude Library for BGP Systems
This section presents our Maude library for analyzing BGP instances. This library
provides specification of the protocol dynamics that are common to BGP instances,
and defines a routing policy template in terms of the Stable Path Problem (SPP) so
that network designers can customize it to analyze a specific instance. Our library
also provides support for detecting route oscillation.
Our library is organized into a hierarchy of Maude modules. Table 6.1 presents
the correspondence between concepts in BGP protocols and the Maude code. We
first show how our library represents a single network state of BGP system (Sec-
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BGP system Maude interpretation
Network nodes (Router) objects
Routing messages Terms of type Msg
Global Network Multiset of router objects and terms rep-
resenting messages
Protocol dynamics Local rewriting rules
Global network behaviors Concurrent rewrites using local rules
Route oscillation support A Logger object recording the histories
of route assignments and rewriting rules
updating the Logger object
Table 6.1: Overview and Interpretation of Maude Library
tion 6.1.1). Then we explain how to capture the dynamic behavior of a local BGP
router using rewrite rules. In doing so, the global network behaviors can be viewed
as concurrent applications of the local rewriting rules (Section 6.1.1). Finally, we
discuss the component in the library that detects route oscillation (Section 6.1.1).
Network State Maude provides a built-in sort Configuration for the global
state of a concurrent object-based system. In our library, we model BGP system
state by defining two sub-sorts of Configuration: Msg and Network. Msg is the
type for routing messages, and Network the type for the collection network nodes.
To construct the Network Configuration from the constituting network nodes,
we further introduce sort Node. Node is a sub-sort of Object, and is the type of
each network node (routers) in the BGP system.
sorts Msg Network .
subsorts Network Msg < Configuration .
sort Node .
subsort Node < Object .
A network state is represented by a multiset of network nodes (routers) and
routing messages used by routers to exchange routing information. Given the
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above sorts, we can represent a BGP system state by a multiset of routing messages
terms (of sort Msg) and network nodes objects (terms of sort Node). To distinguish
a network node object from other Maude objects, we introduce a special Cid (class
identifier) called Router. With Router Cid, we introduce the constructor of a net-
work node (router) object. In Maude, op is the keyword defining constructors:
op Router : Oid .
op [_:_|_,_,_] : Oid Router RoutingTable BestPath Nb -> Node .
The constructor [ : | , , ] takes five arguments: The first two are a unique iden-
tifier (of sort Oid) and a class identifier (the Cid constant Router). The Oid denotes
the node’s unique name in the network, the class identifier denotes the class type
of the node. The last three arguments are object attributes: routing table (of sort
RoutingTable), best path (of sort BestPath), and neighboring table (of sort Nb).
Given the argument terms, a router object term (of sort Node) is constructed. Next
we discuss a Node object’s three attributes.
RoutingTable and BestPath attributes. At a given state, the routing table and
best path attributes store node v’s available paths P v to reach destination 0, and
its current best path that ranks the highest among P v respectively. They are con-
structed as follows:
op routingTable:_ : List{Path} -> RoutingTable .
op bestPath:_ : Path -> BestPath.
The sort Path and its constructors are defined as follows:
sort Path .
op emptyPath : -> Path [ctor] .
op source:_,dest:_,pv:(_),metric:_ :
Oid Oid ListOid Metric -> Path .
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There are two ways to construct a term of sort Path: a path is either an empty path
(emptyPath), or a path from a source node (Oid) to a destination node (Oid) via
a path vector (the list of intermediary nodes denoted by List{Oid}) at some cost
of sort Metric. Sort Metric specify how paths are measured and compared. For
example, a path metric in the SPP formalism is its rank defined in Λ. We interpret
the metrics over Maude’s built-in natural numbers sort Nat:
sort Metric .
subsorts Nat < Metric .
Neighbor attribute. A node’s neighboring table holds its list of link information to
reach its direct neighbors:
sort Neighbor .
op mkNeigh(_,_) : Oid Metric -> Neighbor.
Here the constructor mkNeigh( , ) takes two arguments: the direct neighbor’s
identifier, and the cost (Metric) to reach this neighbor.
Example node object. Based on the above definition, each network node is then rep-
resented by a Maude object, whose attributes consist of its routing table, best path
and neighboring table. We omit the detailed Maude sort definitions, but provide
an example encoding of the network node n1 in Disagree gadget show in Figure 2.5
as follows.
[n1 : router |
routingTable: (source: n1,dest: n0,pv:(n1 n0),metric: 2),
bestPath: (source: n1,dest: n0,pv:(n1 n0),metric: 2),
nb: (mkNeigh(n0,2) mkNeigh(n2,1))]
The constructor for a node is [ : | , , ]. The first two elements (n1:router)
specify the node’s id n1, and its object class router. The next three elements
are the attributes. At a given state, the routing table attribute constructed from
routingTable: contains n1’s current available routes. Each routing table entry
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stores the routing information for one particular next-hop. Here, the routing ta-
ble attribute only contains one entry (source: n1, dest: n0, pv:(n1 n0),
metric: 2). This route is specified by its source (source: n1), destination
(dest: n0), the path vector that contains the list of nodes along the path (pv:
(n1 n0)), and the cost of the route (metric: 2). This route is also used for the
best path attribute, constructed from bestPath: , which contains n1’s current best
path. The last attribute is the neighbor table, constructed from nb: . To extract a
node’s local neighbor table from the network topology, we further introduce an op-
erator mkNeigh. The first argument of mkNeigh is the identifier of the neighboring
node, and the second argument the metric associated with the link to that node.
Node n1 has two neighbors, node n0, the cost to which is 2 (mkNeigh(n0,2)); and
node n2, the cost to which is 1 (mkNeigh(n2,1)).
Besides Router objects, the second part of a network state are routing messages
in the network. Typically, network nodes exchange routing information by sending
each other routing messages carrying newly-learned routing paths. In our library,
it is specified as follows:
op sendPacket(_,_,_,_,_) : Oid Oid Oid Metric ListOid -> Msg
The first two Oid arguments denotes the sender’s Oid and the receiver’s Oid re-
spectively. The rest of the arguments specify the destination Oid, metrics of the
advertised path, and the path-vector (the list of network nodes along the path) of
the routing path the message carries.
For example, in the disagree gadget, the initial routing message sent by node n1
to its neighbors n2 carrying its direct path to n0 are is: sendPacket(n1,n2,n0,2,n1
n0).
Protocol Dynamics We now show how to specify network system dynamics in
Maude. By modeling a BGP system as a concurrent system consisting of router
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objects (and the routing messages), to specify the global BGP evolution, we only
need to specify the local rewrite rules governing the state transition of each BGP
router.
A BGP node’s dynamics can be captured by various equivalent state transitions.
To reduce search space in analysis, we adopt a one-state transition: for each BGP
node N, when it receives routing messages from a neighbor S, N computes the new
path from the received message, updates N’s routing table and re-selects best path
accordingly, and finally sends out routing messages carrying its new best path
information if a different best path is selected. This state transition is encoded as a
single rewrite rule of the following form:
rl [route-update] :
sendPacket(S, N, D, C, PV)
[ N : router | routingTable: RT, bestPath: Pb, nb: NB ]
=>
if (case 1) then best path re-selects (promotion)
else (if (case 2) then best path remains same
else (if (case 3) then best path re-selection (withdraw)
else error processing
fi) fi) fi.
Here, r1 is the identifier of this rule, and route-update is the name of this rule.
Rule r1 is fired when the left-hand side is matched; that is, when a node N consists
of routingTable RT, bestPath Pb, and neighboring table NB receives a route adver-
tisement message from neighbor S. The result of applying the rule is shown on the
right-hand side: the routing message is consumed, and attributes of router N are
updated. Based on the result of the re-selected bestPath attribute, there are three
different cases for N to update its state as specified in the three branches. Next, we
explain these three cases.
Best path promotion. In any case, node N needs to first compute the new path
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based on its neighbor S’s message asserting that S can reach D via a path PV. We
define a function newPath that takes a routing message and the neighbor table
as arguments, and returns the new path by first prepending N to the path an-
nounced by S, setting the new path attribute according to the local ranking func-
tion lookUpRank, and then imposing the import policy by modifying the path met-
ric according to BGP routing policy configuration (import function). Here import
and lookUpRank are unspecified routing policy functions. Together with export
that we will introduce shortly, they constitute our library’s specification interface
for defining BGP routing policy. To specify a particular BGP instance’s routing pol-
icy, the user only needs to specify import, lookUpRank and export accordingly.
The first branch (case 1) is specified below. The newly computed path is com-
pared with the current bestPath Pb, if the new one is preferred over the old value
Pb, the bestPath attribute will be updated to this new path. Furthermore, if the
export policy allows, the new best path value will be re-advertised to all of N’s
neighbors by sending them routing messages.
if getDest(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB))==getDest(Pb) and
prefer?(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB),Pb)==true
then
([ N : router |
routingTable: updatedRT(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB),RT),
bestPath: newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB),
nb: NB ]
multiCast(NB, export(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB))))
Here the new state of N is obtained by updating the old routingTable attribute
RT (updateRT function), and updating the bestPath attribute by setting it to the
new value of bestPath. The updateRT function recursively checks the routing
table, and for each next-hop entry, it either inserts the new path (newPath(...))
if no available route is presented; or replaces the old value with the new path.
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To complete the state transition, for all N’s neighbors, routing messages carrying
the new path are generated by multiCast function. To impose the export routing
policy, before sending the new best path, export is applied to the new path to filter
out the routes which are intended to be hidden from neighbors. Similar to import,
export is to be instantiated by the user when analyzing a particular BGP instance.
If the export routing policy prohibits the new path to be announced, export will
transform it to emptyPath, which multiCast will not generate any message.
Best path remains the same. In the second branch (case 2), a new path newPath(...)
is computed from the received message as before. However, the new path is no bet-
ter than the current bestPath Pb. But the next-hop node of the new path and Pb are
different, implying that the new path is just an alternative path 1 for N to reach the
destination. As a result, the current bestPath value Pb is unchanged, and only
the routingTable will be updated with this alternative path (newPath(...)). No
routing messages will be generated:
if getDest(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB))==getDest(Pb) and
getNext(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB))=/=getNext(Pb) and
prefer?(Pb,newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB))==true
then
[ N : router |
routingTable: updateRT(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB),RT),
bestPath: Pb,
nb: NB ]
Best path withdraw. The same as in the second branch, in case 3, the newly com-
puted path newPath(...) is worse than the current bestPath Pb, but it is now
routed through the same next-hop S as current bestPath Pb. The fact that S now
sends a less preferred path indicates that the previous learned route Pb is no longer
1Different next-hop implies the route is learned from a different neighbor.
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available at S. Therefore, we need to withdraw Pb by dropping Pb from routing ta-
ble, shown as follows:
if getDest(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB))==getDest(Pb) and
getNext(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB))==getNext(Pb) and
prefer?(Pb, newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB))==true
then
([ N : router |
routingTable: updateRT(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB),RT),
newBest(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB),
updateRT(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB),RT)),
nb: NB ]
multiCast(NB,export(newBest(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB),
updateRT(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB),
RT))))
Here, updateRT replaces (therefore removes) the outdated Pb with the new
path
(newPath(...)), and newBest function re-computes the best path from newPath(...)
and the remaining paths in routing table. As in case 1, to complete the state tran-
sition, the newly selected best path is sent to its neighbors by multiCast(...).
Auxiliary Functions. In the following code snippet, we show the auxiliary functions
used in computing new network state. To compute a new path, concat is defined
as follows:
op concat : Oid Oid Oid Metric ListOid ListNeighbor -> Path .
eq concat(S, N, D, C, PV, NB)
= (source: N, dest: D, pv:(N PV), metric: lookUpRank (N PV)) .
eq is a Maude keyword preceding equation definitions. Here the new path of N’s
to reach D is simply by prepending N to PV: N PV. And the metric of (N PV) is de-
termined by N’s routing policy, i.e., route ranking λN implemented by function
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lookUpRank. The definition of this function is specific to each BGP configuration
instance, and is an interface between the protocol dynamics and the routing poli-
cies. We will revisit the specification of specific BGP instance’s routing policies by
lookUpRank in appendix 6.1.2.
Given the newly computed route, to update a node’s routing table, we use
updateRT as follows:
op updateRT : Path ListPath -> ListPath .
eq updateRT (P, nil) = (P) .
eq updateRT (P, (P’ RT)) =
if ((getDest (P) == getDest (P’)) and
(getNext (P) == getNext (P’)))
then (P RT)
else (P’ updateRT (P, RT)) fi .
Note that, updateRT ensures that the routing table always keeps exactly one path
from one particular next-hop neighbor.
Finally, if the best path attribute of the node changes, we use multiCast to
generate routing messages:
op multiCast : ListNeighbor Path -> Configuration .
eq multiCast((NBentry NB’), (source: S, dest: D, pv:(PV), metric: C))
= sendPacket (S, getOid(NBentry), D, C, (PV))
multiCast (NB’, (source: S, dest: D, pv:(PV), metric: C)) .
For each neighbor NBentry in N’s neighboring table, multiCast recursively gener-
ates the routing message sendPacket(S,getOid(NBentry),D,C,(PV)). getOid
is an auxiliary-function that extracts the neighbor NBentry’s Oid.
Route Oscillation Detection Support Our library also provides extra definitions
to help detect route oscillation. Our method is based on the observation that if
route oscillation occurs during network system evolution, there is at least one path
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assignment (at a given state for a BGP system, we define the path assignment to be
the collection of best paths currently selected by all network nodes) that is visited
twice. Therefore, we use the following simple heuristic: we maintain a record of
all path assignments for all visited states in BGP execution, and check for recur-
ring path assignment. Note that a path assignment (best path attribute of router
object) only constitutes a sub-set of the entire system state (the router objects at-
tributes and routing messages), consequently our heuristic based on this partial
system state can have false positives: our analysis may report a false route oscil-
lation when two states are identical only in path assignments, but not the entire
system states. Nevertheless, our heuristic is sound and is still helpful in detect-
ing all potential route oscillation: when route oscillation occurs, a recurring path
assignment state must occur.
More concretely, in our Maude library, we create a global logger object to keep
track of the history of path assignments. For each snapshot of the network state,
i.e. whenever a network node makes a local state transition and updates its best
path attribute, the logger object is synchronized to create a new path assignment
entry that corresponds to the updated best path. We then provide a function that
checks for recurring entries in the list of visited path assignments, which can be
used directly in Maude’s exhaustive search to detect route oscillation.
Logger object. The logger object consists of only one attribute: a history (list) of
path assignments, each entry of which corresponds to the list of best paths for all
nodes in the network at a given state. The Maude code for defining the logger
object is shown below.
sort Logger .
op Logger : -> Cid .
op {_:_|_} : Oid Cid AttributeSet -> Logger .
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op history:_ : List{PathAssignment} -> Attribute .
op {_} : List{BP} -> PathAssignment .
sort BP .
op [_] : List{Oid} -> BP .
The first three lines declares a special Logger object, and the constructor of the Log-
ger, which takes three arguments, the first one is the identifier for the logger, simi-
lar to the identifiers for the router objects; the second argument is the class identi-
fier of logger object; and the last one is the attribute of the logger. The next two lines
declare the only attribute of Logger, which is a list (history) of PathAssignment
elements, each of which denotes one path assignment in the network at a given
state. A path assignment is a list of best path selected by each node in the network.
The last two lines defines each entry in one path assignment, which is simply the
best path for some network node: i.e. the list of nodes in the best path.
By utilizing above definitions, the global logger is represented by an object pa
of Logger class which has one attribute history. At a given state, this attribute
contains a list (history) of path assignments, each entry of which contains the snap-
shot of the network’s collection of best paths in a visited state. An example logger
object for the disagree gadget is the following:
{pa : Logger | history: ({[n1 n2 n0] [n2 n0]}
{[n1 n2 n0] [n2 n1 n0]}
{[n1 n2 n0] [n2 n0]}
{[n1 n0] [n2 n0]})}
The above logger records four snapshots of the Disagree’s best paths. For example,
the first path assignment {[n1 n2 n0] [n2 n0]} denotes the network latest state
where node 1’s best path to 0 is [n1 n2 n0] and node 2’s best path is [n2 n0].
And line 4 {[n2 n0] [n2 n0]} records Disagree’s path assignment at its initial
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(oldest) state. Note that, this object content actually exhibits route oscillation (line
1 and line 3) described in Section 6.1.1.
Synchronized logging. To log all path assignment changes, we only need to
slightly modify the single rewrite rule for route update, such that whenever the
rule is fired to apply local state transition for some node, the global object pa is
synchronized and its path assignment is updated to reflect changes in the local
node’s best path attribute, shown as follows:
rl [route-update-logging] :
sendPacket(S, N, D, C, PV)
[ N : router | routingTable: RT, bestPath: Pb, nb: NB ]
{ pa : Logger | history: HIS }
=>
*** first branch: bestPath re-selects (promotion)
if ... then ...
{ pa : Logger | history:
historyAppend(updateAt(index(N),
[getPV(newPath(sendPacket(S,N,D,C,PV),NB))],
head(HIS)),HIS)})
else ... fi .
On the left-hand side, two objects: a router N and the global logger pa are matched
to trigger the transition. As described in 6.1.1, in the first branch of route update
where the node’s best path attribute is set to newPath(...), the logger pa updates
its path assignment attribute as follows: First, it creates a new path assignment
entry to record newPath(...) by function updateAt(...). Then, the new en-
try updateAt(...) is inserted into the list of previous path assignments HIS by
function historyAppend. Here, the new path assignment entry updateAt(...) is
computed by updating the latest path assignment entry head(HIS)with newPath(...).
The rest of branches 2 and 3 are modified similarly.
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Route oscillation detection. A network state is now a multiset of router objects,
routing messages, and one global logger object. The function detectCycle detects
re-curring path assignments, as follows:
eq detectCycle([ N : router | routingTable: RT,
bestPath: Pb,nb: NB] cf)
= detectCycle (cf) .
eq detectCycle(message cf) = detectCycle (cf) .
eq detectCycle({ pa : Logger | history: HIS } cf)
= containCycle? (HIS) .
The first two equations ignore router objects and routing messages in the net-
work state, and the last equation examines logger pa by function containCycle?
to check for recurring path assignment entries in HIS. We will revisit the use of
detectCycle to search for route oscillation in Section 6.1.3.
6.1.2 Specifying BGP Instance
Given a BGP instance with its network topology and routing policies, we show how
to specify the instance as a SPP in our library. We discuss examples for both eBGP
and iBGP.
eBGP instance An eBGP instance can be directly modeled by an SPP instance
S = (G, o, P,Λ): G, o specifies the instance’s network topology, and P,Λ specifies
the resulting per-node route ranking function after applying the eBGP instance’s
routing policies. Our library provides Maude definitions for each SPP element.
Network topology.
The network topology G, o is represented by three constants: n0, top-Nodes,
top-BGP:
op n0 : Oid .
op top-Nodes : -> ListOid .
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op top-BGP : -> Topology .
n0 is the specific destination o, top-Nodes the set of network nodes, and top-BGP
the set of BGP links. Our library has pre-defined sort Topology to capture that a
network topology is a set of labeled network links:
sorts Link Topology .
op (_,_:_) : Oid Oid Metric -> Link .
subsort Link < Topology .
op __ : Topology Topology -> Topology .
The first line of Maude code declares Topology and Link; The second line says
a Link is constructed from its two end nodes, and the associated metric. The last
two lines specify how Topology is constructed: a topology is either a single link,
or recursively constructed from existing topologies.
Our Maude library automatically generates an eBGP instance’s initial state based
on its topology:
op gadget : -> Configuration .
eq gadget = init-config (top-Nodes, top-BGP) .
By using above Maude library, an eBGP instance’s initial network state is gen-
erated from its network topology, which is represented by a list of network nodes
and links. Our library declares two constants top-Nodes and top-BGP to repre-
sent network nodes and links. For example, to specify the topology of the Disagree
gadget, the user defines top-Nodes, top-BGP as follows:
eq top-Nodes = n1 n2 .
eq top-BGP = (n1,n0 : 2) (n1,n2 : 1) (n2,n1 : 1) (n2,n0 : 2) .
Here, n0 is the identifier of the destination node (o). Each link is associated
with its cost. Based on the value of top-Nodes and top-BGP that are input by the
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user, our library automatically generates Disagree’s initial state by init-config
function:
eq gadget = init-config (top-Nodes, top-BGP) .
The resulting gadget is a network state which consists of the two network
router objects n1,n2, the four initial routing messages, and the initial logger pa,
as shown in Section 6.1.3. In this initial state, the three attributes of each network
node – the routing table and best-path and neighbor tables are computed as fol-
lows: init-config parses the BGP links in network topology (top-BGP), for each
link (ni,nj : M), a new routing table entry for nj with cost M is created, and if
nj == n0, then set ni’s best path to the one-hop direct path ni n0, and its rout-
ing tables containing this one-hop direct route; otherwise if there is no direct link
from ni to n0, set ni’s best path and the routing table to emptyPath. Initial routing
messages and logger pa are computed in a similar manner.
Routing policy. The route ranking function Λ and permitted paths P are the result
of applying three BGP policies functions: import, export and lookUpRank. As
we have discussed in Section 6.1.1, import,export,lookUpRank are three user-
defined functions that serve as the specification interface for routing policies.
Functions import and lookUpRank are used to compute new routing paths
from a neighbor’s routing message: import filters out un-wanted paths, and lookUpRank
assigns a rank to the remaining permitted paths. Note that the metric value lookUpRank
(N PV) assigned by lookUpRank also determines the route’s preference in route
selection. export is used to filter out routes the router would like to hide.
As an example, the policy functions for Disagree are defined as follows.
eq export (P) = P . eq import (P) = P .
eq lookUpRank (n1 n2 n0) = 1 . eq lookUpRank (n1 n0) = 2 .
eq lookUpRank (n2 n1 n0) = 1 . eq lookUpRank (n2 n0) = 2 .
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The first line says Disagree does not employ additional import/export policies.
Whereas the second and third line asserts that Disagree’s two nodes prefers routes
through each other: For example the second line encodes node n1’s ranking policy
that it prefers path (n1 n2 n0) (with higher rank 1) through n2 over the direct
path (n1 n0) (rank 2).
iBGP Instance The main differences between an iBGP and eBGP instances are:
(1) iBGP network topology distinguishes between internal routers and gateway
routers. Gateway routers runs eBGP to exchange routing information with (gate-
way routers of) other ISPs, while simultaneously running iBGP to exchange the
external routing information with internal routers in the AS. (2) iBGP routing pol-
icy utilizes a separate IGP protocol to select best route. Internal to an AS, the ISP
uses its own IGP protocol to compute shortest paths among all routers. The short-
est path distance between internal routers and gateway routers are used in iBGP
route selection: iBGP policy requires the internal routers to pick routes with short-
est distance to its gateway router.
As a result, iBGP requires encoding two types of topologies: a signaling topol-
ogy for gateway routers and internal routers to exchange routes within the AS, and
a physical topology on which the IGP protocol is running. Further, an additional
destination router denoting the special SPP destination o is added as an external
router which is connected with all gateway routers. In our library, we implement
and run separately in Maude an IGP protocol (for computing all-pairs shortest
paths) and pass the resulting shortest path distances to iBGP protocol.
An iBGP configuration instance C = (GP , GS, X) is defined by its physical
topology GP , signaling topology GS , and gateway (egress) BGP nodes X . GP rep-
resents the underlying network topology that runs a separate IGP protocol, there-
fore we also callGP the IGP topology. GS represents the network topology that runs
iBGP. The iBGP links in GS can be partitioned into three classes over,down,up: an
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over iBGP link represents a vanilla iBGP link, a down iBGP link represents a iBGP
session from a iBGP reflector2 node to its client, and an up link represents that from
a client to its reflector server. X represents the gateway (egress) BGP nodes from
which external routes (routes to destinations outside the AS) are learned.
While the eBGP instance is usually given in the form of SPP, we need one ad-
ditional translation [27] to transform iBGP instance into SPP. Because we are in-
terested in the behavior of an iBGP instance C = (GP , GS, X) in distributing ex-
ternal routing information learned from iBGP gateway routers, we define an iBGP
instance’s corresponding SPP representation S = (G, o, P,Λ) as follows: o is an
additional network node outside the iBGP instance, and it represents the external
common destination;G is the signaling topologyGs with the additional node o and
(non-BGP) links between o and egress nodes X ; Λ is the function that computes
IGP-distance. This is because, within an AS, for a common external destination o,
all routes’ AS-level metrics are same, as a result, a route can uses its IGP-distance
alone to decide its rank.
To automate an iBGP instance specification in Maude, for each iBGP instance
C = (GP , GS, X), we provide additional Maude definitions to generate its SPP
reorientation (G, o, P,Λ). We describe network topology G, o and routing policy Λ
respectively.
Network topology. Similar to eBGP, iBGP network topology G, o is represented by
constants top-BGP, nd. Rather than asking the user to manually input top-BGP
as in eBGP instance, our library generates top-BGP from iBGP signaling topology
as follows:
op top-iBGP-signal : -> Topology .
ops top-Nodes top-Xset : -> ListOid .
eq top-BGP = addExternal (top-iBGP-signal, top-Xset, nd) .
2To solve scalability problem in full-mesh iBGP configuration, some iBGP nodes are elected to
be route reflectors that act as focal point in iBGP sessions: the reflectors form a smaller full-mesh,
and the rest of the nodes become their clients.
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top-iBGP-signal, top-Xset stores the iBGP instance’s signaling topology
GS and egress nodes X . Note that, while the metric of each link in an eBGP net-
work topology represents the associated link cost (e.g. the IGP distance between
the two nodes), the metric of link in signaling topology denotes its class: over, up,
or down. So our library further includes three metric constants:
ops up down over : -> Metric .
addExternal is a function that takes the external destination nd, egress nodes
top-Xset as input, and generates the network topology top-BGP by adding to the
signaling topology top-iBGP-signal additional links between each egress node
in X and external destination o:
op addExternal : Topology ListOid Oid -> Topology .
eq addExternal(top, (X Xset), D) =
addExternal (top, Xset, D) (X,D : 1) .
eq addExternal (top, nil, D) = top .
The resulting top-BGP is then used to initialize network state as in eBGP in-
stance.
Based on the above library support, to specify the network topology of iBGP in-
stance, the user only need to specify GP , X by customizing constants top-Nodes,
top-iBGP-signal, top-Xset. For example, to specify a 6-node iBGP instance [16],
we write:
eq top-Nodes = n0 n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 .
eq top-Xset = n3 n4 n5 .
eq top-iBGP-signal =
(n0,n1 : over) (n0,n2 : over) (n0,n3 : down)
(n1,n0 : over) (n1,n2 : over) (n1,n4 : down)
(n2,n0 : over) (n2,n1 : over) (n2,n5 : down)
(n3,n0 : up) (n4,n1 : up) (n5,n2 : up) .
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Routing policy
Like eBGP instance, routing policy Λ is given by customizing import, export,
and lookUpRank. But unlike eBGP instance where lookUpRank simply assigns
each path its rank, iBGP routing policy is more complex.
An iBGP policy consists of two parts: First, a valid iBGP path consists of a set
of (can be empty) up links, which is followed by zero or one over link followed by
a set (can be empty) of down links. Second, for routes with same AS-level attribute,
a node always prefers routes with lower IGP distance, i.e., routes with shorter
distance to a egress node.
The first policy is achieved by imposing an export policy at each node, such
that only routing updates from a client will be exported to all neighbors. In Maude
library, this is achieved by defining export in the iBGP module as follows:
*** for routes learned from internal nodes
*** only allow routing path of the form:
*** ... up ... up (over) down down ...
eq export ((source: S, dest: D, pv:(S N N’ PV), metric: C)) =
if (getLinkMetric (S,N,top-iBGP) == over and
getLinkMetric (N,N’,top-iBGP) == over)
then emptyPath
else (source: S, dest: D, pv:(S N N’ PV), metric: C) fi .
*** for routes learned from egress nodes, do nothing
eq export ((source: S, dest: D, pv:(S N), metric: C)) =
(source: S, dest: D, pv:(S N), metric: C) .
The second iBGP policy is achieved by set a path’s rank to its IGP distance:
eq lookUpRank (PV) =
computeIGP (head (PV), last(front(PV)), top-IGP) .
Here head(PV) is the source of the path PV, and last(front(PV)) is the egress
node head(PV) used to reach destination last(PV). And top-IGP is the underly-
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ing IGP topology. The function computeIGP computes the IGP distance between
the source and the egress node according to the underlying IGP topology. In our
Maude library, we implement computeIGP by implementing a separate IGP pro-
tocol called shortest-path protocol. In shortest-path protocol, the IGP distance be-
tween two nodes is the cost of the shortest path between them.
Based on the above library support, to specify iBGP lookUpRank, the user only
needs to specify the underlying IGP topology GP by providing proper definition
of top-IGP. For example, to specify the 6-node iBGP instance, we write:
eq top-IGP =
(n0,n3 : 10) (n0,n4 : 5) (n1,n4 : 10)
(n1,n5 : 5) (n2,n5 : 10) (n2,n3 : 5) .
Here the link metric 5,10 specifies the IGP distance between neighboring nodes.
6.1.3 Detecting Anomalies
To analyze BGP instances, our library allows us to (1) execute the Maude specifica-
tion to simulate possible execution runs; and (2) exhaustively search all execution
runs to detect route oscillation.
Network Simulation Network initialization.
For any analysis, we need to first generate a BGP instance’s initial network
state. For a given BGP instance, we have shown how to generate its initial state
gadget from its network topology and routing policy, as described in section 6.1.2.
For example, the initial state generated for Disagree is as follows:
{pa : Logger | history:{[n1 n0] [n2 n0]}}
[n1 : router | routingTable: (source: n1, dest: n0,
pv:(n1 n0), metric: 2),
bestPath: (source: n1, dest: n0,
pv:(n1 n0), metric: 2),
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nb: (mkNeigh(n0,2) mkNeigh(n2,1))]
[n2 : router | ... ]
sendPacket(n1,n0,n0,n2,n1 n0) sendPacket(n1,n2,n0,n2,n1 n0)
sendPacket(n2,n0,n0,n2,n2 n0) sendPacket(n2,n1,n0,n2,n2 n0)
This state consists of Disagree’s initial logger object pa that holds the initial path
assignment [n1 n0] [n2 n0], two router objects n1,n2, and four initial routing
messages.
Execution.
Unlike many formal specification paradigms used in static network analysis,
a Maude specification is executable. To explore one possible execution run from
a given initial state gadget, we can directly use Maude’s rewrite and frewrite
(fair rewriting) commands. For example, we could tell Maude to execute the Dis-
agree gadget with the following command: frew gadget . This command termi-
nates and returns the following final state:
{pa : Logger |
history: ({[n1 n0] [n2 n1 n0]} ... {[n1 n0] [n2 n0]})}
[n1 : router |...
bestPath: (source: n1,dest: n0,pv:(n1 n0),metric: 2), ...]
[n2 : router |...
bestPath: (source: n2,dest: n0,pv:(n2 n1 n0),metric: 1),...]
Note that this final state corresponds to one of the stable path assignments of Dis-
agree described in Section 1, where node n1 sets its best path to [n1 n0], and node
n2 sets its best path to [n2 n1 n0].
On the other hand, with the rew command which employs a different rewriting
strategy, divergence scenario is simulated and route oscillation is observed in the
simulation. This is because frewrite employs a depth-first position-fair rewriting
strategy, while rewrite employs a left-most, outer-most strategy that coincides
with the execution trace that leads to divergence.
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Route Oscillation Detection While Maude commands frew/rew explore a small
portion of possible runs of the instance, the search command allows us to exhaus-
tively explore the entire execution space. To exhaustively search BGP execution
for route oscillation, we only need to first input the BGP instance’s network topol-
ogy and routing policy to generate the corresponding initial state, as described in
Section 6.1.2; and then use the search command to automatically search for oscil-
lation. For example, for Disagree, we run:
search [1] gadget =>+ X such that detectCycle(X) = true .
Here, gadget is Disagree’s initial state, and =>+ X tells Maude to search for any
reachable network state X such that at that state, the logger pa contains recur-
ring path assignment (detectCycle(X)=true). search command exhaustively
explores Disagree runs and returns with the first Disagree state that exhibits oscil-
lation:
{pa : Logger | history: ({[n1 n2 n0] [n2 n0]}
{[n1 n2 n0] [n2 n1 n0]}
{[n1 n2 n0] [n2 n0]}
{[n1 n0] [n2 n0]})}
[n1 : router |...] [n2 : router |...] ...
Here, the resulting path assignment content in pa exhibits an oscillation (line 1,
line 3).
In general, Maude allows us to exhaustively search for violation of a safety
property P by running the following command:
search initialNetwork =>+ X:Configuration such that P(X) == false.
which tells Maude to exhaustively search for a network state X that violates P along
all possible execution traces from the initial state initialNetwork. If Maude re-
turns with No solution, we can conclude property P holds for all execution traces.
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6.2 Verifying Declarative Networks
To prove the correct of declarative implementation, and analyzing alternative rout-
ing mechanisms such as HLP, FVR further provides formal analysis support to ver-
ify declarative network. This chapter presents FVR’s ability to maps declarative
network programs [76] automatically into logical axioms that can be directly used
in existing theorem provers to validate protocol correctness. FVR is a significant
improvement compared to existing use case of theorem proving which typically
require several man-months to construct the system specifications.
FVR takes as input NDlog program specifications of the routing mechanisms
protocol. Since most theorem provers leverage type information, FVR further in-
cludes a Type Schema with the NDlog program specifications. This is not unlike a
database-like schema storing the attribute types of all network state being used. In
order to carry out the formal verification process, the NDlog programs and schema
information are automatically compiled into formal specifications recognizable by
a standard theorem prover (e.g. PVS [62], Coq [3]) using the axiom generator. At
the same time, the protocol designer specifies high-level invariant properties of
the protocol to be checked via two mechanisms: invariants can be written directly
as theorems into the theorem prover, or expressed as NDlog rules which are then
automatically translated into theorems using the axiom generator. The first ap-
proach increases the expressiveness of invariant properties, where one can reason
with invariants that can be only expressible in higher order logic. The second ap-
proach has restricted expressiveness based on NDlog’s use of Datalog, but has the
added advantage that the same properties expressed in NDlog can be verified by
both theorem prover and at run-time.
To illustrate the verification process, we step through the path-vector protocol
example, used in BGP networks. For ease of exposition, we defer the treatment
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of soft-state derivations and events to Section 6.2.3, focusing instead on traditional
hard-state data (with infinite lifetimes) that are valid until explicitly deleted.
6.2.1 Path-vector Protocol in Declarative Network
We present an example NDlog program that implements the path-vector proto-
col [57], a standard textbook route protocol used for computing paths between
any two nodes in the network.
p1 path(@S,D,P,C):- link(@S,D,C),P=f_init(S,D).
p2 path(@S,D,P,C):- link(@S,Z,C1), path(@Z,D,P2,C2),C=C1+C2,
P=f_concatPath(Z,P2), f_inPath(P2,S)=false.
p3 bestPathCost(@S,D,min<C>):-path(@S,D,P,C).
p4 bestPath(@S,D,P,C):- bestPathCost(@S,D,C), path(@S,D,P,C).
Query bestPath(@S,D,P,C).
The program takes as input link(@S,D,C) tuples, where each tuple corre-
sponds to a copy of an entry in the neighbor table, and represents an edge from
the node itself (S) to one of its neighbors (D) of cost c. NDlog supports a location
specifier in each predicate, expressed with @ symbol followed by an attribute. This
attribute is used to denote the source location of each corresponding tuple. For
example, link tuples are stored based on the value of the S field.
Rules p1-p2 recursively derive path(@S,D,P,C) tuples, where each tuple rep-
resents the fact that the path from S to D is via the path P with a cost of C. Rule
p1 computes one-hop reachability trivially given the neighbor set of S stored in
link(@S,D,C). Rule P2 computes transitive reachability as follows: if there exists
a link from S to Z with cost C1, and Z knows about a shortest path P2 to D with cost
C2, then transitively, S can reach D via the path f concatPath(Z,P2) with cost
C1+C2. Note that p1-p2 also utilizes two list manipulation functions to maintain
path vector p: f init(S,D) initializes a path vector with two elements S and D,
while f concatPath(Z,P2) pre-pends Z to path vector P2.
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Rules p3-p4 take as input hop tuples generated by rules p1-p2, and then derive
the hop along the path with the minimal cost for each source/destination pair.
The output of the program is the set of bestPathHop(@S,D,Z,C) tuples, where
each tuple stores the next hop Z along the shortest path from S to D. To prevent
computing paths with cycles, an extra predicate f inPath(P, S) = false is used
in rule p2, where the function f inPath(P, S) returns true if node S is in the path
vector P.
The execution model of declarative networks is based on a distributed vari-
ant of the standard evaluation technique for Datalog programs that is commonly
known as semi-naı¨ve (SN) evaluation [37], with modifications to enable pipelined
asynchronous evaluation suited to a distributed setting. Reference [37] provides
details on the implementation and execution model of declarative networking.
For the purposes of formal verification, we do not consider the location spec-
ifiers within the proof. This does not affect the program in terms of the set of
eventual facts being generated but does affect the notion of data distribution. Our
extended technical report [75] elaborate this issue in greater detail.
Axiom Generation: From NDlog rules to PVS Axioms The first step in FVR
declarative network verification involves the automatic generation of PVS formaliza-
tion (or axioms) directly from NDlog rules. Based on the proof-theoretic semantics
of Datalog [65], there is a natural and automatic mapping from NDlog rules to PVS
axioms.3 Before showing the actual PVS encoding for the path-vector protocol, it is
informative to understand the proof-theoretic semantics of p1 and p2 as inference
rules used in proof system:
The inference rule p1 expresses the logical statement ∀(S,D, P, C).link(S,D,C)∧
P = finit(S,D) =⇒ path(S,D, P, C)
3The equivalence of NDlog’s proof-theoretic semantics and operational semantics guarantees
that FVR is sound in the sense that, the correctness property established by FVR corresponds pre-
cisely to the operational semantics of NDlog execution.
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Rule p2 is slightly more complex as some attribute variables do not appear in
the resulting head. The general technique to express these variables is in terms of
existential quantification. Accordingly, rule p2 expresses the logical statement that
∀(S,D, P, C).∃(C1, C2, Z, P2).link(S,Z, C1)∧ bestPath(Z,D, P2, C2)∧C = C1 +C2∧
P = fconcatPath(Z, P2) =⇒ path(S,D, P, C)
From the above logical statements, FVR generates the following axioms:
path_generate: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node)(C:Metric)(P:Path):(link(S,D,C) AND P=f_init(S,D)) OR
((EXISTS (P2:Path)(C1,C2:Metric):(link(S,Z,C1) AND bestPath(Z,D,P2,C2)
AND C=C1+C2 AND P=f_concatPath(Z,P2))) =>path(S,D,P,C)
path_close: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node)(C:Metric)(P):path(S,D,P,C)=>
((link(S,D,C) AND P=f_init(S,D)) OR (EXISTS (Z:Node)(P,P2:Path)
(C1,C2:Metric): (link(S,Z,C1) AND bestPath(Z,D,P2,C2) AND C=C1+C2
AND P=f_concatPath(Z,P2))))
The first path generate axiom is generated in a straightforward manner from
rules p1 and p2, where the logical OR indicates that path facts can be generated
from either rule. The path close axiom indicates that the path tuple is the small-
est set derived by the two rules, ensuring that these axioms automatically gener-
ated in FVR correctly reflected the minimal model of NDlog semantics. The list
manipulation functions f concatPath and f init are predefined from PVS prim-
itive types.
PVS provides inductive definitions that allows the two axioms above to be writ-
ten in a more concise and logically equivalent form:
path(S,D,(P: Path),C): INDUCTIVE bool =
(link(S,D,C) AND P=f_init(S,D) AND Z=D) OR (EXISTS (C1,C2:Metric)
(Z2:Node) (P2:Path): link(S,Z,C1) AND path(Z,D,P2,C2) AND
C=C1+C2 AND P=f_concatPath(S,P2) AND f_inPath(S,P2)=FALSE)
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The universal quantifiers over the attributes to path (i.e. S,D,Z...) are implic-
itly embedding and existential quantifiers such as C1 and C2 are explicitly stated.
FVR axiom generator always produces this inductive definition, and employs the
axiom form only in the presence of mutual dependencies among the head predi-
cates which makes PVS inductive definition impossible. Also note that the use of
f inPath(S,P2)=FALSE constraint prevents loops in path.
Accordingly, NDlog rules p3-p4 are automatically compiled into PVS formal-
ization in a similar way:
bestPathCost(S,D,min_C): INDUCTIVE bool =
(EXISTS (P:Path): path(S,D,P,min_C)) AND (FORALL (C2:Metric):
(EXISTS (P2:Path): path(S,D,P2,C2)) => min_C<=C2)
bestPath(S,D,P,C):INDUCTIVE bool =
bestPathCost(S,D,C) AND path(S,D,P,C)
In addition to the above PVS encoding for NDlog rules, type definitions are pro-
duced automatically from the database schema information. For instance, given a
database schema definition for link(src:string, dst:string, metric:integer)
the corresponding PVS type declaration is link:[Node,Node,Metric -> bool]
where Node is declared as a string type and Metric as an integer type.
6.2.2 Verifying Path-Vector Protocol
The next step involves proving actual properties in PVS. Properties are expressed
as PVS theorems and serve as starting points (or goals) in the proof construction pro-
cess. We illustrate this process by verifying the route optimality property in the
path-vector protocol expressed in the following PVS bestPathStrong theorem:
bestPathStrong: THEOREM
FORALL (S,D:Node) (C:Metric) (P:Path): bestPath(S,D,P,C) =>
NOT (EXISTS (C2:Metric) (P2:Path): path(S,D,P2,C2) AND C2<C)
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The above theorem specifies that for a given bestPath(S,D,P,C) from S to D, P
is the optimal path, i.e. there does not exist another path P2 from S to D with lower
cost C2.
Given the above theorem, one can then utilize PVS to carry out the proof pro-
cess. PVS performs the proof in a goal-directed fashion, in this case, starting from
the bestPathStrong goal, and then recursively reducing it to sub-goals until all
sub-goals are trivially true. PVS has approximately 100 built-in proof strategies,
of which 20 are usually sufficient to automate a majority of the proof effort. We
display the straw-man proof process that does not utilize any user-defined proof
strategies specific to declarative network beyond PVS’s built-in proof commands:
("" (skosimp*) (expand bestPath) (prop) (expand bestPathCost)
(prop) (skosimp*) (inst -2 C2!1) (grind))
The proof script reflects the interactive proof process in PVS directed by the
user, where PVS takes care of all low level proof details and allows the user to con-
centrate on high-level proof strategies. Without going into details of each PVS com-
mand, we provide a high-level intuition of each step. The first command skosimp*
performs repeated skolemization that removes universal quantifiers S,D,C and P
in the theorem. Skolemization is generally the first proof step to try in proving
any universal quantified theorems. The subsequent two expand commands are
used to unfold the earlier inductive definition shown in 6.2.1, each followed by
prop that performs proportional simplification. Then skosimp* is employed to re-
move universal quantifiers and inst to instantiate the existential quantified vari-
able with proper instance (C2!1) . The rest of the proof is complete by using PVS’s
grind command which performs skolemization, heuristic instantiation, proposi-
tional simplification and decision procedures for linear arithmetic and equality.
Once the above proof script is supplied, PVS requires only fraction of a second
to carry out the actual proof. When the proof is completed, it covers all instances
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of the network. This is in contrast to model checking, which explores only specific
network instances. In addition to proving the route optimality property of the
declarative path-vector protocol, we have proved properties such as the potential
cycles in the protocol if the cycle check (enforced using the f inPath function) is
removed.
The straw-man proof process here is restricted to PVS’s built-in proof com-
mands, and does not utilize any user-defined proof strategies that exploits domain-
specific information. As a result, the proof requires an expert in declarative net-
work and theorem proving. Given that our target users are network designers, the
proof process should ideally be automated. In reference [75], we discuss the po-
tential of using domain-specific PVS strategies tailored to declarative networking
to support the proof construction.
6.2.3 Soft-state, Events and Network Dynamics
Up to this point, we have limited our verification to a subset of the complete NDlog
language by omitting the treatment of soft-state tuples (i.e. predicates). This simpli-
fication enables us to generate axioms recognizable by a theorem prover directly
from NDlog programs without having to worry about the semantics of time and
data expiration. In practice, soft-state data and events are central in network proto-
cols, and adopted in many declarative network implementations. In the rest of this
section, we will introduce the soft-state model in declarative networking, describe
how rules with soft-state predicates (referred as soft-state rules) can be verified in
a similar fashion, by first rewriting soft-state rules into logically equivalent rules
with only hard-state predicates (i.e.hard-state rules).
Soft-state Model in Declarative Networking Declarative networking incorpo-
rates support for soft-state [58] derivations commonly used in networks. In the soft
state storage model, all data (input and derivations) has an explicit “time to live”
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(TTL) or lifetime, and all expired tuples must be explicitly reinserted with their
latest values and a new TTL or they are deleted.
To support soft-state, an additional language feature is added to the NDlog lan-
guage, in the form of a materialize declaration at the beginning of each ND-
log program that specifies the TTL of predicates. For example, the expression
materialized(link,10,keys(1,2)) specifies that the link tuple is stored at a
table with primary key set to the first and second attributes (denoted by keys(1,2)
and that each link tuple has a lifetime of 10 seconds4. If the TTL is set to infinity,
the predicate will be treated as hard-state.
The soft-state storage semantics are as follows. When a tuple is derived, if there
exists another tuple with the same primary key but differs on other attributes, an
update occurs, in which the new tuple replaces the previous one. On the other
hand, if the two tuples are identical, a refresh occurs, in which the existing tuple is
extended by its TTL.
For a given predicate, in the absence of any materialize declaration, it is
treated as an event predicate with lifetime set to zero. Since events are not stored,
they are primarily used to trigger other rules or in response to network events.
Reference [37] provides more details on how soft-state storage model and events
are implemented within a declarative networking engine.
Soft-state to Hard-state Rewrite in FVR The rule rewrite consists of two steps.
First, all soft-state predicates of the form p(...) where “...” refer to predi-
cate arguments, are translated into an equivalent hard-state predicate of the form
p(...,Tc,Tl), where the additional attributes Tc and Tl denote the creation time
and lifetime of each tuple p respectively. This initial rewrite step makes explicit the
creation time and lifetime by adopting Tc, Tl in each soft-state predicate. Event
4Following the conventions of the P2 declarative networking system, attribute 0 is reserved for
the predicate name.
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predicates are rewritten in a similar fashion. However, Tl is omitted since events
have zero lifetime by definition.
After the first step, additional constraints reflecting soft-state semantics are
added to ensure that all soft-state facts only process with other facts valid within
the same window period of time, as expressed in terms of constraints over Tc and
Tl. Consider soft-state rules of the form, e : −e1, s1, s2, ..., sn. This rule triggered
by input event e1 with creation time Tce1, takes as input both the triggering event
and several soft-state predicates s1, s2, ..., sn, and generates a event. The rewritten
equivalent hard-state rules is of the form:
e(..., T ce1) : −e1(..., T ce1), s1(..., T cs1, T ls1), s2(..., T cs2, T ls2), ..., sn(..., T csn, T lsn),
. T cs1 < Tce1 ≤ Tcs1 + tls1, ..., T csn < Tce1 ≤ Tcsn + T lsn.
Since the event e1 directly triggers the derivation of e, the creation time of the
derived event e is set to be the same as that of the input e1 (i.e. Tce1). An additional
n constraints Tcsi < Tce1 ≤ Tcsi + T lsi are added to ensure that only soft-states si
with valid time interval [Tcsi, T csi + T lsi] that always overlaps with Tce1 are used
to generate e.
Another possible class of soft-state rules are of the form, e : −s1, s2, ..., sn, where
an event e is generated by sets of soft-states. The main difference compared to the
previous soft-state rule is the lack of a triggering event. The rewritten hard-state
rule is of the form:
e(..., T c) : −s1(..., T cs1, T ls1), s2(..., T cs2, T ls2), ..., sn(..., T csn, T lsn), T c = max < Tcs1,
. T cs2, ..., T csn >, Tcs1 < Tc ≤ Tcs1 + tls1, ..., T csn < Tc ≤ Tcsn + T lsn.
Note that Tc is set to themax of all possible creation times of the input soft-state
predicates (since the derived fact is true only when all the input facts are present).
The same rewrite process applies to rules that derive soft-state predicates s in-
stead of events e. The main difference is an additional Tl attribute to s in the
rewritten rule. This Tl attribute is set to the to the declared lifetime in correspond-
ing table for s (indicated in the materialize statement).
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6.2.4 Alternative Routing Mechanisms: Distance-Vector
In this section, we illustrate the capability of FVR in reasoning about eventual se-
mantics of protocols in dynamic networks. We base our illustration on the verifica-
tion of the distance-vector protocol, commonly used for computing shortest routes
in a network.
Distance Vector Protocol Specification in NDlog The following soft-state NDlog
program implements the distance-vector protocol, computing best paths with least
cost:
materialize(hop,10,keys(1,2,3)).
materialize(bestHop,10,keys(1,2)).
materialize(bestHopCost,10,keys(1,2)).
dv1 hop(@S,D,D,C) :- link(@S,D,C).
dv2 hop(@S,D,Z,C) :- hopMsg(@S,D,Z,C).
dv3 bestHopCost(@S,D,min<C>) :- hop(@S,D,Z,C).
dv4 bestHop(@S,D,Z,C) :- bestHopCost(@S,D,C), hop(@S,D,Z,C).
dv5 hopMsg(@N,D,S,C1+C2):-periodic(@S,5),bestHop(@S,D,Z,C1),link(@S,N,C2).
Query bestHop(@S,D,Z,C)
This program derives soft-state predicates hop, bestHop, and bestHopCost
with TTL of 10 seconds, and an event predicate hopMsg, and takes as input link
tuples which represents dynamic network topology and is implemented by some
periodic neighbor maintenance mechanism.
First, rules dv1-dv2 derive hop(@S,D,Z,C) tuples, where Z denotes the next
hop (instead of the entire path) along the path from S to D. Second, the proto-
col is driven by the periodic generation of hopMsg(@S,D,Z,C) in rule dv5, where
each node S advertises its knowledge of all possible best hops table (bestHop) to
all its neighbors. Note that bidirectional connectivity and cost is assumed. Each
node receives the advertisements as hopMsg events (rule dv2) which it then stores
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locally in its hop table. Finally, Rules dv3-dv4 compute the best hop for each
source/destination pair in a similar fashion as the earlier path-vector protocol.
Unlike the path-vector protocol presented in Section 6.2.1, the distance-vector
protocol computes only the next hop along the best path, and hence does not store
the entire path between any two nodes.
Soft-state Rewrite and Automated Axiom Generation The following NDlog rules
dv1-dv6 shows the equivalent hard-state rules after applying the soft-state rewrite
process described in Section 6.2.3.
dv1 hop(@S,D,D,C,Tc,10) :- link(@S,D,C,Tc,10).
dv2 hop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc,10) :- hopMsg(@Z,D,W,C2,Tc2), Tc=Tc2+5, C=C2+1.
dv3 bestHopCost(@S,D,min<C>,Tc,10) :- hop(@S,D,D,C,Tc,10).
dv4 bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc,10) :- bestHopCost(@S,D,C,Tc,10),
hop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc1,10), Tc1<Tc<=Tc1+10.
dv5 hopMsg(@N,D,Z,C,Tc) :- periodic_dv(@S,5,Tc), bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc1,10),
link(@S,N,C,Tc2,10), Tc2<Tc<=Tc2+10, Tc1<Tc<=Tc1+10.
dv6 periodic_dv(@S,5,Tc) :- periodic_dv(@S,5,Tc2), Tc=Tc2+5
Query bestHop(@S,D,Z,C,Tc,Tl)
Rules dv1-dv5 are the corresponding hard-state rewrites, and dv6 emulates the
behavior of periodic streams employed in dv5, as described in Section 6.2.3. We
introduce an extra constraint Tc=Tc2+5 in rule dv2. This condition is required so
that causality of rule execution is preserved within one interval: resulting hopMsg
events generated within one periodic interval derives hop facts used in the next
period internal and not vice versa. We note that this addition constraint is au-
tomatically added: required only in cases when rules depend on each other in a
cyclical fashion (e.g. hop derived in dv1-dv2, hopMsg in dv5, and bestHop in dv4),
a dependency that can be detected via static check.
Based on this rewritten program, the automatically generated PVS axioms are
as follows:
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hopMsg(S,D,Z,C,Tc): INDUCTIVE bool =
(EXISTS (Tc2,T3:Time): bestHop (S,D,Z,C,Tc2,10) AND periodic(S,5,Tc)
AND link(S,D,Tc3,10) AND Tc2<Tc<=Tc2+10 AND Tc3<Tc<=Tc3+10 AND C=1)
hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,Tl): INDUCTIVE bool =
(link(S,D,Tc,10) AND Z=D AND Tl=10 AND C=1) OR (EXISTS (C2:Metric)
hopMsg(S,D,Z,C2,Tc2) AND C=C2+1 AND Tl=10 AND Tc=Tc2+5)
bestHopCost(S,D,MIN_C,Tc,Tl): INDUCTIVE bool =
(EXISTS (Z:Node): hop(S,D,Z,MIN_C,Tc) AND Tl=10) AND
(FORALL (C:Metric): (EXISTS (Z:Node): hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10))=>MIN_C<=C)
bestHop_refresh: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node) (C:Metric) (Tc:Time): bestHopCost(S,D,C,Tc,10)
AND hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10)=>bestHop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10)
bestHop_close: AXIOM
FORALL (S,D,Z:Node) (C:Metric) (Tc:Time): bestHop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10)
=> (bestHopCost(S,D,C,Tc,10) AND hop(S,D,Z,C,Tc,10))
periodic_dv(S,I,Tc): INDUCTIVE bool =
EXISTS (Tc2:Time): periodic_dv(S,I,Tc2) AND Tc=Tc2+5 AND I=5
Recall automatic axiom generation process in Section 6.2.1, PVS axioms would
be explicitly used in face of mutual dependencies between rules (that derive bestHop,
hop, and hopMsg). To break the dependency, we therefore specify dv4 with two ax-
ioms bestHop refresh and bestHop close.
Eventual Convergence Proof in a Stable Network The lack of knowledge of the
entire path in the distance-vector protocol comes at the expense of potential up-
date loops in the presence of link updates. This is a well-known limitation of the
distance-vector protocol, commonly known as the count-to-infinity problem.
Our verification is performed on a 4-node network instance as shown in Fig-
ure 6.2. Note that this instance represents a loop consisting of three nodes (a, b, and
c) that can reach the rest part of the network via a fourth node d, and the results of
this verification apply to any arbitrary network that contains such a loop. For ease
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of exposition we do not consider computation of link tuple here and supply this
network instance using the following PVS inductive definition, where each clause
connected by logical operator OR represents a link between two nodes:
link(S,D,C,Tc,Tl): INDUCTIVE bool =
((S=a AND D=b AND C=1 AND Tl=10 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i)) OR
((S=b AND D=c AND C=1 AND Tl=10 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i)) OR
...
((S=a AND D=d AND C=1 AND Tl=10 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i))
Network convergence is expressed using the following theorem:
bestHopCost_converge: THEOREM
EXISTS (j:posnat): FORALL (S,D:Node)(C:Metric)(i:posnat): (i>j)
=> bestHopCost(S,D,C,5*i,10) = bestHopCost(S,D,C,5*j,10)
Given an input network, the distance-vector protocol requires a number of
rounds of communication among all nodes, for route advertisements (in the form
of hopMsg) to be propagated in the network. In the above theorem, the existen-
tial quantified variable j denotes the initial number of periodic intervals (set to
be at least the network diameter) required to propagate all route advertisements.
The theorem states that for any arbitrary time i after j, the value of bestHopCost
always converges (i.e. no longer changes).
Count-to-Infinity Analysis in a Dynamic Network In the final FVR example,
we demonstrate the capability of FVR to prove the presence of the count-to-infinity
problem in the distance-vector protocol. This is a well-studied limitation where
the protocol potentially diverges (i.e. not reach steady state) in the presence of link
failures.
Before showing the actual proofs, we provide a textbook example [57] that
clearly demonstrates the problem intuitively. Revisiting the network in Figure 6.2,
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Figure 6.2: Network Dynamics
when link(a,d) fails, node a would advertises this information to its immediate
neighbors b and c. However, despite the fact that d is no longer reachable from
either a b or c, based on information that c can reach d in two hops, b would con-
clude that it can reach d in three hops. Node c makes a similar conclusion. In
the next round of updates, node a learns that b and c can reach d in three hops,
and updates its distance to d as four accordingly. This cycle continues indefinitely,
resulting in the count-to-infinity problem.
The proof requires a network scenario that results in a count-to-infinity prob-
lem. Using the example described above, we supply this network dynamics using
the following PVS inductive definition:
link (S,D,C,Tc): INDUCTIVE bool =
((S=a AND D=b AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)) OR
((S=b AND D=a AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)) OR
...
((S=a AND D=d AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)) OR
((S=d AND D=a AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc<100)) OR
((S=a AND D=b AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100)) OR
((S=b AND D=a AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100)) OR
...
((S=c AND D=b AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100)) OR
((S=b AND D=c AND C=1 AND (EXISTS (i:posnat): Tc=5*i) AND Tc>=100))
The definition indicates that the link(a,d) and link(d,a) facts are only present
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before time 100, denoting that a link failure between nodes a and d happens at time
100. The count-to-infinity theorem is expressed as follows:
bestHop_increase_to_infinity: THEOREM
FORALL (a,b,d:Node)(t:Time)(c:Metric):(t>100 AND bestHop(a,d,b,c,t,10))=>
(EXISTS (t’:Time)(c’:Metric):(t’>t AND c’>c AND bestHop(a,d,b,c’,t’,10)))
The theorem above states that if the distance vector protocol diverges, the best
hop from a to d will increase indefinitely over time, a symptom of the count-to-
infinity problem. In reference [10], we have the complete proof of this theorem, as
well as addition theorems that further verify the presence of the count-to-infinity
problem. Interestingly, we have been able to prove a stronger PVS theorem spe-
cific to a three-node network cycle: ∀b, d, a, c, t.(∃i.t = i × 5 ∧ t > 100) =⇒
(bestHop(b, d, a, c, t, 10) =⇒ bestHop(b, d, a, c + 2, t + 10, 10)), which expresses
the precise pattern that the value of cost argument increases by 2 at every two
update intervals of 10 seconds.
We further verify that a well-known solution to this problem, known as the
split-horizon solution can avoid any two-node cycle, and show that this solution is
insufficient for fixing the count-to-infinity problem in a three-node cycle. Refer to
our extended technical report [75] for more details.
6.3 Evaluation
We have analyzed well-known eBGP instances, including good gadget, bad gad-
get, disagree [24]. In addition, we analyze two iBGP configuration instances: a
9-node iBGP gadget [16] that is known to oscillate, and a 25-node configuration
randomly extracted from the Rocketfuel [68] dataset. Rocketfuel is a well-known
dataset on actual iBGP configurations that are made available to the networking
community. Given that an ISP has complete knowledge of its internal router con-
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Disagree Bad Good 9-node
iBGP
25-node
iBGP
Simulation 2 NA 4 20 31
Exhaustive 2,10 181,641 10997,37692 20063,52264 723827,177483
Safe? No No Yes No No
Table 6.2: Summary of BGP analysis in Maude. In the first row, each entry shows the simulation
time in milliseconds. In the second row, for each entry, the first value denotes exhaustive search
time in milliseconds, the second denotes number of states explored, and the third on whether our
tool determines the instances to be safe (“Yes”) or unsafe (“No”).
figurations, the Rocketfuel experiment presents a practical use case for using our
tool to check an actual BGP configuration instance for safety.
For each BGP instance, we simulate its possible executions using rewriting
commands (Simulation), and check for route oscillation using exhaustive search
(Exhaustive). We summarize our analysis results are as follows:
We have carried out these analysis on a laptop with 1.9 GB memory and 2.40GHz
dual-cores running Debian 5.0.6. The version of Maude is Maude 2.4. While route
oscillation detection explores the entire state space of the instance execution, the
analysis time for rewriting based execution are measured for only one possible
terminating execution (that converges to a stable path assignment).
Here we summarize findings from our case studies. Single-trace simulation
is helpful in finding permanent routing oscillation. When simulating the execute
trace that diverges, Maude does not terminate (e.g., in executing Bad gadget 5).
However, simulation can miss temporary oscillations which are only manifested
on a particular executing trace. When Maude terminates, single-trace simulation
time increases when network size grows. On the other hand, exhaustive search
always provides a solid safety proof. For instances of similar network size, the
search time for a safe instance (good) is considerably longer than that of an unsafe
instance (bad). For instances of different sizes, as network size grows, exhaustive
5Bad gadget always diverges and does not have any stable path assignment, therefore, when we
simulate bad gadget with rewriting, Maude does not terminate, and we do not record the statistics.
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search time grows exponentially. Nevertheless, even for the 25-node scenario, ex-
haustive search can be completed in 12 minutes. As future work, we are going to
scale our analysis technique to larger networks.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we present FVR’s ability to verify actual BGP systems. We first
developed a Maude library for detecting routing anomalies in a policy configura-
tion. To use the library, users provide specifications of the network topology and
routing policies. The dynamic behavior of the resulting BGP system can then be
analyzed automatically by Maude. To validate this approach, we performed safety
analysis of well-known BGP instances and actual routing configurations.
Second, we use theorem prover PVS to verify BGP routing mechanism. We
take as input declarative networking specifications written in the Network Datalog
(NDlog) query language, and maps that automatically into logical axioms that can
be directly used in PVS to validate correctness. FVR is a significant improvement
compared to existing use case of theorem proving which typically require several
man-months to construct the system specifications. To validate the use of PVS, we
present case studies of verifying various properties, including routing optimality
and eventual properties in dynamic settings.
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Scalability Techniques for Analysis
In Chapter 6, we have shown FVR automatically detects anomalies in policy con-
figurations via Maude’s exhaustive search capability. Unfortunately, this approach
works only for small instances due to the state explosion problem. To address this
limitation, this chapter presents a novel scalability technique called network re-
duction that transform policy configurations into smaller and simpler forms while
preserving safety property (arc 7), as shown in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: FVR Architecture: Network Reduction.
In network reduction, we provide two types of reduction rules that transform
policy configurations by merging duplicate and complementary router configura-
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tions to simplify analysis. We show that the reductions are sound, dual of each
other and are locally complete. The reductions are also computationally attractive,
requiring only local configuration information and modification.
We have developed a prototype of network reduction and demonstrated that it
enables significant savings in analysis time due the the use of reduction. We eval-
uated the effectiveness of the reduction technique analysis on routing configura-
tions ranging from synthetic networks to sampled CAIDA and Rocketfuel dataset,
using the Maude-based safety analysis (Chapter 6) as reasoning engine. Our exper-
imental results show that network reduction enables us to perform safety analysis
efficiently, often completing the analysis on large networks that would otherwise
not be possible to study within reasonable time.
In addition to making possible safety analysis on large networks that would
otherwise not complete within reasonable time, network reduction is also a useful
tool for discovering possible redundancies in BGP systems.
7.1 Network Reduction
7.1.1 Formal Model for Reduction
We first present the formal model used for performing reduction and analysis.
The central data structure, called the Enhanced Path Digraph (EPD), is a compact
representation of two configuration aspects of a BGP system: the topology of how
routers are connected, and for each router, the export, import, and route preference
policies.
The policy configuration problem can be understood independently of the means
for calculating routes—the BGP path-vector mechanism as implemented by the
various router vendors. Policy conflicts exist independently from the details of
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how messages are exchanged and local data structures are updated. So the EPD
model abstracts away the mechanism, and focuses on the policy itself.
Enhanced path digraph (EPD) is an extension of the path digraph structure [67],
tuned to enable us to conveniently express and perform reduction. As we will see
in Section 7.2, through this modification, EPD allows us to prove the correctness of
reduction in a much more intuitive and concise way reasoning directly with path
digraph in our prior work [84].
Definition 5 (Path digraph). Let (V,E) be a directed graph and let d be a designated
‘destination’ node in V . A path digraph instance on (V,E, d) is given by (P,Ev, Ep),
where P is a set of paths in (V,E) terminating at d, and Ev and Ep are binary relations on
P fulfilling the following properties:
C1. (p, q) is in Ev if and only if p is a prefix of q.
C2. If p and q have different origin nodes, then (p, q) is not in Ep.
C3. The restriction of Ep to any set of paths having the same origin node is a strict linear
order.
The relationsEv andEp are called the transmission and preference relations respectively.
We may also write Ep as ‘≺’, where p ≺ q means that p is strictly preferred to
q. The ‘path digraph’ structure, then, is the derived graph where the nodes are the
elements of P and the arcs are Ev∪Ep. For example, Figure 7.2 shows a network of
three nodes 0, 1 and 2, where 0 is the particular destination. The paths are shown
alongside their origin nodes, in preference order (so 1 prefers path 120 over 10);
any path not shown is not permitted. The path digraph is shown in Figure 7.3,
where dashed arcs correspond to prefers arcs, and solid arcs for transmission arcs.
We can define a notion of ‘stable solution’ corresponding to the endpoint of the
route computation process.
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Figure 7.2: The network configuration of Disagee
Figure 7.3: The path digraph for Disagee
Definition 6. A stable solution to a path digraph (P,Ev, Ep) is a subset S of P that
contains the empty path d from d to itself, and such that any other path q is in S if and
only if
C1. there is some p in S such that (p, q) is in Ev, and
C2. there is no p′ in S such that (p′, q) is in Ep.
In general, there may be zero, one, or many stable solutions. If there is no stable
solution then the routing protocol will certainly oscillate; if there are more than
one, then it might oscillate (depending on details of the path-vector mechanism).
If, however, there is exactly one stable solution, then the protocol will necessarily
converge to it [67, 29]. A sufficient condition for this is that the path digraph be
acyclic.
Theorem 7. If a path digraph has no cycle (that is, the transitive closure of Ev ∪ Ep is
irreflexive) then it has a unique stable solution.
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Proof. See [31].
The property of a path digraph having a unique stable solution implies that
the configuration is both safe and robust [19, 14, 22, 64]. Informally, a routing con-
figuration is safe if any fair execution sequence for the path-vector protocol must
eventually result in convergence of the routing state. It is robust if it remains safe
even after removing some subset of the nodes and arcs in the graph.
The transmission relation Ev forms an arborescence rooted at d. It therefore
contains, implicitly, data about the connectivity of the original graph. The ex-
tended structure, which we now define, makes that information more explicit.
Definition 8 (Extended path digraph (EPD)). If (P,Ev, Ep) is a path digraph on (V,E, d)
then the extended path digraph is (P,Ev, Ep, s), where s is the function from P \ {d}
to V that maps each path to its origin node.
An EPD may be represented diagramatically by grouping the paths in P ac-
cording to s, as in Figure 7.4. Here, and in the rest of this thesis, paths in P are
represented by square boxes, nodes in V by ovals, preference arcs by dashed ar-
rows and transmission arcs by solid arrows.
We will also use the following notation, for an EPD instance (P,Ev, Ep, s) on a
graph (V,E, d):
• Pu is the set {p ∈ P | s(p) = u}.
• Concatenation of arcs and paths is denoted by ‘◦’.
• Γ+(u) = {v ∈ V | (u, v) ∈ E} and Γ−(u) = {v ∈ V | (v, u) ∈ E}.
We call elements of Γ+(u) the downstream neighbors of u, and elements of Γ−(u)
the upstream neighbors of u. We will also use the notation Γ+(u, v) to mean the
union of Γ+(u) and Γ+(v), and similarly for Γ−(u, v).
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In general, a cycle in an EPD must involve more than one node in V , since the
preference arcs alone do not contain cycles. That is, this paper does not consider
inconsistent preference relations within a single node. More details are in Ap-
pendix A.1. Moreover, since the transmission arcs form a tree, the EPD cannot be
cyclic unless there is a cycle in (V,E). That is, regardless of the routing preferences,
convergence is guaranteed for any network that has no cycles.
7.1.2 Network Reduction
This section presents a rewriting calculus for policy-based routing systems, based
on the idea of reducing a given network to one which is smaller, but has the same
safety property. We define two specific rules, called duplicate and complementary
reduction, for merging two router nodes in an EPD. Both of these are purely local,
meaning that the operations only require examination of the relevant nodes and
their immediate neighbors. In the following, assume we are working with a given
EPD instance G = (P,Ev, Ep, s) on a graph (V,E, d).
Definitions To ease the discussion of these reductions, we first introduce three
auxiliary notions: ‘consistent node’, ‘node rewrite’, and ‘strongly adjacent’. We
say two nodes are consistent if their configurations do not form a cycle in the EPD
representation, formalized as follows:
Definition 9 (Consistent nodes). Given a policy configuration’s EPD (P,Ev, Ep, s) on
the network graph (V,E, d), nodes u and v in V are consistent if there is no cycle in the
EPD which consists only of paths p for which s(p) ∈ {u, v}.
An example of nodes violating consistency is in Figure 7.4: nodes 1 and 2 are
not consistent since there is a cycle of paths (120, 10, 210 and 20) that only involves
these two nodes. This conflicting configuration causes route oscillation behavior.
Such examples of consistency violation, where two nodes have a policy conflict,
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should not be eliminated during reduction, in order for the problem to be detected
in the final analysis. A consistency check is hence a precondition for reduction.
Figure 7.4: The EPD notation for the Disagree configuration.
Definition 10 (Strongly adjacent). Two nodes u and v in V are strongly adjacent if for
every path in Pu, either v does not appear, or it appears as the next node following u; and
likewise for Pv.
Strong adjacency implies that two nodes are either immediate neighbors, or
one does not route to destination through the other. It is also a precondition for
reduction.
Definition 11 (Node rewrite). The procedure to rewrite node u to v is as follows: Rewrite
the path p ∈ Pu in u to p′ ∈ Pv in v by: If p = u ◦ w ◦ r, and w 6= v, then rewrite p to
w ◦ r; If p = u ◦ v ◦ r, then rewrite p to r; For all other cases, abort rewrite. Rewrite the
preference among Pu to that among Pv by: Rewrite preference arc (p, q) to (p′, q′), where p
rewrites to p′ and q to q′.
The global rewrite on the EPD is straightforward, once the two nodes have been
merged. All paths in P are rewritten according to the procedure of Definition 11, as
is the transmission relation Ev. Write p[u, v 7→ w] for a path p where all occurrences
of u or v are replaced with w, eliding any ‘ww’ subpath. The preferences at the new
node w are determined by the specific reduction procedure; for any other node t,
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the new path preferences on Pt are obtained as follows. For a path p, let pˆ denote
the path that is minimal according to Ep among {q ∈ Pt | q[u, v 7→ w] = p}. Then
the written Ep on t is {(pˆ, qˆ) | (p, q) ∈ Ep}: that is, a path ‘inherits’ the relative
preference of the highest ranked path in its preimage.
Duplicate Reduction
Definition 12 (Duplicate condition). Suppose that u and v are two consistent and
strongly adjacent nodes. Then v is a duplicate of u, if after rewriting v to u, the fol-
lowing conditions hold: (1) v’s path P ′v is equivalent to (or a subset of) the u’s paths Pu; (2)
For every preference arc (p, q) in v, there exists (p′, q′) in u.
Figure 7.5: Nodes u, v are merged by duplicate reduction if they agree on how to
route to destination d through their neighbors x, y, . . . , z: For any path pi, qj , u, v
agree on their preference.
The duplicate precondition ensures two nodes agree on the paths and their
preference to reach the destination. The duplicate ‘redundancy’ of u and b is char-
acterized in terms of the neighbors through which they route to destination d.
The general duplicate reduction process is shown in Figure 7.5, where u and v
are merged into one node u. One can view the local change as merging the paths
of v into u, and this operation can be done consistently since they have the same
routing preference.
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Complementary Reduction In contrast to duplicate reduction, complementary
reduction captures the redundancy observed from the point of the view of the
neighbors of u and v. The intuition is that if all the neighbors route to destinations
through u and v in a consistent way, then u and v can be combined into one node
without changing the routing behavior of these neighbors. This is formalized as
follows.
Definition 13 (Complementary Condition). Two consistent and strongly adjacent nodes
u and v are complementary if, for any paths p and q in Pu ∪ Pv, and any nodes x and y
which are immediately downstream from u and v, the preference (x ◦ p, x ◦ q) is in Ep if
and only if (y ◦ p, y ◦ q) is in Ep.
Figure 7.6: Nodes u, v are merged by complementary reduction if their neighbors
x, y, . . . , z agree on how to route to destination d through them: After merging,
the route preference for any path pi, qj are set according to the consensus among
x, y, . . . , z.
The general complementary reduction process is illustrated in Figure 7.6 where
nodes u and v, whose neighbors x, y, . . . , z agree upon routes through them, are
merged into one node. The merging is more subtle than the duplicate one: (1)
The merged node w’s paths combine those from u and v, i.e. Pw is the union of Pu
and Pv; (2) The route preferences for the new node w are partly determined by the
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consensus of preferences of their neighbors (in cases where the preference could
not be derived from either u or v). That is, if u has path p (and not q) and v has path
q (and not p) then we set p to be preferred over q in w if and only if all upstream
neighbors x agree that x ◦ p is preferred over x ◦ q.
Example Consider the configuration in Figure 7.7, Here, there is an AS with three
border routers (3, 7 and 4) and two internal routers (4 and 6), as well as three ex-
ternal router nodes (1, 2, and the destination 0). The nodes 3 and 4 are comple-
mentary because their downstream neighbors (the internal nodes 5 and 6) agree
on the preference among paths to 0. After merging them, the new node is again
complementary to node 7. Following a second complementary reduction step, the
two internal nodes are both duplicate, and can also be eliminated.
Figure 7.7: Application of complementary and duplicate reduction to border and
internal routers, respectively.
Another example configuration is in Figure 7.8 (left), it consists of an AS con-
sists of 5 nodes 3,7,4 (border gateway routers) and 5,6 (internal routers), two ex-
ternal nodes 1,2, and the destination 0. Nodes 3,4 are complementary because
their downstream neighbors (i.e. internal nodes 5,6) agree upon the preference
among paths to 0. Therefore 3,4 can be merged. On the other hand, node 7 is
not complementary with 3 nor 4 because 5,6 have different preferences: while 5
prefers paths from 7 over that from 4, 6 prefers otherwise.
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Figure 7.8: One-step reduction of complementary nodes 3, 4
Figure 7.9: Two-steps reduction: when internal nodes have consensus on how to
rank paths from border gateway nodes, all the border gateway nodes can be re-
duced into one.
In a configuration with same topology but different route preference, as shown
in Figure 7.9 (left), all 3,4,7 are complementary nodes and can be reduced to
one in two steps, because 5,6 agree upon the same route preference. Note that,
after merging all border gateway routers, we are left with two internal routers
that are duplicate. This is due to the dual nature of duplicate and complementary
reduction, which we will revisit in details in Section 7.2.
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7.2 Properties of Network Reduction
This section establishes the three properties of network reduction: (1) The duality
property reveals that duplicate and complementary reduction are symmetric; (2)
The soundness property enables us to use the reduced configuration to study the
original one; (3) The local completeness property shows that reduction can be done
efficiently just by examining only “local configuration” — the two nodes and their
immediate neighbors, and that duplicate and complementary reductions form a
complete repertoire of such “local” methods; and (4) The confluence property re-
veals the role of merging order in reduction. In this section we present the defini-
tions and proof sketches. Our complete proofs are available in Appendix A.2.
Assume in the rest of the section that we are working with a given EPD in-
stance G = (P,Ev, Ep, s) on a graph (V,E, d), where u and v are two reducible
(duplicate or complementary) nodes. Write Nup for the upstream neighbors of u
and v, through which they route to d, and Ndown for the downstream neighbors
which route to the destination through u and v. Let G′ be an instance to which G
reduces by duplicate or complementary reductions.
7.2.1 Duality: Relating Duplicate and Complementary
Reduction
Theorem 14. a. If all the nodes in Nfrom can be merged into one node by (multiple steps
of) complementary reductions, then u and v must be duplicate. b. If all the nodes in Nto
can be merged into one node by (multiple steps of) duplicate reductions, then u and v must
be complementary.
Proof. Proof by definitions. The complete proof and its graph illustration are in
Appendix A.2.
The duality theorem reveals the symmetry between duplicate and complemen-
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tary reduction, as prefigured in Section 7.1.2 (where the border routers were com-
plementary but the internal, downstream routers were duplicate). It also implies
that if two nodes’ upstream (or downstream) neighbors can be reduced into one
node in our calculus, then these two nodes themselves can be further merged into
one.
7.2.2 Soundness
The main soundness result is that the reduced policy configuration has the same
safety and robustness properties as the original one, and so we can use the reduced
one to analyze the original.
Theorem 15. If G′ is safe then G is safe; and if G′ experiences route oscillation, then in
running G, there exists at least one execution trace that exhibits route oscillation.
According to Theorem 2, we only need to prove that the rewriting process pre-
serves the presence or absence of cycles in the configuration’s EPD representation,
as follows:
Lemma 1. The path digraph of G is acyclic if and only if the path digraph of G′ is acyclic.
Proof. For duplicate reduction, we prove rewriting preserves cyclicity by construct-
ing a cycle in G′ for any cycle c in G. The duplicate rewrite from G to G′ is defined
by merging duplicate nodes u and v, and the proof proceeds by case analysis of
whether any of the paths originating from u or v are on c. We prove rewriting pre-
serves acyclicity via the contrapositive: if G′ is cyclic then G is cyclic, which is also
proved by construction.
For complementary reduction, the proof is similar thanks to the EPD formal-
ization and the dual nature of the two rules.
We only provide a proof sketch here, the complete proof and its graph illustra-
tion are in Appendix A.2.2.
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7.2.3 Local Completeness
We first formalize the notion of “local reduction” and “local safety”, and then
prove that duplicate and complementary reductions are locally complete with re-
gard to preserving the presence or absence of EPD cycles. Intuitively, a reduction
rule applied to nodes u and v is “local”, if it only requires information from u, v
and their immediate neighbors (Γ−(u, v) and Γ+(u, v)) in order to test the reduction
precondition, and generate the configuration of the merged node.
Let Nrest stand for the nodes in V which are not within one hop of u or v. We
introduce a binary relation ∼u,v on EPDs, capturing the idea that they only differ
on the configuration of Nrest, by G ∼u,v G′ if and only if the following hold:
1. G and G′ are on graphs having the same set of nodes.
2. They have the same path configuration for u and v: so Pu = P ′u, Pv = P ′v, with
the same preference arcs; and they have the same set of transmission arcs to
and from u or v.
3. A preference arc (y ◦ p, y ◦ q) is in Ep if and only if it is in E ′p, for any y in
Γ+(u, v), and any p and q in Pu ∪ Pv.
Definition 16 (Local Safety). A network reduction rule on G by merging u and v is
locally safe, if it also preserves safety for any G′ with G′ ∼u,v G.
Theorem 17 (Local Completeness). If a network reduction rule that rewrites G by
merging u and v is locally safe, then it must be either duplicate or complementary reduc-
tion.
Proof. We use proof by contradiction to establish that if u and v are neither dupli-
cate nor complementary, then the reduction rule that merges them is not locally
safe. That is, there is some acyclic EPD G, where application of the merge results
in G′ being cyclic, but G ∼u,v G′.
By assumption, G is acyclic, so in particular u and v are not on a cycle (see the left
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of Figure 7.10). Consider an EPD where there is a series of transmission arcs from
a downstream neighbor of v to an upstream neighbor of u (illustrated from y2 to
x1). Merging u and v creates a cycle, shown in the right of Figure 7.10.
Figure 7.10: If u and v are neither duplicate nor complementary, merging them can
create a cycle.
Note that, while duplicate and complementary reduction are locally complete,
we do not exclude the existence of other safety preserving reduction that requires
checking policy configuration beyond u, v and their neighbors. That is, we do not
exclude less efficient algorithms for simplifying networks.
7.2.4 Confluence
This section discusses confluence properties of the reductions: we first prove du-
plicate reduction is confluent but complementary reduction is not.
Theorem 18. [Duplicate reduction is confluent] If, for a set of nodes V , any pair of nodes
u and v in V are duplicate, then V can be merged into one single node by multiple steps of
duplicate reduction, regardless of the reduction order.
Proof. By induction on the size of V .
The base case. |V | = 2 is trivial.
The induction step. For |V | = k + 1 > 2. Consider two nodes u and v in V , which
by assumption are duplicate. By merging them into a new node z, we can rewrite
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V to V ′ = W ∪ {z} where W = V \ {u, v}. By the induction hypothesis that any k
pair-wise duplicate nodes can be merged into one node, it is sufficient to prove that
V reduces to one node by showing that V ′ is pair-wise duplicate, since |V ′| = k. By
definition, in V ′, the subset W is pair-wise duplicate, so we only need to show that
z is duplicate with any w in W . Since u and v are duplicate with w, it must be the
case that z and w satisfy at least the duplicate conditions. Since Pz = Pu ∪ Pv, and
by the pair-wise duplicate definition we know that paths in Pu and Pw, in Pv and
Pw, and in Pu and Pv always form a unique total ordering. That is, for any three
paths p ∈ Pu, q ∈ Pv, and r ∈ Pw, we know how to set the preferences between any
two of them. Then there must be be a unique ordering between the three of them,
and so all paths from Pu ∪ Pv ∪ Pw are totally ordered.
On the other hand, complementary reductions are not confluent, counter-example
is shown Figure 7.11(a). Nodes u, v and w have the same set of downstream neigh-
bors. For example, node u has two paths p2 and p3, and there is some down-
stream preference p2 ≺ p3. All downstream neighbors have consensus on pref-
erence among paths from u and v (p2 ≺ p1 ≺ p3), and among paths from v and w
(p2 ≺ p1 ≺ p4). However, there is no consistent ranking for paths from u and w,
since some nodes prefer p3 over p4, and others prefer the reverse. While comple-
mentary reduction can be applied to either u and v (as in Figure 7.11(b)), or u and
w (as in Figure 7.11(c)), a further reduction step is not possible.
Finally, we show that duplicate reduction does not commute with complemen-
tary reduction, by exhibiting a counterexample. Consider the EPD in Figure 7.12,
where nodes u and v are duplicate, and v and w are complementary. If u and v are
merged into z through duplicate reduction, then this z is not reducible with w, due
to the lack of consensus on paths p3 and p4 among downstream neighbors.
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Figure 7.11: The EPD in (a) either rewrites to (b) or (c) depending on the order of
two complementary reductions (u, v or v, w)
Figure 7.12: Duplicate/complementary reductions do not commute
7.3 Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype of network reduction using Maude. With the
prototype, we demonstrate that network reduction is applicable on various net-
works, can be done efficiently at low overhead, and enables analysis of BGP con-
figurations that cannot otherwise be completed. Moreover, by comparing BGP
systems before and after reduction, we not only validate our reduction theory, but
also gain insights into redundancy and conflicts in network configurations. We
primarily selected Maude due to its existing libraries [85, 84] for modeling BGP
systems and performing safety analysis [85].
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7.3.1 Network Generation
We present evaluation on a variety of networks ranging from synthetic networks
including configurations of Cisco guidelines [87], and random network topologies
generated using GT-ITM, to actual network topologies including CAIDA inter-AS
level topologies [4], and Rocketfuel router-level ISP topologies [68]. All experi-
ments are carried out on an Intel Xeon 2.33GHz CPU with 4GB memory, running
Linux 2.6.
Reduction on Synthetic Networks We evaluate network configurations that span
multiple ASes, consisting of both iBGP and eBGP configurations. We first develop
a model of a BGP system [60] in Maude, which consists of several ASes and routers
running the path-vector protocol, and exchanging routes based on their import,
export, and route selection policies. In particular, both the Cisco-Synthetic and GT-
ITM network policies are realized by the local preference and AS path attributes for
route selection, and import/export filtering for route exchange. In addition, we
develop Maude functions that generates the EPD model from a BGP system in
terms of topology and configuration attributes [60].
Cisco-Synthetic Network. To evaluate network reduction on well-designed, highly
structural policy configurations proposed by Cisco, we construct various synthetic
topologies combining full-mesh and reflection configurations according to these
guidelines [87].
An full mesh topology is simply a complete graph of the routers. Our reduc-
tion theory will collapse all of these routers into a single node, so long as they
implement the same policy. In route reflector configuration, the network graph is
partitioned into a set of clusters. Inter-cluster communication is done by special
routers configured as ‘reflectors’; other routers within a cluster are clients of the
local reflector(s). As depicted in Figure 7.13, the reflectors form a full-mesh core
graph, while the clients are only connected to their reflectors. However, the clus-
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Figure 7.13: Route reflector example: clients are border routers
ters can be interconnected by either a reflector or a client, and our experiment
includes both. Our experiments also include configurations with multiple redun-
dant reflectors in a single cluster, as shown in Figure 7.14.
Figure 7.14: Route reflector with POP
To understand how reduction helps in detecting route oscillation due to pol-
icy misconfigurations, we embed in the network three small substructures or gad-
gets [26]: namely the Good, Bad and Disagree gadgets that correspond to safe, per-
manent, and transient oscillation behaviors. These gadgets are embedded within
the transit ASes by configuration of the local preference attributes. There are also
several stub ASes, set up with full-mesh or reflection topologies (described below),
and employing a policy that prefers paths with fewer AS hops. (To break tie, an
older route is preferred over a newly generated one.)
GT-ITM networks. As an alternative dataset, we generate transit-stub topologies
using the GT-ITM topology generator [47]. Each transit-stub topology is param-
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eterized by the number of transit domains, nodes within a transit domain, stubs
per transit nodes, and finally, nodes per stub. We increase the network size by in-
creasing all of these parameters. We configure routing policies as follows: transit
ASes are willing to carry all traffic, while each stub AS carries traffic only for itself.
Given the randomness of GT-ITM topology generation, this dataset are less struc-
tured compared to the earlier Cisco-Synthetic topologies, resulting in increased
variance in our results.
Reduction on Actual Topologies . We evaluate the effectiveness of our reduction
techniques on actual Internet topologies, obtained from the CAIDA Inter-AS level
topologies [4] and the Rocketfuel router-level ISP topologies [68]. In the CAIDA
and Rocketfuel dataset, we sample1 the dataset to derive network of sizes up to
185 and 128 respectively. For all the topology samples, we insert the same policy
configurations as our earlier Cisco-Synthetic and GT-ITM setups. We observe that
the reduction rate was high, achieving a rate of 75% and 69% on average respec-
tively. This suggests that in practice, there is significant configuration redundancy
in actual configurations, observable even for a sample of the network.
7.3.2 Reduction Performance
Table 7.1 summarizes the performance overhead of network reduction and analy-
sis on the two classes of input topologies for various network sizes. Cisco-Good-22
refers to a 22-node Cisco-Synthetic topology embedded with Good Gadgets. The
columns shown refer to:
• EPD Generation. Time to generate a EPD model from the input BGP configura-
tion.
1Our experimental dataset was limited by the physical memory constraints of storing the entire
EPD in memory. As future work, we plan to explore out-of-core implementations or the use of
multiple machines for executing a single reduction.
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Input Topology EPD
Time
(ms)
Reduction
Time
(ms)
Reduction
Time (ms,
Dup)
Reduction
Rate
Reduction
Rate
(Dup)
Analysis
Time
(ms)
Cisco-Good-22 3 74 22 68% 63% 429043
Cisco-Good-48 113 863 124 85% 84% 429043
Cisco-Good-87 5299 5665 649 92% 92% 429043
Cisco-Good-104 26567 10341 1814 93% 93% 429043
Cisco-Good-140 983300 32562 1814 95% 94% 429043
Cisco-Bad-22 5 96 23 69% 68% 80224
Cisco-Bad-49 112 935 119 86% 86% 80224
Cisco-Bad-87 5204 6075 465 92% 92% 80224
Cisco-Bad-104 25449 11258 725 93% 93% 80224
Cisco-Bad-121 177421 19741 1111 94% 94% 80224
Cisco-Disagree-23 2 30 14 78% 80% 184
Cisco-Disagree-53 40 352 73 90% 90% 184
Cisco-Disagree-70 182 901 164 93% 92% 184
Cisco-Disagree-103 3951 3641 469 95% 95% 184
Cisco-Disagree-122 20792 6430 810 96% 96% 184
GT-ITM-12 1 6 2 82% 81% 1
GT-ITM-38 7 24 9 94% 94% 1
GT-ITM-77 57 2279 68 95% 95% 1
GT-ITM-80 71 5241 84 90% 90% 2
GT-ITM-118 350 583143 455 86% 91% 2
Table 7.1: Summary of results across various input topologies. Averages across
multiple runs are presented.
• Reduction Time. Reduction time required to generate the reduced EPD from the
corresponding input EPD. Both reduction rules are applied, duplicate followed
by complementary.
• Reduction Time (Dup). Same as above, except that complementary reduction
is not applied. The difference allows us to compare the marginal overhead of
applying complementary reduction.
• Reduction Rate. Percentage of redundant nodes that are reduced. For example,
68% for Cisco-Good-22 means that the reduced EPD is only 1-68% = 32% of the
original network size.
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• Reduction Rate (Dup). Rate of reduction achieved by only merging duplicate
nodes.
• Reduced Analysis. Time required to run the safety analysis, using our Maude
analyzer (Section 6) on the reduced EPD after reduction.
EPD Generation and Reduction. The overhead of reduction includes the time
required to generate the EPD representation of the policy configuration, and the
overhead of doing the reduction itself. Due to space constraints, we will show
performance graphs (derived from Table 7.1) for the the Cisco-Synthetic networks,
but discuss conclusions drawn from both input topology classes.
Figure 7.16 shows the EPD generation time (left) and reduction time (right) as
the number of nodes increases. We observe that the execution times are polynomial
(cubic/quadratic) with respect to network size. While the complexity bounds are
not ideal for scaling up, we note that the absolute numbers are easily within the
realm of practicality. For instance, on a single commodity PC, EPD and reduction
using our unoptimized Maude code requires only 16 minutes and 32 seconds (or
18 seconds with duplicate only reduction) respectively, for a network of 140 nodes
(Cisco-Good-140). While the EPD generation time dominates, this cost is amortized
across both reduction and analysis, since the subsequent analysis essentially uses
the same EPD representation.
In Cisco-Synthetic networks, the reduction overhead is dominated by the EPD
generation time. Note however that EPD generation is amortized across both re-
duction and analysis, since the subsequent analysis essentially uses the same EPD
representation. However, in GT-ITM networks, we observe that the actual reduc-
tion dominates over EPD generation, suggesting that a nosier (more randomize)
configuration increases reduction overhead. Among Cisco-Synthetic networks, we
observe that reduction times are increased on denser topologies with full meshes
within an AS, as compared to ASes that use route reflectors internally.
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Figure 7.15: EPD Generation time as number of nodes increases for the Cisco-
Synthetic topologies
Reduction rate. Table 7.1 shows that reduction is very effective at reducing the
size of the EPDs. In some cases, as the network sizes increases, the reduction can
reduce the original EPD by 95%. Figure 7.17 shows the reduction rates on the
Cisco-Synthetic networks. For networks beyond 40 nodes, the reduction rate is
above 80% and relatively stable. The effectiveness of reduction can be attributed to
the highly structured natures of these topologies, where the resulting reduced EPD
is often identical to the original embedded gadgets themselves. Another source of
irreducibility is if the BGP decision procedure falls through to attributes we do not
analyze.
The trends observed in GT-ITM are largely similar, though we note that since
these topologies are randomly generated, the reduction times and rates have higher
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Figure 7.16: Reduction time as number of nodes increases for the Cisco-Synthetic
topologies
variance across experimental runs. In Cisco-Synthetic networks, the reduction rate
exhibits smaller variance due to its regular structure. In general, when a network
becomes more hierarchical, (from GT-ITM to Cisco, from full-mesh to reflection),
reduction rate improves due to increased redundancies. Moreover, the reduction
overhead is relatively smaller (compared with the growth of network size). All in
all, our results imply that a well structured hierarchical network configuration is
easier to analyze in terms of reduction times. They are also more likely to result in
safer configurations that do not oscillate.
Duplicate vs Complementary. As we noted in Section 7.1.2, the complementary
condition is more complex. Our experimental results summarized in Table 7.1
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Figure 7.17: Reduction rate as number of nodes increases for the Cisco-Synthetic
topologies.
validate that the overall reduction time tends to be dominated by complementary
reduction. While duplicate reduction only requires two nodes to agree upon what
they learned from their neighbors, complementary requires all the neighbors of
the two nodes to agree upon what are learnt from them. In addition, the marginal
benefit of performing complementary reduction on top of duplicate reduction is
often small. For instance, Cisco-Good-22 results in a 63% reduction compared to the
original EPD when only duplicate reduction is used, and 68% (i.e. an additional
5%) with both forms. While complementary reduction is less effective, we note
that in almost all cases, the EPD is further reduced by the reduction. Moreover, as
noted in Section 7.3.3, both forms of reduction allow us to shed light into the policy
configurations themselves.
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Analysis time. To understand the benefits of performing safety analysis on the
reduced EPDs, we run analysis on the original EPD, as well as the reduced EPD.
The analysis is achieved by exhaustive search over all executions of the BGP sys-
tem using Maude [85]. Oscillation is detected if the same best route is selected
multiple times during protocol execution. Overall, we observe that after reduc-
tion, we are able to detect the same route oscillation pattern found in the original
network. While the original pre-reduction EPDs did not terminate within minutes,
all the post-reduction EPDs completed successfully, while requiring significantly
less time and state exploration. The Cisco-Synthetic topologies with Good Gadget
requires the longest analysis time, since these are safe instances, and hence require
enumerating all possible states before completing the analysis. In the case of un-
safe instances, the analysis time was quicker and terminated whenever an unsafe
execution trace was obtained.
In the GT-ITM networks, since they were less structured, not all of input topolo-
gies reduced to small gadgets (like the Cisco-Synthetic examples do) that can be an-
alyzed quickly. For instance, in GT-ITM-118, only 25% of the reduced EPDs were
analyzable, since the other reduced instances themselves still contain 20 nodes. We
note however that when these instances are analyzable, they are typically reduced
to small EPDs which can be analyzed quickly.
Overall, we observe that reduction is very effective at reducing the size of the
EPDs. In some cases, as the network sizes increases, the reduction can reduce
the original EPD by 95%. After reduction, we are able to detect the same route
oscillation pattern found in the original network. While the original pre-reduction
EPDs did not terminate within minutes, all the post-reduction EPDs completed
successfully, while requiring significantly less time and state exploration.
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Figure 7.18: In a Cisco-Synthetic network, duplicate reduction (left) merges core
(triangles), internal routers (ovals) and retains the border gateway nodes (high-
lighted squares) post-reduction; Complementary reduction (right) merges core,
border gateway routers and retains internal nodes (highlighted ovals).
7.3.3 Observations and Implications
In addition to performance benefits of feasible analysis, the process of reduction
allows us to gain new insights into policy configurations.
In Section 7.2, we prove that duplicate and complementary are dual concepts.
Figure 7.18 illustrates these effects, by comparing the EPDs before and after reduc-
tion, while only applying duplicate and complementary reductions respectively.
In these figures, triangles denote core network (transit) ASes (which includes the
embedded gadgets) in the Cisco-Synthetic networks, and transit AS nodes in GT-
ITM. Squares refer to reflectors in stub ASes, and all other nodes are drawn as
ovals. Nodes that remain after reduction are highlighted.
The duplicate reduction (left) removes some of the core network nodes, as well
as some internal nodes in stub networks (those which are not border routers) In
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contrast, complementary reduction (right) removes an opposite family of nodes,
namely the border routers that connect each stub network to the core.
This duality reveals deeper insights into the role of redundancy in networks.
For core and iBGP internal nodes, duplicates arise because they are likely con-
figured to agree upon how to route to their neighboring BGP routers for a given
destination node. Such redundancies are typically eliminated by duplicate reduc-
tion. On the other hand, redundancies among border routers may be caused by
configuring one router as a backup for another, so that the internal nodes that
route through them view them in the same way. This falls into the definition of
complementary nodes.
7.4 Summary
We present network reduction, FVR’s scalability technique for efficiently analyz-
ing BGP configurations in a sound and automated fashion. Based on a unified EPD
(extended path digraph) model of policy configurations for both specification and
analysis, we develop two reduction rules that transform a policy configuration to
a smaller one by only local inspection. We proved that the two reduction rules
(duplicate and complementary) are dual to each other, and are sound and locally
complete with respect to the safety property. Our evaluation results not only show
the benefits of reduction by scaling up safety analysis of BGP systems, but also al-
low us to gain insights into structural redundancies among Internet routing policy
configurations.
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Conclusion
8.1 Summary
This thesis centers around the application of formal methods and programming
languages techniques that enable us to create network systems that are function-
ally correct, scalable, and easy to manage. In the setting of Border Gateway Pro-
tocol (BGP), the single de-facto inter-domain routing system, the control logic and
the “brain” that inter-connects the Internet, this thesis develops FVR, to bridge the
formal reasoning and the actual configurations.
FVR’s key enabling components and techniques are as follows.
• Verifying formal network models. To free the network operators from the
manual reasoning process, FVR automates analysis on network models, by
using existing formal tools.
• Generating faithful implementations from verified models. To enforce the
verified correctness properties in the actual implementations, FVR compiles
the verified model into property-preserving distributed implementations, by
leveraging recent advances in network programming framework.
• Verifying actual network systems. To go beyond network models, FVR
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automatically analyzes real-world network systems, by combining formal
methods and network domain knowledge.
• Scalability techniques for analysis. To scale up formal analysis, FVR in-
cludes a novel scalability techniques – network reduction, by exploring the
networking problem space.
8.2 Future Directions
Building on my research experience in formal verification of today’s inter-domain
routing systems, an interesting future direction of research is to ease network man-
agement in software-defined networks (SDN) and virtual networks through the
use of formal synthesis.
In order to lower the barriers to innovation in the network, and to accommo-
date multi-tenants and the incremental deployments of new techniques, new net-
work techniques such as SDN and network virtualization are emerging. I envi-
sion that, these promising techniques, while still early in their stages, can benefit
from formal synthesis — a systematic way that shortens the development cycles of
new solutions, and guarantees formal correctness. In both scenarios for software-
defined network and virtual networks, a driving synthesis task is network migra-
tion.
8.2.1 Software-Defined Network
SDN aims for new solutions for future network architecture, leading to network
with flexibility (e.g. programmable), ease of management (e.g. reconfiguration, mi-
gration), rapid development (e.g. network virtualization), and multi-tenants (e.g.
network virtualization). The key enabling technique of SDN is to decouple control
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decision and actual forwarding — the large number of switches that perform for-
warding actions are configured by one (or multiple) separate logically centralized
controller through communication specified by the openflow protocol [55].
The killer application for SDN is network virtualization, a collection of promis-
ing techniques ranging from resource allocation to network slice/isolation, pro-
posed and deployed at different network layers. A common theme in network
virtualization is to allocate and map the physical network infrastructure (network
equipments) into virtual slices for end-to-end logical services. Hence, network
virtualization can be viewed as an effective way to accommodate multi-tenants,
granting them individual virtual slices on one single physical infrastructure.
8.2.2 Formal Synthesis for Software-Defined Networks
The new trends in software-defined networks, while directly impacting current
networking practice and research, also promise new opportunities for adopting
formal methods. The logical controller, which maintains a global view of the en-
tire network, is more amenable to formal methods in a distributed setting. More-
over, the openflow protocol, used by the controller and switches to communicate,
serves as a general abstraction for management and new applications deployment.
I envision that this “general abstraction layer” also provides the foundation for a
unified formal synthesis framework. I plan to develop a general formal synthesis
framework, and as proof of concept, to synthesize the control configurations that
realize a given high-level policy.
On the other, I envision that the multi-tenancy in virtual networks maps natu-
rally into compositional synthesis. The core of the methodology is to decompose
the multi-tenancy virtual network allocation/management task under “global” in-
frastructure constraints into (potentially overlapping) a collection of individual
synthesis tasks. Each individual synthesis task seeks to manage the virtual slice
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for a particular tenant subjecting to the tenant’s “local” slice policy. These individ-
ual synthesis tasks, while solved in isolation with one another, when put together,
should also satisfy the global infrastructure constraints. Moreover, the modular-
ity nature of compositional synthesis also makes its application more flexible. For
example, the network operators may perform compositional synthesis for a partic-
ular tenant on a fraction of the network without affecting the rest of the tenants or
infrastructure.
Driving Task: Network Migration While targeting network management in software-
defined virtual networks, I plan to use network migration as the common driving
management task. Example network migration task includes moving a collection
of virtual node in virtual networks while conforming to the global infrastructure
constraints (e.g. substrate node capacity and link bandwidth), and updating a set
of configuration rules in software-defined networks while enforcing the high-level
security policy.
I choose network migration as the driving synthesis goal for two reasons: First,
network migration is an critical management to accommodate planned or unex-
pected changes; Second, there is a common theme in network migration that is
amenable to synthesis — figure out a “proper” ordering to perform a series of
atomic network updates. The ordering is crucial to maintain or satisfy network
constraints during all transient states in the migration. While software-defined vir-
tual networks ease each atomic updates, e.g. one move of virtual node, or update
of a single control rule, it is still an open question regarding the updating ordering.
To this end, I propose a formal synthesis approach that formulates migration as a
reachability problem from the initial network state to the target final one.
As a proof of concept, for configuration migration in software-defined net-
works, I will use model checkers to logically synthesize an update ordering that
preserves the high-level policy in all transient states. Moving forward, I will de-
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velop a compositional synthesis framework for migration in virtual networks. The
framework will enable network operators to manage various migration tasks in-
cluding (1) migrations that are restricted to a single network slice that does not
overlap with other slices, (2) migrations that occur in a slice that overlaps with
others, and (3) migrations that occur across network slices.
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A.1 Inconsistent Policy Configuration
Inconsistent policy preference within a node can occur, of the form p1 ≺ p2, · · · pk−1 ≺
pk, pi ≺ p1. Inconsistent policy preference at a single node can cause route oscilla-
tion and make the BGP system unsafe.
Figure A.1: A policy configuration, known to suffer oscillation due to inconsistent
configuration (cyclic preference arcs) within a single node.
An example unsafe configuration is shown on the left of Figure A.1, originally
presented in [21]. The right hand shows that its EPD contains a cycle, which is
illustrates the problematic preference configuration at node 1.
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The inconsistent policy preference is un-desirable and can be avoided by per-
forming local check within a node. Therefore, this paper focuses on unsafety
caused by conflicting policies across nodes and assumes the inconsistent policies
have been prevented.
A.2 Properties of Network Reduction
A.2.1 Duality
Theorem 19. a. If all the nodes in Nfrom can be merged into one node by (multiple steps
of) complementary reductions, then u and v must be duplicate. b. If all the nodes in Nto
can be merged into one node by (multiple steps of) duplicate reductions, then u and v must
be complementary.
Proof. Part a may be proved as shown in Figure A.2 (a). After all nodes in Nfrom
(left-most EPD) are merged to x (the middle EPD), nodes u and v are duplicate,
since they satisfy the criteria of Definition 12. Part b can be proved in the same
way.
Figure A.2: Relate duplicate and complementary reduction
A.2.2 Soundness
Our main soundness result is that the reductions preserve the presence or absence
of cycles in the EPD. From Theorem 7, this means that the reduced EPD has the
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same safety and robustness properties as the original. In the following, let G be
the original EPD, containing nodes u and v which are merged (by duplicate or
complementary reduction) to a single node w in the reduced EPD G′.
Figure A.3: Lemma 2: Case (a.2) and (b) None of Nfrom are on a cycle; Case (c.1)
Some of Nfrom and u, v are in the cycle, and at least one of those in Nfrom is in Γ−(u)
and Γ−(v); Case(c.2) Same as (c.1) except that no nodes in Nfrom are both in Γ−(u)
and Γ−(v).
Duplicate Reduction Preserves Cyclicity
Lemma 2. If G rewrites to G′ by duplicate reduction, then (1) G is cyclic implies G′ is
cyclic, and (2) G is acyclic implies G′ is acyclic.
Proof. For (1), we construct a cycle c′ in G′ for any cycle c in G. The duplicate
rewrite from G to G′ is defined on u,v and Nfrom, and the proof proceeds by case
analysis of whether any of these nodes are on c.
Case (a) None of the nodes in Nfrom are on c. Consider two sub-cases: (a.1) Nfrom =
∅when u and v have no common upstream neighbor. Regardless of whether u or v
is on c, a cycle c′ in G′ is constructed from c by the global rewrite c[u, v 7→ w]. (a.2)
Nfrom 6= ∅. We know u and v cannot be on c either, as then one of the upstream
nodes from Nfrom would be on c too. Merging u and v will not affect c, and c′ is
obtained by c[u, v 7→ w] (Figure A.3 (a)).
Case (b) Some of the nodes in Nfrom, but neither of u and v, are on c. As in case
(a.1), c′ can be constructed from c by c[u, v 7→ w].
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Case (c) A subset of Nfrom (call it X), and u and v, are on c. Consider two sub-
cases: (c.1) Some of Nfrom, u and v are on c, and at least one of those in Nfrom is an
upstream neighbor of both u and v. On the cycle, x must be the last element in X ,
shown in Figure A.3 (b). After merging u and v, they are replaced by w in c′. The
rest of the changes in c′ are obtained by c[u, v 7→ w]. Note that the presence of arcs
between u and v will not affect the result, represented by the line between u and v
in the figure. (c.2) Some of Nfrom, u and v are on c, and none of those in Nfrom are
upstream neighbors of both u and v. There must exist at least two nodes x and x′
in c, shown in Figure A.3 (c). After merging u and v, c is broken into two cycles.
Pick either for c′.
Part (2) is proved via the contrapositive: if G′ is cyclic then G is cyclic. The
proof is similar to that of (1): for any cycle c in G′, we construct a cycle c′ in G.
Consider the two cases:
Case (a) None of the nodes in Nfrom are on c. There are two sub-cases: (a.1) Nfrom =
∅. Regardless of whether w is on c, in the preimage, a cycle c′ must exist inGwhere
w replaces either u or v. (a.2) Nfrom 6= ∅. In this case, w cannot be on c. In the
preimage G, where w is split into u and v, the cycle is still present. (Note that we
only depict one possible splitting here.)
Case (b) Some x in Nfrom, but not w, is on c. The proof is similar to that of case (a.1).
Case (c) At least one x in Nfrom, and w, are on c. In the preimage, there are two
cycles, one through u and the other through v (but which are otherwise identical).
Complementary Reduction Preserves Cyclicity
Lemma 3. If G rewrites to G′ by complementary reduction, then G is cyclic implies G′ is
cyclic.
Proof. Proof by case analysis, for any cycle c in G, consider whether u, v are on it.
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Case (1) Neither u nor v is in the cycle. Merging u, v does not affect cycle, shown
on the left of Figure A.4.
Case (2) Either u or v is in the cycle. Then according to complementary reduction
definition, consider two sub-cases: (2.1) shown on the right of Figure A.4, if a
common downstream neighbor x of u, v is also on c, then after merging u, v, c
transforms to a new cycle c′ where u is replaced byw. (2.2) If none of u, v’s common
neighbor is on c, c′ can still be constructed similarly.
Case (3) Both u and v is in the cycle, as shown in Figure A.5. Regardless whether
some of u, v’s common downstream neighbor (the figure depicts the case where
such a common neighbor is x), after merging u, v, cycle c transforms to two cycles
in G′.
Figure A.4: Proof sketch of Lemma 3: Case 1 (left) and Case 2.1 (right).
Figure A.5: Proof sketch of Lemma 3: Case 3.
Lemma 4. If G rewrites to G′ by complementary reduction, then G is acyclic implies G′
is acyclic.
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Proof. Prove the dual statement: If G′ is cyclic, then G is also cyclic. Proof by case
analysis. For any c inG′, assumeG′ is obtained fromG by merging complementary
nodes u, v into w.
Case (1) If w is not on c, as shown in the left of Figure A.6. Obviously, reversing
the reduction by splitting w into u, v does not affect the cycle.
Case (2) If w is on the cycle of G′, as shown in Figure A.6. Then at least one of the
downstream neighbor x is also on c. Reversing the reduction by splitting u, v will
split c into two cycles in the original G.
Figure A.6: Proof sketch of Lemma 4, Case 1 (left), and Case 2 (right).
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